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This dissertation is comprised of three essays on real property tax administration and related 
state-local fiscal relations. All three essays exploit variation in state policies as natural 
experiments to study the various features of the property tax system. 
The first essay examines how county governments respond to a state policy that reduced 
counties' share of state Medicaid costs, in a state where counties are mandated to financially 
contribute to the state program. The key motivation of this study is to understand the 
consequences of a change in the way a large public insurance program is co-financed by 
different levels of governments. This paper intends to fill the gap in the literature by providing 
empirical evidence on how local governments respond to a sudden decrease instead of an 
increase in the outlay of a large mandatory spending category. Utilizing the plausibly exogenous 
decline in county Medicaid spending in New York between 2005 and 2006, I estimate its impact 
on various fiscal outcomes including non-Medicaid budget and effective property tax rate, by 
using difference-in-differences and event study estimators. I find no income effect on other 
spending but evidence of significant property tax relief among affected counties in New York. 
The findings suggests that reallocation of limited state and local resources or fiscal responsibility 
through changes in cost sharing may have spill-over effects on local fiscal decisions.  
The other two essays examine the effects of two key institutional elements of the real property 
tax on the cost and outcome of property assessment – the size of tax assessment jurisdictions and 
the length of property assessment cycles. The second essay estimates the returns to scale in 
property assessment. This essay focuses on tax assessing jurisdictions in New York that unified 
assessing functions with neighbors, forming a coordinated unit in response to state aid. Using a 
cost function framework, this essay tests whether merging assessing functions among assessing 
jurisdictions leads to cost savings. We employ multiple instruments to address the potential 
selection bias of each jurisdiction's decision to form a coordinated unit. The instruments are 
based on spatial intersection across jurisdiction boundaries and the history of inter-municipal 
cooperation among neighboring jurisdictions. 
The third essay examines the effect of regular, short cycles on assessment performance, by using 
two separate case studies of assessing jurisdictions in a representative strong "dillon state", 
Virginia and a strong "home rule" state, New York. Outdated property assessment is widely 
believed to undermine equity and cost efficiency in administering the property tax. This essay 
first tests the effect of frequent mass appraisal on assessment uniformity, using exogenous 
variations in the timing of reassessment across assessing jurisdictions in Virginia. Then it 
examines whether more frequent (consecutive annual reassessment, in particular) leads to 
improvement in horizontal equity among assessing jurisdictions in New York, employing two 
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This paper aims to advance empirical understanding about local fiscal responses to an 
intergovernmental fiscal policy that changes the way two levels of governments share the costs 
of a large public social insurance program. New York State passed a legislation in 2005 to cap 
the growth of county-level Medicaid spending, which abruptly decreased county Medicaid outlay 
in relative and absolute terms. This paper exploits a discontinuity in county Medicaid outlay to 
analyze the impact of the relief mandate on county budgets and property tax levies. This study  
helps to fill a gap in the literature on how local governments respond to a sudden decrease 
instead of an increase in the outlay of a large mandatory spending category, which could 
potentially lead to property tax relief. I find compositional change but no income effect on non-
Medicaid spending. The results show that effective property tax rate is lower by 6.6 to 8.1% on 
average among affected New York counties after enactment of the cap policy, relative to 
comparison counties. This essay contributes to the empirical literature on the various indirect 
channels for property tax relief. 
 
JEL codes: H5, H7 
Keywords:   Intergovernmental fiscal relation, Local fiscal behavior, Medicaid, Property tax 








What are the consequences of a higher-level government's policy decision to abate the lower 
level government's share of financing a large public insurance program? One of the major 
concerns of intergovernmental relations in a federal system is understanding how certain changes 
in the way sub-national governments at different levels share costs of providing public services 
may affect their fiscal behaviors. This paper specifically studies the fiscal responses of local 
governments when the New York State government in the United States reduced the local burden 
to finance Medicaid, a public health insurance program for the poor, in 2005. The primary 
rationales of the 2005 Medicaid cap legislation were to relieve county governments from the 
fiscal stress to deal with strained budgets and to prevent them from cutting back local spending 
in response to growing Medicaid costs. There are mainly two reasons why this policy needs to be 
examined.   
The public finance literature is relatively long on the consequences of an increase in one 
spending category at the expense of other categories. However, little is known about how local 
governments respond when there is a sudden decrease in local spending in a large spending 
category, as opposed to an increase, which is what happened when the New York (NY) state 
enacted a local Medicaid mandate relief in 2005. As fiscal constraints start to bite harder, the 
pressure to pay for expensive entitlement programs such as Medicaid grow for governments at 
all levels, but particularly for local governments that have the most limited tax base. Like other 
entitlement programs, Medicaid is continuously expanding and in fact the fastest growing 
component of state and local government budget. Previous research debates the extent to which 
State Medicaid crowds out other programs such as K-12 public education (Berry and Lowery 
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1990; Baicker 2005). Although downsizing an entitlement program is generally considered as 
politically infeasible, it is still important to understand the consequences of such policy change in 
an era of retrenchment.  
Second, Medicaid is largely funded by the federal and state governments and 
administered by the states, but in some states, local governments play a considerable role. More 
than half of the state governments in the U.S. require localities to financially contribute to the 
state Medicaid program. Among those states, New York requires the highest level of local 
contribution from its localities. NY is also an interesting case to study since it has a generous 
Medicaid program and relatively high local property tax rate when compared to its neighboring 
states1. Thus, how to lower local tax burden while maintaining an expensive Medicaid program 
in a financially sustainable way is an imminent policy concern that requires scrutiny.  
The local fiscal responses to this 2005 mandate relief policy will be analyzed in two steps: 
The primary step to understanding the potential impact on property tax relief is to see how 
spending on other categories changed immediately after the cap policy was enacted. The first 
research question raised in this paper is the following: (1) What happens when there is an 
exogenous decrease instead of an increase in Medicaid spending and what bearings it may have 
on the provision of other public services. By studying this reverse case of budgetary crowd out, 
we can check the asymmetry in the budgetary tradeoff, which has been neglected in the existing 
literature. A government's decision to increase spending in one category may simply lead to 
compositional changes at the expense of other public programs, while not affecting the total 
budget to avoid raising the tax rate. However, part of the existing scholarship on the flypaper 
effect suggest that intergovernmental grants are likely to encourage aid recipients to expand their 
                                                          
1 In 2017, New York State had the highest Medicaid liability, which amounted to 27 billion US dollars (Office of the New York 
State Comptroller 2018). 
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budgets which often creates the need to increase own source revenue. If we can treat state-
mandated reduction in mandatory spending as a variant of a state grant, it is meaningful to 
analyze how the NY counties respond to the mandate relief policy. In terms of budgetary 
response, they can either simply redirect their limited resources to other programs within their 
existing budget constraint, or they can increase their total outlay; a phenomenon which can be 
akin to flypaper effect. Depending on their budgetary decisions, they can either choose to 
provide tax relief to local taxpayers or increase tax levy to finance their expanded budget. By 
construction, property tax may play a balancing role in the local budgeting process. This leads to 
the second question raised in this research: (2) Did the 2005 Medicaid mandate relief policy 
lower county-level property tax burden in New York?  
This paper first analyzes whether a sudden decrease in one spending category led to 
changes in expenditure on other programs using event study framework. Then this study checks 
whether the policy generated a reduction in effective property tax rate (ETR) at the county level.  
Using variations across counties within NY State and then comparing NY counties against 
counties from comparable states with a difference-in-differences estimator, this paper reports 
evidence of local property tax relief caused by Medicaid mandate relief. This study suggests that 
certain changes in the way state and local government reallocate their resources to fund an 
expensive public program may lead to property tax relief.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 The first step is to understand how the governments affected by the mandate relief change 
their budgetary decisions when there is a sudden decrease in one large expenditure item. The 
second step is to assess the impact on property tax relief.  
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2.1 Budgetary Trade-off 
 In regard to the first question, early scholarship on public budgeting separated politics 
from budgets and demonstrated that each expenditure item is independent of each other, as they 
should be (Wildavsky 1964; Dye 1966). Since the 1980s, political scientists started to counter 
this view, underlining that budget decisions intrinsically reflect political competition and policy 
priorities (Natchez and Bupp 1973; Garand 1985; Schick 1988; Alt and Lowery 2000; 
Nicholson-Crotty et al. 2006; Jacoby and Schneider 2001). Several scholars asked in what 
spending categories or policy area the relation between politics and budgeting would be the 
strongest (Garand and Hendrick, 1991; Jacoby and Schneider, 2001). Schick (2000), in his 
depiction of the American federal budget, argues that the American federal budget is set up in a 
way that entitlement and defense obligations crowd out discretionary spending in other 
categories.    
A number of studies analyze the extent to which an increase in either health or education 
spending crowds out the other since these two are the largest spending categories at the state and 
local level (Domke et al. 1983). In the Medicaid literature, Baicker (2005) shows that additional 
mandated increase in Medicaid expenditure crowds out other public welfare spending.  Several 
other commentators, on the contrary, have suggested that health spending is relatively immune to 
budget-cuts (Berry and Lowery 1990; Coughlin et al. 1994)2.  
Although this paper addresses a similar question of crowd-out or spillover effect on other 
spending, it mainly analyzes the behavioral responses of a slightly different event. The question 
is what happens when there is an exogenous decrease instead of an increase in Medicaid 
                                                          
2 Coughlin and his colleagues (1994) find that state governments are reluctant to enact large-scale cuts in Medicaid 
spending and instead seek for alternative budgetary actions including incremental program cutbacks; constraining other spending; 
shifting fiscal burden to the federal government and ultimately raising state tax rates.   
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spending and what bearings it may have on other expenditure. While the general concern is how 
increasing burden of entitlement programs impose fiscal stress on governments and diminishes 
their discretionary budget, we know little of what happens when there is a sudden decrease in 
obligatory spending.  
In which direction other discretionary budgets might change, as a response to a reduction 
in a major obligatory spending category is rather ambiguous. There are four possible scenarios 
for county governments' budgetary decisions. In the first scenario, there could be no change in 
other spending except for Medicaid and thus, lowering total spending. Alternatively, there could 
be either no change or increase in total spending, depending on how much the recipient 
governments augment other discretionary budgets. In the fourth scenario, county governments 
may cut other discretionary budgets as well, should they feel the need to undertake fiscal 
consolidation3. In this paper, we would expect to find evidence in support of the second or third 
scenario. In other words, it is likely that the county governments may substitute away from 
Medicaid and simply reallocate their limited resources to other direct services, which would be a 
mere compositional change without dramatically changing the total current services budget. 
However, depending on how much the counties decide to utilize the fiscal space generated by the 
cap policy, there could be a simple substitution effect. 
This paper examines the impact of state mandate relief, which may or may not have 
similar effect as a direct grant. The 2005 Medicaid cap policy reduced the amount of Medicaid 
cost each county government was mandated to pay back to the state government. This creates 
fiscal space among the affected county governments, which can lead to responses analogous to 
                                                          
3 Although this could be accompanied by income effect in theory, the amount that counties spend from their general 




those from an increase in grant receipt. In response, the counties that benefit from this policy 
may either choose to increase their total operational budget and accordingly raise their own 
source revenue 4 . In the absence of such response, on the other hand, there might be no 
significant increase in the total outlay. If there is also no substitution effect between Medicaid 
and other public spending, total spending could even decrease which may provide an opportunity 
for reducing own-source revenue and providing property tax relief, in particular.  
 
2.2 Direct and Indirect Property Tax Relief 
  In the public finance literature, there are two types of state-initiated property tax relief 
programs. A direct type explicitly targets lowering property tax burden as the primary policy 
goal, while an indirect type has unintended or indirect spillover effects on local property tax 
(Duncombe and Yinger 2001). Among the latter, the most extensively studied cases are state aids 
provided to local governments. The most traditional equivalence literature suggested that some 
state intergovernmental aids have a similar impact on lowering the tax burden of median 
taxpayers as state-funded property tax cuts (Bradford and Oates 1971). Duncombe and Yinger 
(2000) find that state aid leads to property tax cuts, ultimately relieving tax burden among local 
voters in the State of New York. Nguyen-Hoang and Hou (2013) also report that grant receiving 
municipalities in another American state, Massachusetts, did not provide property tax relief when 
there was a significant cut in state aid between 2008 and 2009. The authors find that the 
municipalities opted for financing capital projects or saving for future liabilities in response to 
grant cuts. 
                                                          
4 This would be unlikely when there is sufficient interstate competition that works as a constraint on public spending, 
assuming Tiebout's logic of private firms and individuals "voting with their feet." Ceteris paribus, firms would avoid moving to 
or move from areas with higher tax rates to fund generous redistributive social programs. Therefore sub-national governments 
will refrain from becoming welfare magnets and compete with each other to keep their level of social benefits low4 (Besley and 
Case 1995; Thompson 2012). Citizens tend to assess whether the local governments are wasting their tax money which constrains 
the size of government spending and restricts the growth of a revenue-maximizing Leviathan.  
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Another case of an intergovernmental fiscal policy that may indirectly affect local 
property tax is a takeover of what previously used to be local spending responsibilities by the 
higher level government. One example is a study by Olmsted and his colleagues (1993) that 
examines state aid in the form of a retirement of debt issues that were expected to affect fiscal 
behaviors of local school districts in Missouri State. They found that debt retirement that allowed 
school districts to no longer pay the state government with regular interest payments, did not lead 
to tax cuts but increased operating budgets. This paper intends to fill the gap in the literature by 
analyzing another variant case of an intergovernmental policy that may have an indirect effect on 
fiscal behaviors among lower-level governments, in a federal system. 
 
3. Medicaid Local Mandate in New York State 
 The U.S. federal government allows each state government to run the state Medicaid 
program, a public health insurance program for the poor, at their discretion. As long as the state 
governments abide by the federal requirements, the federal government reimburses half of the 
total Medicaid costs to each state.  22 states cover the other half of the total costs from own 
source revenue; New York State is one among 19 states that require the local governments to pay 
a certain share of the non-federal costs5. New York State included a local share mandate that 
required county governments to share the burden in 1966 when the state government first 
enacted the Medicaid program. The local share requirement was initially 50 percent of non-
federal Medicaid costs and 25 percent of the total cost. While New York state government has a 
long history of sharing costs to provide public services with its localities, an across-the-board 
                                                          
5  There are 28 states in total where local governments share the burden of non-federal Medicaid costs, with or 
without a state mandate of local requirement. 
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reallocation of funding responsibility was a more recent event6. Facing fiscal burden induced by 
increasing Medicaid costs and limited tax base, counties began to complain against the even 
division of responsibility for financing Medicaid7. Such movement in the political arena was 
soon translated into changes in the state government's decision over funding Medicaid.  
In response to the rising complaints from local governments, the NY state government 
established a cap on counties' share of total Medicaid expenditure that applies universally to all 
counties in the state fiscal year 2005. First, the state fully took over local contribution to Family 
Health Plus program, which is a Medicaid expansion program, effectively completed by 2006. 
More importantly, the state capped county share of Medicaid spending at each county's 2005 
baseline costs estimated by the State, which would be adjusted by a certain annual growth rate 
set by the statute (Part C of Chapter 58 of the Laws of 2005)8. The statute also set the growth 
rate to be adjusted by uncompounded trend factors: The rates were 3.5 percent in 2006, 3.25 
percent in 2007 and 3 percent each year from 2008 onwards until 20139. All exceeding costs that 
go above the growth rate were to be covered by the state government. The state also relieved the 
counties of existing liabilities for Medicaid in 2005 under the accrual accounting system. In the 
original system, counties had to set up reserve funds to pay for Medicaid services expected to be 
provided in a given year but not paid until the next calendar year. From 2005, the state converted 
the accounting methodology to a cash-based accounting system, where the counties started to 
budget their Medicaid expenses in the year of payment instead of the year of service provision.  
                                                          
6 State policymakers gradually corrected the local share arrangement during the 1980s. Yet, there was no 
fundamental policy to adjust the local share across all services until the mid-2000 (Bachrach and Burghardt 2006). 
7 Especially, since the enactment of the Family Health Plus, which was a part of the Health Care Reform 
Act (HCRA) in 2000, local fiscal burden rose considerably. 
8 The 2005 baseline costs are estimated primarily using 2004 data using individualized worksheets 
provided by the State to each county (Birnbaum 2010). The capped amounts are expected to be paid by counties to 
the state government in weekly installments starting from calendar year 2006. In New York, each state fiscal year 
runs from April 1st until March 31st. The cap was effective from January 2006 calendar year, which is 2005 state 
fiscal year. 
9 The growth rate was capped at 2 percent for 2013-2014, according to the NY State annual reports. 
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This created one-time positive net savings to a majority of counties in 200510. This 
savings is partially offset by elimination of accrued revenue receivables in 2005 which used to be 
typically paid by the state to counties at the end of each year for Medicaid recoveries and 
reimbursement for mentally disabled. The net effect of the expenditure and revenue accrual 
closeout process and cap of future growth rate led to positive savings for 45 counties between 
2005 and 2006. However, there were twelve counties that did not experience a  reduction in 
Medicaid expenditure after 2005. These counties may not have been affected by the cap policy, 
either because the growth in their Medicaid spending was less than the capped growth rate or 
experienced a greater loss in revenue accruals, because they used to spend more on the mentally 
disabled than other Medicaid programs where they could have benefited from expenditure 
accrual. Either way, the reason why the 12 counties did not benefit from the cap policy is 
exogenous to the counties' fiscal behaviors. I use the variations between 45 affected and 12 
unaffected counties as part of the identification strategy in the within-NY analysis. 
 The direct intermediary effect of the statute on affected NY counties is a reduction in 
local Medicaid outlay, both in absolute and relative terms11. As shown in Figure 1 - Panel A and 
Panel B, introduction of the Medicaid spending cap immediately led to a sharp fall in counties' 
share of Medicaid spending in 2005 12. In addition to a noticeable discontinuity in average 
county-level Medicaid spending in 2005, the slope also changes after the cap is implemented, as 
illustrated in Panels A and B. The increasing trend in county portion of Medicaid cost is reversed 
                                                          
10 Also, from 2008, counties have the options to either continue paying the capped amount that grows at maximum 
three percent or to get rid of the burden to fund Medicaid altogether while swapping a portion of their local sales tax revenue with 
the State.  As of 2011, only Monroe County elected this sales tax swap option.  
11 The highest drop in Medicaid spending in 2005 was found in the Counties of Delaware, Erie, and Essex. There also 
were several counties (Hamilton; Putnam; Tioga and Tompkins) that did not experience any fall in Medicaid spending in that 
year, mainly since their average Medicaid expenditure were below the baseline cap.  
12 The cost-sharing ratio varies by subprograms: The State and local governments each evenly divided the non-federal 
share for acute care services; while, the State covered 40 percent, and localities covering the remaining 10 percent for the non-
federal cost of long-term care services.  
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after 2005 which coincides with the period when the NY state government enacted the Medicaid 
cap legislation. The empirical contribution of this paper is to understand the consequences of this 
particular local mandate relief, by focusing on the impacts of the abrupt decrease in local 
Medicaid spending.  
 After adoption of the cap policy, the price for Medicaid spending above the capped limit 
at the county level essentially became zero. In a typical case, one can expect county's 
maximizing behaviors of increasing Medicaid provision, that may offset the impact on other 
types of spending. However, there is no evidence of such price effect on Medicaid spending, due 
to the limited role of county governments in administering Medicaid. The generosity of Medicaid 
in NY is mostly (almost entirely) determined by the State and the counties do not play an 
important role that would affect the level of Medicaid outlay. The counties have some discretion 
in processing applications and monitoring enrollment and utilization. Perhaps they could become 
more lenient in admitting Medicaid applicants after the policy enactment. However, the extent to 
which this could translate into an increase in Medicaid outlay is very limited. Panel B in Figure 2 
shows that the average count of Medicaid enrollment across all counties in New York is in fact 
declining between 2005 and 2008. In addition, the county governments may not have the strong 
incentives to expand Medicaid should they fear becoming welfare magnets, as suggested by 
inter-jurisdictional competition in the public finance literature. Although we find no increase in 
Medicaid spending, the combination of income and substitution effect may lead to changes in 






4.  Sample and Data 
 The unit of analysis in this study is county governments. The first part of the analysis 
exploits the heterogeneity across 57 upstate counties within the New York State, which will later 
become the treated group in the difference-in-differences analysis. The treated group excludes 
five counties in New York City, which are outliers in terms of the level of Medicaid spending 
and the role of county governments13. The final sample covers 10 years from 2001 to 2010: The 
sample years are limited to the period before 2011 when the state enacted a property tax cap on 
local governments, which may conflate the effects on property tax relief14. 
All revenue and expenditure data on New York counties are from the Open Book 
annually published by the New York Comptroller's Office. The state total Medicaid expenditure 
data are from the Annual State Expenditure Report from the National Association of State 
Budget Officers (NASBO).  Local property tax rate data is collected from the New York State 
Office of Real Property Tax Services (ORPTS). The county-only-ETR is calculated by using real 
assessed value tax rates and multiplying this figure by local equalization rates, which is 
equivalent to assessment ratio calculated by the state15. Property tax levy and tax rate data are 
reported by individual local governments through schedules of real property taxes and 
assessments (MA-144) to the state, while local equalization rates are computed by the New York 
State Office of Real Property Tax Services16.  Table 1 and 2 provides summary statistics of the 
observable characteristics of counties within New York State. 
                                                          
13 Monroe County, is the only county that chose the sales tax intercept option as an alternative option to abiding by the 
Medicaid spending cap. This option was provided since 2008 and there is a three-year difference, between the treatment year. 
Although this is not expected to affect the short-term impact of treatment, it may affect the 𝛽𝛽3 estimates. Monroe is dropped from 
the final sample; however, the reported estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of Monroe County.  
14 Each year refers to county fiscal year, which is the calendar year. These years are the year when the county 
government establishes an assessment roll for levying property tax and not the tax levy year.  
15 The NY state has been using the median sales ratio since 1992 to calculate state equalization rate. 
16 Counties, towns, cities as well as school district in the state of New York collect property tax. 
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In the second analyses using difference in differences, a larger sample was incorporated. I 
use various subgroups of comparison units from a larger pool of 1,309 counties in 21 states that 
maintained local Medicaid requirement and  1,117 counties in 19 states that had no property tax 
levy or rate limitations. Property tax levy per capita from the Annual Survey of State and Local 
Government Finances is used as the alternative measure of the dependent variable. Annual 
housing price index provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency is also used to control for 
the fluctuations in the housing market. 
In the following analysis, I use ETR of counties from seven states outside of New York 
that were unaffected by the NY cap policy as the counterfactual. County-level effective property 
tax rate data was collected separately from each state's department of taxation or comptroller’s 
office. Median assessment sales ratio data for each state was collected to calculate the county-
only real effective property tax rate. The seven comparison states were selected based on the 
administrative role the county governments plays, such as levying the property tax as in New 
York17. We also exclude states that do not provide data on county-level property tax rate or have 
data that are incomparable to that of New York from the pool of potential control states. The 
seven comparative states included in the final sample are Maryland, New Jersey, Iowa, Virginia, 
Kentucky, Tennessee and Georgia18. In the final balanced panel sample for the second analysis, 
584 counties are in the control group and 45 New York counties are in the treated group.  
Data for covariates such as median household income, population and poverty rate are 
from the U.S. Census, while county unemployment rate data is from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Also, one should note that each year (unless labeled as state fiscal year or calendar 
                                                          
17 . For instance, Connecticut and Rhode Island are excluded since these states do not have county-equivalent 
jurisdictions. 
18 Some states provided the countywide total that includes overlapping municipal areas while others provided county-
only nominal property tax levy. The seven states included here report the real property tax rate for unincorporated and non-
municipal county-only areas excluding school or special districts. 
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year) indicates the end of a fiscal year the county governments were surveyed.19 One of the 
concerns about using counties from other states as the comparison group would be the 
heterogeneity in the pressures of growing Medicaid costs and generosity. While Medicaid 
expenditure for other counties outside NY is not employed in the main analysis, it is worth 
mentioning that the trend in total state Medicaid spending was stable during the post period. 
Parental Medicaid income threshold which is used as a key eligibility criterion for Medicaid is 
also included to account for the heterogeneity in state's generosity for providing Medicaid 
(Hamersma & Kim, 2013)20.  Tables 2 provides a summary statistics of the variables included in 
the final sample using variation across states. 
 
5. Empirical Identification Strategy 
5.1 Spillover Effects on Other Spending: Empirical Models 
This study takes advantage of the fact that the sudden drop in county Medicaid spending 
between 2005 and 2006 in NY State is exogenous to the fiscal decisions made by the county 
governments. County residents and legislators had long been filing complaints about increasing 
Medicaid costs crowding out limited resources for other public goods and services at the county 
level, such as community colleagues and highways. Therefore it is worthwhile to investigate 
whether the state policy of capping local Medicaid spending can relieve local fiscal burden by 
moderating cutbacks in public spending or lowering the need to increase the tax rate.  
Ideally, the current services budget should be balanced, i.e. total outlay should match with total 
revenue in the general fund account. Next year's total expenses are expected to be covered by 
                                                          
19 For instance, the 2007 data was collected between July in the calendar year 2006 and June 2007.  
20 Parental Medicaid eligibility threshold steadily increased in New York while remaining stable on average in other seven states. 
One case of State Medicaid expansion is in Iowa, where the monthly parental threshold for Medicaid increased from $1,065 to 
$1,268 per household in 2007. 
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projected revenue particularly at the local level, where the governments have limited resource to 
draw upon such as taxing, saving or borrowing. While the total revenue and expenditure trend 
converges over most of the sample period, there is a small surplus created between 2005 and 
2006. The main objective of the first analysis is to empirically test the presence of substitution 
effect due to this surplus. In other words, I test whether spending in other categories changes 
before and after the cap policy among the affected counties, relative to changes in the same 
outcome among an appropriate control group. The treated group in this analysis are 45 counties 
that actually experienced negative growth in Medicaid spending after 2005. The 12 counties that 
did not benefit from the Medicaid mandate relief policy are used as the control group in the 
primary analysis using county-level variation within New York State21. 
I assess impacts on total non-Medicaid spending, debt and reserve fund balance. Total 
spending excluding Medicaid, debt and reserve balance are measured in both annual growth rate 
and per capita amount(in 2010 constant dollars). To further examine whether there were 
budgetary spillover effects on each spending category, I use category specific expenditure 
measured by annual growth rate, per capita level of expenditure, and share of total expenditure as 
the dependent variables. The budgetary spill-over effects will be analyzed using the following 
equation, 
Y c,t =  𝛼𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)≠−1 𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) +  𝐗𝐗c,t𝛤𝛤+δc +λ𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀c,t     (1)              
           
where 𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) is an indicator of lead and lag from the first year of reassessment for each county c 
in year t. The omitted time period is 2005 or one calendar year before the policy was 
                                                          
21 These unaffected counties are Monroe; Hamilton; Putnam; Tioga; Tompkins; Allegany; Erie; Lewis; Onondaga; Rensselaer; 
Westchester and Wyoming. 
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implemented.  𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) is an index of periods relative to the start of annual reassessment and period 
0 indicates the first year when the counties were effectively affected by the cap policy. We 
would expect the spending reactions to occur immediately in 2006 if the budget officers of each 
administrative unit head and the governing board at the county level were well informed and 
convinced of the effectiveness of this sudden change in Medicaid budget. Given that most of the 
deliberation at the county level budgeting process happens in the latter half of county budget 
cycle — which is equivalent to a calendar year, if there is an immediate effect, such effect will 
be picked up by 𝛽𝛽0. Unless the counties choose to save the extra monies in their unreserved fund, 
which I do not find any evidence on, the spillover effect should appear immediately after the cap 
is enacted. The coefficients on the lagged indicators, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) , are the estimates of differential 
change in outcomes Y𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡  between the counties that experienced a reduction in Medicaid spending 
and those that did not relative to 2005.  
A rich set of controls are also included in the vector of predetermined covariates, 𝐗𝐗𝐜𝐜,𝐭𝐭 that 
are suspected to commonly affect changes in spending of other categories. Factors that are 
expected to commonly affect the demand for relevant public services include median household 
income, population as well as population growth rate and county poverty rate. Voter 
characteristics such as the share of female, black and population over the age of 65 from the U.S. 
Census are also included. County unemployment rate is also included to capture the local 
business cycle, and particularly to control for the potential effect of great recession22. In addition, 
state and federal aid specific to spending category are added, since the determinants of demand 
                                                          
22 As an assumption of the identification strategy for this study, a covariant balance test will be followed in order to 
confirm that the controls in 𝐗𝐗𝐜𝐜,𝐭𝐭 vary by each outcome. 
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for each public service will be different 23. County fixed effects  are included to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across counties that do not vary across time. The effect estimates may 
be biased if there are time-variant confounders specific to counties in the error term. Such factors 
may include sudden changes in county officials' policy priority and local civil movements that 
affect county-level budget decisions. However, given the infrequent turnover of local officials in 
most upstate counties, this may be less of a concern. Finally, the reported standard errors are 
bootstrapped with 1,000 iterations, which shows to be more conservative than clustering the 
standard errors at the county level, given the small number of treated and control units.  
5.2 Impact on Property Tax Relief: Empirical Models 
 New York county governments heavily rely on local property tax to finance their general 
fund expenditure24. In response to the 2005 Medicaid cap policy, county governments can either 
simply reallocate their limited resources to other spending categories or reduce property tax 
(while it is also possible that they reduce their debt or do nothing).  Assuming that I find no 
significant changes in their total spending, the county governments may adjust their own source 
revenue in response to the cap policy. I test this with both county-only and non-county 
overlapping property tax rate as the dependent variables to check if there were any noticeable 
responses in other school districts or cities unaffected by the cap policy. I follow the standard 
approach of difference in differences to test for such heterogeneous effects, using equation (2),  
yc,t =  𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 +  𝐗𝐗c,tΥ+δc +λ𝑡𝑡 + 𝑡𝑡µ𝑐𝑐 +𝜀𝜀c,t         (2) 
 where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 represents an interacted dummy of post-intervention which will be 
one for years 2006 until 2010 and affected 45 NY counties and zero for years before 2006 and 12 
                                                          
23 Intergovernmental transfers such as state aid or federal transfers with binding legal mandates may also affect 
spending level in a specific budget category which is why intergovernmental transfer is used for each category separately for 
different dependent variables.  
24 Property tax revenue accounted for 27.7% of NY counties' total own-source revenue, on average in 2010. 
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unaffected counties. Coefficient 𝜃𝜃1 indicates the slope differences between before and after the 
treatment, or whether there is an increasing or decreasing trend in spending in the particular 
category over time. The underlying idea is that each county just before and after 2006 are 
considered to be similar on average, which allows us to interpret any changes in the property tax 
rate during the post period as a consequence of the New York Medicaid cap policy.  
In addition, I use the same difference in differences and event study approaches, to see if 
there were any differences in county-level property tax rates between the treated and comparison 
group, relative to the reference period in the absence of the cap policy. The event study estimates 
are reported in Table 6 and Figure 5 that illustrates the coefficients β𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) for each sample period 
from equation (1). 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 denotes an indicator for county c being affected by the Medicaid cap 
policy in period  𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) , relative to the omitted reference year, which is one year before the 
Medicaid policy was enacted. This allows to check for the potential lagged effects of changes in 
property tax rate.   
 The potential fiscal impacts of the mandate relief may also vary across counties with 
different relative burden of Medicaid cost, relative demands for other public services, as well as 
the relative burden on its property tax levy. To account for the heterogeneity in Medicaid 
spending, I stratify the sample by growth rate of Medicaid expenditure, poverty rate and 
Medicaid enrollment, the results of which are reported in Panel B in Table 7. Through these 
subgroup analyses, we would expect to see larger property tax relief in counties that spent more 
than the median level of Medicaid expenditure than counties that spent less than the median 
amount. Similarly, we can suspect that the fiscal responses would be different between counties 
that experienced a greater decline in Medicaid spending between 2005 and 2006 than counties 
that did not benefit as much from the Medicaid cap policy. In addition to the event study analysis, 
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I also use equation (3) to check for the heterogeneity effect across counties with different amount 
of savings in Medicaid costs, 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 c,t+x =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 +  𝐗𝐗c,tΥ+δc +λ𝑡𝑡 +𝜀𝜀c,t                         (3)                                                                              
where 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙  indicates the difference in linear projection of county 
Medicaid spending in the absence of the cap and the actual expenditure. Estimate of coefficient 
𝛼𝛼1  captures how much Medicaid saving would lead to changes in ETR after the cap.  The 
effective tax rate is lagged by 1 to 3 years, following the standard approach of accounting for 
time lags in government fiscal response as well documented in the literature of public finance: 
The general idea is that there often are time lags for governments to respond to external 
macroeconomic shocks through fiscal and monetary policies. Gramlich (1987) in his seminal 
work on sub-national fiscal policies provided that there may be different types of lags — 
including a lag in recognizing the presence of a shock and the need to respond, in addition to lag 
in observing the effects of a responsive policy action. A more recent empirical study by Lutz 
(2008) found that there are two to three-year lags on average for property tax revenues to 
respond to local macroeconomic changes such as changes in housing prices. Such finding also 
seems applicable to this project since county governments may not be able to and/or willing to 
immediately change the property tax rate in response to the adoption of the Medicaid cap. 
The key challenge for this study is that we cannot observe both potential outcomes for the 
same county, before and after the adoption of Medicaid mandate relief.   The local Medicaid cap 
is a universal state policy that plausibly affects all counties in New York, which means that we 
need a reasonable comparison group of local governments that were unaffected by the policy to 
corroborate evidence for a causal argument. One of the main threats to internal validity of the 
within NY estimation is the presence of any other coincidental external event in 2006 that may 
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have unevenly affected the fiscal behaviors at the county level.  There is no such incident found 
between 2005 and 2007, so the immediate impact on both other spending and property tax rate 
may not be confounded. However, if there is a reason to believe that there might be lagged 
effects particularly on property tax rate, the NY School Foundation Aid reform and the Great 
Recession between 2007 and 2009 may be the potential confounders. Particularly in 2007, the 
New York State Education Budget and Reform Act of 2007 consolidated existing 30 school aid 
categories and streamlined the original formula to target additional aid resources to schools 
based on education needs.  According to the state's projection, the foundation aid virtually led to 
an increase in school aid by approximately $1.1 billion each year. Therefore, it is worth 
including a reasonable comparison group in order to see whether any effect on property tax rate 
during the post period are purely due to the Medicaid mandate relief and not confounded by the 
school aid reform or the financial crisis.  
Therefore, in the following analysis, I use effective property tax rate (ETR) of 
overlapping tax levying localities within a county area as the counterfactual. The NY Office of 
Real Property Tax Services annually reports both county-specific and county-wide full value 
property tax rate that are based on combination of levies across overlapping jurisdictions (city, 
town, village, school district and certain special districts) within a county-area. I first use the 
non-county ETR, i.e. the difference between county-wide property tax rate and county-specific 
property tax rate as the outcome variable using equation (1) and (2) for falsification test. Then I 
using the ETR of non-county tax levying localities within a county as the counterfactual of the 
county-specific ETR, I estimate the average treatment of the policy on the 45 affected counties at 
the county-area level with county fixed effects. 
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To test for the generalizability of the effects found in NY, I identify the impact of 
Medicaid mandate relief on property tax relief, using counties from comparable states as 
comparison units. I use two measures of outcome variable from two different datasets to utilize 
the variation across states. In the first analysis, I use property tax levy as the alternative measure 
of dependent variable and a larger pool of comparison counties. The dependent variable is 
measured as the log of properly tax levy per capita (in 2010 constant dollars) amount at the 
county level. The final sample include 1,309 counties in 21 states with Medicaid mandate. I also 
conduct subgroup analysis of 1,117 counties in 19 states with no property tax rate or levy 
limitations. 
In the third analysis, I use effective property tax rate from six states, where counties have 
the similar role in levying the property tax. Among the six states, Iowa maintained the local 
Medicaid requirement throughout the sample period, while the counties in five other states were 
never required to share state Medicaid costs until 2010. I also include New Jersey which requires 
its counties to share the operating costs for county nursing facilities. New Jersey does not allow 
counties to have direct taxing authority, but still establishes the property tax rate and conduct 
assessments. New Jersey counties are included in one of the models where the comparison units 
continue to contribute to non-federal Medicaid costs.  
For both analyses, the following equation (4) is used to estimate the property tax effect on 
the NY counties relative to various comparison counties,  
Yc,s,t =  𝜌𝜌0 + 𝜌𝜌1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 +  𝐙𝐙𝑐𝑐,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡Γ + 𝚨𝚨𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡Π +  σc + τt + 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡                  (4) 
where vector 𝐙𝐙c,t  includes county-level socio-economic variables such as county 
unemployment rate, growth in housing price, population growth, log of median household 
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income as well as demographics (share of female, black and senior population) that may affect 
demand for public services. County level fiscal variables include log of own source revenue 
excluding property tax, log of state and federal aid, log of county revenue exported to other local 
governments. In order to account for predetermined heterogeneities across states, a vector of 
time-variant state controls 𝚨𝚨𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡.  These include the growth rate of gross state product and 
dummies of industry structure (Finance, agriculture and durables) are included in the model as 
well. State Medicaid eligibility measured by parental Medicaid income threshold is also included 
to capture any state initiated expansion in Medicaid provision.  County fixed effect is also 
included to control for time-invariant differences across counties, while we also test to see if the 
results are sensitive to including state fixed effect. Year dummies are included to account for any 
unobservable heterogeneity that is common across counties in a specific year. The estimates are 
also weighted by county population. The coefficient of interest is 𝜌𝜌1, indicating the difference in 
property  tax levy per capita and effective property tax rate before and after the Medicaid 
mandate relief between counties in NY State and other comparison states. The standard errors 
are adjusted using block bootstrap estimation to correct for auto-correlation (Bertrand et al 2003). 
If there is a parallel trend in property tax between both NY and control counties before 2006, we 
can argue that the average differences in the outcome during the post period are due to the 
Medicaid mandate relief.  
 
6. Results and Discussion 
6.1 Estimates of Expenditure Spillovers 
 Table 3 shows that total spending excluding Medicaid expenditure is unchanged, as well 
as debt and reserve fund balance using an event study framework. More importantly, there are no 
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differences in total expenditure excluding Medicaid after the cap (relative to the omitted year, 
2005) among the affected NY counties relative to one year prior. This finding is robust to the 
inclusion of a comparison group within NY, i.e. 12 counties that did not benefit from the cap 
policy. This finding holds when using the level of spending measured by log of per capita 2010 
constant dollar instead of the first difference of logged values as the dependent variable.  
 
 Meanwhile, there is no evidence of significant change in borrowing behaviors,  but some 
evidence of decline in unreserved fund balance among affected NY counties in 2010, relative to 
the other NY counties that did not benefit from the mandate relief. Nonetheless, while the 
budgetary spillover effects of the mandate relief is expected to occur in the short term, we do not 
observe any short term changes in spending, borrowing or saving behaviors among affected NY 
counties. 
 Panel A in Figure 2 shows that the average annual growth rate in total spending 
excluding Medicaid was higher than total spending between 2005 and 2007. This suggest that 
counties may have decided to partially redirect extra monies generated since 2005 to provide 
other public services instead of borrowing or saving. Overall, there seem to be compositional 
changes without a significant shift in the county budget constraint right after the cap was 
implemented  
Such compositional changes are reported in Table 4 to Table 5. The single category 
where the level of spending significantly declined in budget in the year of policy enactment is 
general government expenditure. We observe an increase in miscellaneous other spending 
category. This increase however is offset by a decrease in general government spending by 81.57 
dollar among 45 affected counties in 2006, relative to one year prior and the comparison counties. 
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We can also initially observe a positive growth in spending on social services other than 
Medicaid, such as financial and medical assistance in 2006, the change in level of which is 
statistically insignificant. Combination of these changes may partially explain why we do not 
observe any significant change in non-Medicaid total spending. Such finding is supported by the 
results when using share of each category spending out of total budget as the dependent variable 
instead of level of spending. An increase in the share of miscellaneous spending by 3.3% point is 
offset by a 4.7% point decline in the portion of general government spending out of total 
expenditure. 
The county governments may have initially substituted away from Medicaid and 
redirected their limited resources to local public services such as financial assistance where the 
budget has been constantly declining during the pre-cap period. On the other hand, the fact that 
there is no significant evidence of change in other spending categories after 2007 leads us to the 
next question of whether the mandate relief policy may have been translated into a reduction in 
county-level property tax rate.  
6.2 Effects on Property Tax Relief: Using Variations within New York 
 The average annual growth rate in counties' property tax levy was approximately 7 
percent between 2001 and 2005, while the growth rate considerably declined in 2006 to 3.3 
percent. Panel C in Figure 1 is a plot of the average county-specific effective property tax rate 
across 57 New York counties. Although we do not observe a discontinuity in property tax rate at 
the cutoff year, there seems to be some time lag in the response.  
The difference in differences estimates in Table 7 show evidence of decline in both 
property tax levy and county-only effective property tax rate among the 45 affected NY counties, 
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relative to the 12 unaffected units. These findings are corroborated by the event study estimates 
reported in Table 6 and Figure 5. The statistically insignificant estimates of 𝛽𝛽 during the pre-cap 
period shows that county-only property tax rate trended similarly among the treated and 
untreated NY counties before 2005, which validates the underlying assumption of the difference 
in differences analysis. The results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show strong evidence of an 
immediate and significant decrease in county-only effective property tax rate and property tax 
levy from 2007, one year after the policy was adopted. Estimates in column (4) are the 
coefficients of time dummies used for robustness check: Non-county property tax rate, i.e. 
county-wide overlapping tax rate minus county-only tax rate is used as the outcome variable that 
should not be affected by the cap policy. There is a notable differential trend of lower non-
county property tax rate among the treated counties relative to the 12 control counties before 
2006. However, the results in column (4) yield no evidence of a reduction in non-county local 
property tax rate during the post period. This suggests that the property tax relief impact was 
unique to the counties and not common across other local governments in NY. Figure 3 also 
shows the event study estimates in graphs.  
The NY State's Real Property tax law section 900 stipulates that the board of supervisors 
in each county levies the property tax for the upcoming fiscal year, no later than the last day of 
each calendar year. Property tax rates are typically set at the final stage of the budget process 
after the appropriation resolution is adopted. The Medicaid mandate relief was enacted in 
October 2005, which makes it highly unlikely for the potential benefits to be reflected in the 
2006 levy rate. The need to account for time lags in government fiscal response is well 
documented in the literature of public finance: The general idea is that there often are time lags 
for governments to respond to external macroeconomic shocks through fiscal and monetary 
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policies. Gramlich (1987) in his seminal work on sub-national fiscal policies provided that there 
may be different types of lags — including a lag in recognizing the presence of a shock and the 
need to respond, in addition to lag in observing the effects of a responsive policy action. A more 
recent empirical study by Lutz (2008) found that there are three-year lags on average for 
property tax revenues to respond to local macroeconomic changes such as changes in housing 
prices. Such finding also seems applicable to this project since county governments may not be 
able to and/or willing to immediately change the property tax rate in response to the adoption of 
the Medicaid cap. 
The extent to which counties adjust property tax rates in response to the Medicaid 
mandate relief may also vary across counties depending on their relative burden of Medicaid cost. 
Table 7 reports how the pre and post differences in property tax rate within affected counties can 
be associated with the Medicaid cap policy. The difference in differences estimates shows that 
the NY counties reduced the effective property tax rate by 0.652 mills rate on average, relative to 
the pre-period 25 . The magnitude of this effect is also economically significant, since it is 
approximately a 8% decline from the average ETR among affected counties in 2005. The 
property tax relief effect also remains significant when I limit the post period to 2006-2008: The 
average treatment effect of the cap on county level effective property tax rate among the affected 
NY counties is -0.662 which is statistically significant at the 10% level. The findings also is 
robust to use of alternative measure of outcome, log of property tax levy per capita. The level of 
property tax levy was significantly lower by 6% during the post period among treated counties 
relative to the unaffected NY counties.  
                                                          
25 In the meantime, sales and use tax revenue did not show any significant drop associated with Medicaid spending 
after the cap was introduced. Also, there is no significant change in the amount of state aid received by counties during the 
sample period.    
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On the other hand, I find that there is no evidence of change in property tax rate among 
other localities within the county area that should not be affected by the cap policy, during the 
post period. In fact, the event study results show positive coefficients estimates of non-county 
property tax rate in 2006 and 2008. The DD estimates in column (5) and (6) in Panel A of Table 
7 suggest that the property tax relief is unique to county governments and not found among other 
level of governments within the county boundaries. When using non-county property tax rate as 
the counterfactual potential outcome of county-specific property tax rate, we find larger and 
statistically significant estimates of property tax relief for counties, as reported under column (4) 
in Table 6 and Panel A of Table7.  
The subgroup analyses results in Panel B of Table 7 depict the differential effects across 
counties in terms of the level and growth rate of Medicaid expenditure. As expected, we observe a 
significant decrease in property tax rate by 0.779 mills rate among counties that have higher than 
state-wide median poverty rate at the county level. I do not find evidence of property tax relief 
among relatively affluent counties with lower than median poverty rate and Medicaid enrollment. 
The estimated effects also seem larger among counties with higher growth rate in Medicaid 
spending than counties with lower than median growth rate (-1.431 versus -0.605). However, 
since the confidence intervals of the two estimates overlap, we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the effects are similar between the two groups. In other words, there is no evidence of larger 
property tax relief in counties that spent more and experienced a greater drop in Medicaid outlay, 
relative to counties that spent less and experienced smaller decline in Medicaid spending in the 
year of the policy enactment. Nonetheless, both groups show a significant drop in property tax 
rate during the post period. The results in Panel C provide support the finding of a two year 
lagged effect of property tax relief among NY counties. The coefficient of the interacted term 
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between a post dummy and the log of Medicaid savings amount (measured as the logged 
difference between the estimated counterfactual and actual Medicaid expenditure) is statistically 
significant and negative at the 10% level. This suggests that a one percent increase in Medicaid 
savings from the cap policy led to 0.384% decline in effective property tax rate on average during 
the post period. 
One of the key underlying assumptions of the analyses using within-NY variation is the 
absence of historical threats during the post period that may have differential affect on county 
fiscal outcomes and bias the effect estimates. However, there are two external events during the 
post period that may potentially pose threat to internal validity of these estimates using variations 
within NY ⎼ the NY School Finance reform implemented in 2008 and the Federal Stimulus 
package introduced in 2009. The School Finance Reform was the NY state government’s plan to 
provide additional $1.7 billion to eligible school districts starting from 2008 by introducing a 
new foundation aid formula26. If the provision of foundation aid successfully led to property tax 
relief among affected school districts, such decision may have spillover effects on revenue 
raising behaviors at the county level.  However, this may not be a major concern since we do not 
observe any significant change in non-county local property tax rate that includes the school 
district's portion during the post period among affected counties. When comparing the pre and 
post outcomes of 57 counties without a comparison group, we observe evidence of an increase in 
non-county property tax rate, which albeit being statistically significant, has little economic 
significance when compared to the 2005 baseline level of 24 mills rate.  Although the estimate 
becomes statistically significant and negative in 2010, this does not bias our estimate of the cap 
policy's effect. The potential lagged effect should typically last for two to three years according 
to the public finance literature (Gramlich 1987; Lutz 2008). In fact, the average effective 
                                                          
26 While the Foundation aid was designed to phase-in over four years, funding froze since 2009. 
30 
 
property tax rate for non-county localities do not show any significant decrease between the first 
post period of interest, which is 2008. 
Another event that may confound our effect estimates in later post years is the federal 
stimulus package in 2009 after the great recession. The federal government included $2.7 billion 
in the federal stimulus package as part of the Federal Medical Assistance Percentages aid to 
support the local governments in New York State.  However, the federal aid may not lead to any 
bias in the estimates, as the federal decision to provide fiscal relief is exogenous to the New York 
State government's decision to introduce Medicaid cap policy in 2005. Also, the county-only 
property tax rate started declining from 2007, which is two years before the stimulus package 
was introduced.  
 
6.3 Robustness Check: Effect on Property Tax Relief Using Variations across States  
In order to account for such potential confounders, the next step is to introduce an 
appropriate comparison group and check whether the previous findings from the within-NY 
estimation holds.  A difference-in-differences and event study estimator is employed to estimate 
the average treatment effect on the treated counties, using two datasets to find comparable 
counties outside of New York State.  
First, I use effective property tax rate of comparison counties from seven states outside of 
New York State. The final sample includes counties from five states that never required their 
localities to share Medicaid costs until 2010, as well as counties in Iowa and New Jersey that 
maintained state mandates for counties to share the state Medicaid costs. Iowa, has a relatively 
less stringent mandate, which requires its counties to pay 4.3% of the total state Medicaid cost to 
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the state27. Introducing these comparison units from outside of New York State can be useful for 
addressing the concern of the great recession being a potential confounder that biases the within-
NY estimates. The property tax rate level may vary across states, with New York having the 
highest property tax rate, yet this may not affect the main analysis since we are mainly interested 
in estimating the slope difference before and after the cap policy.  
As an alternative to using the limited pool of states where county-specific effective 
property tax rate is available, I use property tax levy growth from the Annual Survey of State and 
Local Government Finances. To cope with any potential heterogeneity in housing market 
fluctuations, I control for annual growth in housing price index, provided by the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency in addition to county unemployment rate and the same set of county and state 
level covariates used in equation (4). One caveat of using the levy growth as the outcome 
variable is that it is not the optimal measure for cross-jurisdiction comparison, unlike effective 
property tax rate since the property tax levy may not be specific to county if the county 
distributes the revenue to other localities including school districts. However, this measure can 
be still used to include a more comprehensive pool of counties in states that maintained local 
Medicaid mandates and particularly those without restrictive tax limits.  
The key assumption remains the same for both analyses: Ideally, there should be no 
differential trend in property tax burden over time between affected NY counties and comparison 
counties, in the absence of the spending cap. In other words, there should be no heterogeneous 
                                                          
27 Other potential comparison states that have significant local Medicaid requirement include Arizona, New Hampshire, 
California and North Carolina. However, North Carolina initiated relieving the local requirement gradually from 2005 and 
eventually eliminated the mandate by 2010, replacing it with the options to remit county level sales tax revenue to the state 
government. California is an exceptional case with restrictive property tax limitations and New Hampshire counties do not have 
the authority to levy property tax.  
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policies across counties during the sample period that would alter the county property tax rate, 
other than through the indirect channel of the mandate relief28.  
The DD results using property tax levy growth and a larger pool of comparison counties 
outside of New York is reported in Tables 8. The estimates show consistent evidence of 
significant decline in property tax levy growth among affected New York counties, relative to 
various groups of comparison counties. It is important to address the potential confounding 
effects of property tax limitations since counties in states with property tax limitations 
(particularly rate and levy limits) may have limited discretion to increase their property tax 
revenues.  The effect estimates vary between -0.077 and -0.084, with higher estimates when 
using subgroup of counties in states without restrictive rate or levy limits that should be more 
comparable to NY counties. The effect estimate using more comprehensive model using all 
states with mandate may be underestimated due to the inclusion of counties in states that restrict 
the growth of levy amount or nominal tax rates which are less similar to the treated counties in 
New York. 
In order to test whether the parallel trend assumption holds and to check for the dynamic 
effect of the cap policy, I use an event study framework. An event study analysis also allows us 
to capture the timing of the change in the property tax rate relative to the timing of cap enactment. 
In Table 9, none of the pre-period annual coefficients show to be statistically significant in any 
of the models. The event study estimates consistently show evidence of a reduction in treated 
counties' property tax rate between 2007 and 2008, the result of which is robust to the selection 
of comparison group. We find negative coefficients on post period indicators from 2007 when 
comparing NY counties to counties in states that maintained their Medicaid mandate and had no 
                                                          
28 However, if there are time-variant unobserved components that may affect changes in the property tax rate, this 
model may still suffer from omitted variable bias. 
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restrictive property tax limitations. The suggestive evidence of lagged property tax relief is also 
evident and consistently found across various subgroup analyses using event study estimator. 
Figure 6 also shows the event study estimates in graphs. 
These findings are corroborated when using variation in effective property tax rates 
across counties in different states. As shown in Table 10, the DID estimates provide strong 
evidence of decline in effective property tax rates between 2006 and 2010 in New York counties 
compared to various combinations of comparable counties in seven other states. We find 
statistically significant effects that are robust across samples using different combinations of 
comparison groups. The results tell us that NY counties had ETR that are lower than comparable 
counties by 0.644 to 0.827 during the post period, which is similar to the event study estimate for 
the first post period (-0.548) using within NY variation. The estimate of key interest is under 
column (2) that suggests affected New York counties had lower effective property tax rate by 
0.827, relative to counties in New Jersey and Iowa that continued to pay their share of Medicaid 
costs to the state government throughout the sample period. All coefficients of the interacted 
term reported in Table 10 have significant negative signs in every subgroup analysis29.  
Similar to the previous analysis using property tax levy in counties across states, one 
concern about the choice of seven comparison states is the potential confounding effects of 
property tax limitations. Two states - Iowa, and Kentucky - have rate limits on overall county 
property tax rates30. Iowa is the only state that has assessment limits that constrains the annual 
rate of growth of assessed value. Assessment cap in general, however, is least restrictive 
                                                          
29  An exception is where the comparison units counties that are not required by the state to share the cost of Medicaid. 
The effect estimate from this subgroup analysis still shows to be negative although, statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, we 
observe signs of reduction in property tax rate among affected New York counties from 2008, relative to counties in these five 
states in the event study results.    
30 Kentucky is the state with the most restrictive tax rate limit of 0.5% as well as a cap on the growth rate of the property tax rate 
to a maximum of 4%.  
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compared to tax rate limits and does not effectively deter increases in the tax rate, but rather is 
designed to restrict incidental tax increases.  In addition, Iowa has a relatively permissive annual 
cap, which is 4% for residential and agricultural parcels, but no limits for commercial and 
industrial properties. Virginia and Kentucky are the two states with limitations on property tax 
levy(or revenue) increase, which can be less restrictive than capping the level of nominal tax rate. 
Nonetheless, no comparison state included in the sample has any legislative changes during the 
study period that may have directly affected county level property tax rates. The event study 
estimates in Table 11 reveals that there were no differential trends in property tax rate between 
New York counties and the comparison counties in states with property tax rate limitations 
before enactment of the cap policy. Both event study and DID estimates show to be robust to the 
selection of counties in states with and without restrictive tax rate limits. Overall, the event study 
estimates corroborates the difference-in-differences results of a reduction in treated counties' 
property tax rate between 2008 and 2010, the result of which is robust to the selection of 
comparison group. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 This paper shows estimates of the impact of intergovernmental fiscal policies on local 
fiscal behavior.  While the public finance literature has predominantly focused on testing the 
crowd out effects of growing expenditure, the potential spillover effects of a large reduction in 
spending should also receive an in-depth scrutiny. In this paper, we suggest that the local fiscal 
responses to a decrease in the growth of one major spending category may be different from the 
typical reaction to a steady increase. This study examined New York counties in the United 
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States to see how a higher-level government's assumption of local spending on a large public 
health insurance program may have affected budgetary decisions and property taxation. 
In this paper, there is no evidence of short term changes in the borrowing or saving 
behaviors among affected NY counties after the mandate relief. In response to reduced Medicaid 
burden, county governments instead, redirected small portions of their monies to other 
miscellaneous operational functions over the first two post periods. Nonetheless, this study 
shows no evidence of a net increase in their total outlay after the cap. The NY county 
governments did not become more generous in spending when the state government lowered 
counties' Medicaid spending.  
This finding complements past studies on federal Medicaid expansion crowding out other 
public services (Baicker 2005; Kane et al. 2002). This study provides evidence of asymmetric 
response in a budgetary trade-off in the short term: While previous work finds federal-mandated 
increases in Medicaid spending reducing spending on other categories, I do not observe a state-
mandated decreases in Medicaid spending leading to a positive spillover on other categories. 
When coupled with slower growth in total spending, I do not find any evidence of budgetary 
spillover effect in the longer term, and instead find evidence that the cap policy led to property 
tax relief. 
When using variation across counties within NY, the effect estimates suggest that the NY 
counties experienced a decrease in property tax rate by one mill rate, on average, after the policy 
was implemented. There is no statistically significant evidence of heterogeneous effects between 
counties that were presumably expecting to benefit more from the policy and those that were less 
affected. However, I find consistent evidence of a decline in NY counties' property tax rate after 
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enactment of the cap or at least potential lagged effects on county property tax rate from event 
study results. 
These findings are supported by difference-in-difference estimates that show by 6.6 to 8.1%  
decrease in effective property tax rate or 6% reduction in levy per capita among NY counties 
during the post-cap period, relative to unaffected counties in other comparable states. I also find 
that one percent increase in Medicaid savings led to 0.23 percent reduction in ETR, two years 
after the cap was enacted. These findings suggest that a higher level government's decision to 
assume parts of local expenditure also has the potential to provide property tax relief at the local 
level. Overall, this study shows that reallocation of limited sub-national government's resources 
or fiscal responsibility may have spillover effects on revenue raising behaviors as well as 
budgetary decisions. 
However, there are numerous limits to this study in its current form, primarily due to data 
limitations. An alternative way would be using a larger donor pool of counties from states that 
never had the cost-sharing component as a comparison group and using synthetic control method 
to address the same question.  There also may be other ways to explain why we do not observe 
an immediate response in local property tax rate, other than mere time lags.  
Finally, there are other related questions that are worth addressing but were not within the 
scope of this research. A state government's takeover of local fiscal responsibilities may lead to 
an increase in the need to raise tax levy at the state level, thereby canceling out the effects on 
local tax relief. Therefore, the next step would be to check whether the policy affected the net tax 
burden on households in treated regions. One can also test whether this policy led to changes in 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of New York counties 
Panel A. New York Counties 
 Mean Std.dev Min Max 
     
Property tax rate 1 (County only) 6.89 3.60 0.20 37.20 
Property tax rate 2 (Countywide) 31.86 6.19 14.70 49.50 
∆ Log(Property tax levy) 0.04 0.132   −0.33   0.71 
County Medicaid spending ($1,000) 38,200 59,900 441 370,000 
Annual growth in county Medicaid spending  0.16 0.19 −0.86 3.58 
      
 
Panel B.  Treated and control units within New York  
  Treated Control 
P-value 
of difference 
County characteristics     
Medicaid budget per capita (2010$)  208.88 180.67      0.001*** 
Property tax rate (County only)  7.12 6.44  0.164 
Property tax / Total revenue (%)  19.40 18.14   0.105 
Non-Medicaid total budget per capita (2010$)  1,103 1,286      0.000*** 
Debt per capita (2010$)  40.222 48.496  0.193 
Undesignated reserve per capita (2010$)  145.57 141.51  0.860 
Share of Medicaid enrollee population (%)  13.90 12.09      0.000*** 
     
                  County covariates     
Unemployment rate  5.61 5.36   0.116 
Population  164,396 299,137       0.001*** 
Population growth rate  0.441 0.000 0.554 
Share of senior population (%)  14.55 14.04    0.051* 
Share of female population (%)  51.52 51.71   0.095* 
Share of black population (%)  3.98 5.83     0.000*** 
Blind or disabled/Medicaid enrollment (%)  4.8   5.6     0.127 
Poverty rate (%)  11.34 10.45    0.010** 
Median household income ($)  40,451 43,427    0.012** 
Log(intergovernmental transfer)  11.03 11.32     0.020** 
Log(own source revenue minus property tax)  11.00 11.13    0.410 
     
     
Note: Figures in second and third columns in Panel B represent mean characteristics of counties 








Table 2. Summary statistics of counties in New York and comparable states 
 
                                                          
31  The other comparison states with Medicaid local mandate are Florida; Hawaii; Illinois; Indiana; Michigan; Minnesota; 
Montana; Nevada; New Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico; North Dakota; Ohio; Oregon; Pennsylvania; South Carolina; 
South Dakota; Texas; Utah; Washington and Wisconsin. 
32 States without neither rate nor levy limit are Hawaii, Maryland, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Connecticut and Vermont. 
However, counties in latter two states do not have the authority to levy property tax.  Among states with Medicaid mandates, 
those with either rate or levy limit are Florida; Hawaii; Minnesota; Oregon, South Carolina and Wisconsin. 











Property tax / Total revenue (%) 17.9 19.4   0.018** 26.4 26.1 0.870 
Effective property tax rate (per $1,000AV)  7.11   6.62   0.096* 2.97   3.18       0.000*** 
 County covariates       
Unemployment rate 5.0 6.3 0.139 5.03 7.11    0.000*** 
Population 308,340 310,157   0.079* 65,679 69,489 0.246         
Population growth rate (%) 0.30 -0.15     0.000*** 1.37 0.83    0.000*** 
Share of senior population(%) 14.32 14.19 0.510 13.92 13.93 0.975 
Share of female population(%) 51.76 51.32     0.000*** 51.75 51.32    0.000*** 
Share of black population(%) 4.23 4.54 0.304 14.1 14.2 0.875 
Poverty rate 11.8 13.2     0.000*** 14.08 16.44    0.000*** 
∆Log(personal income) 0.032 0.036  0.056* 0.039 0.037 0.212 
Log(federal aid) 7.74 7.99 0.108 6.07 6.47    0.000*** 
Log(state aid) 10.91 11.05 0.189 9.08 9.31   0.000*** 
Log(own source revenue-property tax) 11.57 11.82   0.028** 9.49 9.77    0.000*** 
State covariates       
Medicaid income threshold($) 1,677 2,200    0.000*** 679 843    0.000*** 
GSP growth rate 4.54 3.23 0.418 4.89 2.57   0.031** 
Finance (Share of industry, %) 30.2 29.5 0.334 17.82 17.96   0.028** 
Agriculture (Share of industry, %)) 0.201 0.204 0.829 1.89 2.07  0.016** 
Durables (Share of industry, %)) 3.4 2.7    0.004*** 8.24 6.85    0.000*** 
 All states with local mandates31 
States with local mandates  
but no levy or rate limit32  
       
∆ Log(Property tax levy) 0.06 0.05 0.122 0.06 0.05 0.342 
Unemployment rate 5.33 6.49     0.000*** 5.27 7.01    0.000*** 
Population 146,968 146,053 0.895 186,366 194,261 0.493         
Population growth rate (%) 1.25 0.52    0.000*** 1.50 1.51 0.334 
Share of senior population(%) 15.02 15.10 0.334 15.41 15.40 0.981 
Share of female population(%) 51.53 51.09    0.000*** 51.66 51.30    0.000*** 
Share of black population(%) 4.86 4.98 0.506 8.43 8.98 0.875 
Poverty rate 11.55 12.68    0.000*** 9.54 11.05    0.000*** 
∆Log(personal income) 0.03  0.04    0.000*** 0.04  0.03    0.000*** 
∆Log(housing price growth) 1.73  0.83   0.000*** 1.79   1.16      0.000*** 
Log(export revenue to local governments) 8.92   9.24     0.080* 6.81    7.02     0.043** 
Log(federal aid) 6.48 6.91    0.000*** 7.08 7.60    0.000*** 
Log(state aid) 8.62 8.97   0.000*** 9.72 10.02   0.000*** 
Log(own source revenue-property tax) 7.72 9.09    0.000*** 8.34 9.93    0.000*** 
Medicaid income threshold($) 876 1,074    0.000*** 1,114 1,408    0.000*** 
GSP growth rate 4.92 3.64    0.000*** 4.56 3.02    0.000*** 
Finance (Share of industry, %) 18.57 18.30    0.000*** 19.38 19.36 0.873 
Agriculture (Share of industry, %)) 1.72 2.10    0.000*** 1.31 1.45    0.000*** 
Durables (Share of industry, %)) 9.17 8.11    0.000*** 10.41 10.44 0.875 
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Table 3. Event study estimates: Total expenditure, debt and savings 
 
Panel A.  Annual growth rate 
   
 
∆ln(Total) ∆ln(Total - Medicaid) ∆ln(Debt) ∆ln(Unreserved fund) 
     
𝐷𝐷−5 −0.024 −0.028 −0.716* 0.475 
 (0.033) (0.049) (0.376) (0.824) 
𝐷𝐷−4 0.006 0.011 −0.076 −0.550 
 (0.033) (0.040) (0.346) (0.421) 
𝐷𝐷−3 −0.041 −0.048 −0.363 −0.205 
 (0.032) (0.036) (0.294) (0.728) 
𝐷𝐷−2 
 
0.001 0.008 −0.221 0.139 
(0.038) (0.062) (0.380) (0.425) 
𝐷𝐷0  −0.054 −0.052 −0.233 −0.489 
(0.038) (0.043) (0.237) (0.319) 
𝐷𝐷1 −0.015 −0.013 −0.273 −0.085 
 (0.035) (0.048) (0.232) (0.275) 
𝐷𝐷2 −0.025 −0.031 −0.306 −0.261 
 (0.037) (0.042) (0.235) (0.397) 
𝐷𝐷3 −0.067 −0.068 −0.230 −0.184 
 (0.046) (0.048) (0.278) (0.333) 
𝐷𝐷4 −0.010 −0.006 −0.246 −0.705* 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.323) (0.373) 
     
𝑙𝑙−1 | affected 0.062 0.078   0.284 0.370 
 (0.086)     (0.095) (0.796) (0.331) 
     
𝐷𝐷  (2005)  −0.031 −0.031 −0.455 −0.264 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.858) (0.215) 
     
Note: N=570. 2005 is used as the reference year. Standard errors bootstrapped with 
1,000 replications are reported in parentheses. All models control for observable and 
unobservable county characteristics. Estimates under columns (2) and (4) use twelve 
NY counties that did not experience a reduction in Medicaid spending between 2005 
and 2006 as comparison groups. All estimates are from an event-study model, using 
equation (1) and are coefficient estimates of variable 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)  that measure the 
differential change in outcomes between the treated counties and comparison 




Panel B. Log of per capita amount (2010 constant dollars) 





    
𝐷𝐷−5 −0.042 −0.325 −0.172 
 (0.064) (0.307) (0.491) 
𝐷𝐷−4 −0.012 −0.075 −0.561 
 (0.069) (0.258) (0.420) 
𝐷𝐷−3 −0.032 −0.012 −0.513 
 (0.071) (0.325) (0.350) 
𝐷𝐷−2 −0.016 0.102 −0.036 
 (0.062) (0.234) (0.278) 
𝐷𝐷0  −0.028 −0.081 −0.273 
(0.049) (0.203) (0.273) 
𝐷𝐷1 −0.011 −0.092 −0.531 
(0.046) (0.215) (0.335) 
𝐷𝐷2 −0.007 −0.174 −0.169 
 (0.058) (0.239) (0.283) 
𝐷𝐷3 −0.035 −0.320 −0.252 
 (0.048) (0.207) (0.286) 
𝐷𝐷4 −0.033 −0.111 −0.793*** 
 (0.089) (0.233) (0.189) 
    
𝑙𝑙−1 | affected 7.237 5.589 5.283 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.112) 
    
𝐷𝐷  (2005) −0.120 −0.292 0.527 
 (0.079) (0.338) (0.283) 
    
Note: N=570. Year 2005 is used as the reference year. Standard errors 
bootstrapped with 1,000 replications are reported in parentheses. All models 
control for observable and unobservable county characteristics. Reported 
estimates show the differential change in outcomes among 45 affected 
counties,  relative to 12 unaffected NY counties that did not experience 
reduction in Medicaid spending after enactment of the cap policy. *** p<0.01, 






Table 4. Event study estimates: Share of total expenditure 
          








Safety Transportation Others 
          
𝐷𝐷−5 0.006 −0.002 −0.001 −0.006 0.007 −0.004 −0.005 −0.011 0.016 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.018) 
𝐷𝐷−4 0.010 0.005 −0.003 −0.011 0.007* 0.002 −0.002 −0.021* 0.019 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) 
𝐷𝐷−3 0.009 0.006 −0.001 −0.008 0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.010 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.017) 
𝐷𝐷−2 0.006 -0.017 −0.002 −0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.008 −0.001 0.019 
 (0.006) (0.021) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) 
𝐷𝐷0  0.011 −0.047** −0.001 0.004 0.000 −0.001 −0.005 −0.001 0.033* 
 (0.007) (0.023) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) 
𝐷𝐷1 0.004 −0.005 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.006 −0.003 0.015 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) 
𝐷𝐷2 0.008 −0.003 0.000 −0.004 0.004 −0.001 −0.011 −0.016 0.026** 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) 
𝐷𝐷3 0.009 −0.001 −0.001 −0.004 0.004 −0.001 −0.007 −0.008 0.018 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) 
𝐷𝐷4 0.006 −0.002 −0.000 −0.002 0.003 −0.001 −0.004 −0.004 0.019* 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) 
          
𝑙𝑙−1 | affected 0.177 0.098 0.016 0.120 0.041 0.007 0.091 0.088 0.079 
Constant 0.191 −0.693 0.024 1.176*** −0.332 0.244 −0.019 −0.126 0.542 
 (0.389) (0.922) (0.093) (0.310) (0.268) (0.179) (0.271) (0.461) (0.793) 
          
         
Note: N=570. Omitted year is 2005. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. All models control for observable and unobservable 
county characteristics. All reported estimates use twelve NY counties that did not benefit from the cap policy as comparison groups. 




Table 5. Event study estimates: Level of total expenditure, per capita 
          








Safety Transportation Others 
          
𝐷𝐷−5 −18.450 8.348 −1.437 21.251 5.833 −3.882 −7.279 −6.721 30.465 
 (15.183) (34.191) (2.624) (39.798) (10.548) (6.440) (8.864) (25.910) (43.687) 
𝐷𝐷−4 −12.308 9.240 −2.585 4.896 10.228 2.367 −5.047 −19.161 25.925 
 (12.470) (37.542) (2.582) (30.572) (7.966) (4.582) (9.330) (18.932) (30.899) 
𝐷𝐷−3 −9.427 15.881 −0.967 7.687 5.007 −2.235 −5.369 −15.891 3.091 
 (15.287) (29.878) (2.240) (28.826) (8.089) (5.382) (11.443) (19.061) (31.469) 
𝐷𝐷−2 −7.095 −36.654 −1.637 −17.062 2.731 −1.866 −8.271 −4.211 26.937 
 (12.257) (58.004) (2.344) (16.046) (7.752) (3.521) (7.524) (20.374) (30.120) 
𝐷𝐷0  8.444 −81.577** −1.263 3.523 −3.620 −2.827 −9.682 −4.596 61.898* 
 (12.658) (35.010) (2.060) (16.251) (7.859) (3.906) (11.550) (18.513) (35.410) 
𝐷𝐷1 −0.092 −32.290 1.036 −2.456 −4.150 −5.597 −14.829 −13.480 10.470 
 (13.878) (37.936) (2.891) (20.680) (8.949) (4.611) (12.281) (26.342) (30.885) 
𝐷𝐷2 8.198 −28.088 1.472 −14.497 2.483 −5.097 −21.214 −53.827 49.915 
 (16.841) (29.316) (3.679) (22.743) (9.766) (4.473) (14.588) (35.384) (33.152) 
𝐷𝐷3 16.410 −7.341 −1.549 −33.030 −2.356 −1.397 −15.488 −18.839 38.220 
 (20.030) (42.401) (2.540) (52.237) (12.673) (3.943) (13.518) (23.781) (30.241) 
𝐷𝐷4 13.651 −18.454 0.556 −39.308 −4.500 −1.205 −14.218 −3.990 26.866 
 (25.904) (38.491) (2.898) (52.244) (16.047) (3.607) (11.427) (22.345) (29.241) 
          
𝑙𝑙−1 | affected 244.26 141.02 23.20 170.98 58.16 11.17 134.80 124.11 189.56 
Constant 2,590 1,539 267 5,580*** −956** 739** 404 1,593 2,639 
 (1,688) (2,232) (173) (1,896) (405) (335) (562) (1,946) (1,868) 
          
         
Note: N=570. Omitted year is 2005. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. All models control for observable and 
unobservable county characteristics. All reported estimates use twelve counties that did not benefit from the cap policy as comparison 




Table 6. Effect on county and local property tax rate: Event study estimates 
 Outcome variables 
 Ln (Levy  
per capita) 
County only ETR Non-county  
local ETR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
𝐷𝐷−5 −0.096 −0.162 −0.839 −0.352 
 (0.062) (0.465) (0.961) (1.350) 
𝐷𝐷−4 −0.048 −0.375 −0.141 −2.170** 
 (0.058) (0.412) (0.494) (0.944) 
𝐷𝐷−3 −0.018 −0.610 −0.059 −1.154 
 (0.054) (0.413) (0.673) (1.044) 
𝐷𝐷−2 −0.045 −0.323 0.763 −1.108 
(0.055) (0.491) (0.588) (0.994) 
𝐷𝐷0 
 
−0.054 −0.543 −1.173*** 0.032 
(0.052) (0.387) (0.449) (1.175) 
𝐷𝐷1 
 
−0.104** −1.313*** −1.358 −0.308 
(0.049) (0.483) (1.203) (0.893) 
𝐷𝐷2 
 
−0.113** −1.080** −3.758*** −2.152 
(0.048) (0.487) (0.632) (1.349) 
𝐷𝐷3 −0.122** −1.022* −1.784** −1.997* 
 (0.061) (0.605) (0.702) (1.031) 
𝐷𝐷4 −0.118 −0.979* −0.065 −1.706 
 (0.072) (0.561) (0.650) (1.223) 
     
𝑙𝑙−1 | affected 7.781 7.980 24.097 
 (3.850) (3.937) (3.929) 
     
# Treated units 45 45 45 45 
# Control units 12 12 45 12 
Level of control units County County Non-county 
localities 
County 
R-squared 0.741 0.742  0.761 
Note: All estimates are from an event-study model, using equation (1) and are 
coefficient estimates of variable 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)  that measure the differential change in 
outcomes between the treated counties and comparison counties in each 𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) , 
relative to period -1. Omitted period -1 is calendar year 2005. All models control 
for observable and unobservable county characteristics. Estimates under columns 
(1), (2) and (4) are from analyses using twelve NY counties that did not benefit 
from the cap policy as comparison groups. Reported estimates under column (3) are 
from an analysis using ETR of other local jurisdictions within the county area as the 
counterfactual. Bootstrapped standard errors with 1,000 replications are in 




Table 7. Effect on county and local property tax rate: Difference in differences estimates 
Panel A. County-only and local effective property tax rate 
 
Ln(Levy per capita) 
 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
𝜃𝜃1   −0.066**   −0.652**  −0.662* −1.418*** −0.159 0.062 
 (0.030) (0.349) (0.378) (0.434) (0.544) (0.661) 
𝑙𝑙−1| 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = 1 5.92 7.99 25.08 
       
# Treated units 45 45 45 45 45 45 
# Control units 12 12 12 45 12 12 
# of years 10 10 8 10 10 8 
R-squared R-
square 
 0.743 0.794  0.770 0.792 
 


















       
𝜃𝜃1 −1.431* −0.605** −0.779* −0.699 −0.799*** −0.436 
 (0.766) (0.287) (0.404) (0.526) (0.288) (0.695) 
       
𝑙𝑙−1| 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = 1 8.288 7.682 9.493 6.423 9.127 6.695 
       
# Treated units 23 22 23 22 23 22 
# Control units 12 12 12 12 12 12 
R-squared R-
square 
0.653 0.966 0.930 0.674 0.935 0.652 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. All models in both panel control for observable 
and unobservable county characteristics. Reported estimates under column (4) in Panel A are from a 
DD analysis using ETR of other local jurisdictions within the county area as the counterfactual. High 
groups in Panel B (columns (1), (3) and (5)) refer to 22 counties that had higher than or equal to the 







Panel C. Interaction with estimated Medicaid savings from the cap policy 
 County-only ETR 
 
Non-county local ETR 
DV: Ln(ETR)t+1 Ln(ETR)t+2 Ln(ETR)t+3 Ln(ETR)t+2 Ln(ETR)t+3 
      
Affected 45 New York Counties 
 
𝛼𝛼1 −0.595 −0.229* −0.326** 0.064 0.066 
 (1.043) (0.131) (0.165) (0.075) (0.080) 
N 570 513 456 513 456 
Note: N=450. Only 45 treated NY counties were used in this analysis. All models 
include county level covariates as well as year and county fixed effects. 𝛼𝛼1 
indicates the coefficient of Ln(Medicaid saving) in equation (3). Bootstrapped 




Table 8. Difference in differences estimates with different control groups 
 
 States with local Medicaid mandate All states 
DV:  
ln (Levy per capita) 
(1) 
All states  
with mandate 
(2) 
No rate or  
levy limit 
(3) 
No levy limit 
(4) 
No rate or  
levy limit 
     
𝜌𝜌1 −0.014   −0.081** −0.084** −0.077** 
 (0.023) (0.037) (0.032) (0.035) 
     
𝑙𝑙−1 5.33   5.63    5.51   5.34 
 (0.235)   (0.115) (0.147)     (0.168) 
# of observations 6,109 2,593 1,373 7,276 
     
Note: Standard errors clustered at the county level reported in parentheses. 
Number of  treated counties in New York is 45. The number of comparison 

















Table 9. Levy growth: NY versus comparison counties from other states 
 
 States with local Medicaid mandate All control states 
DV:  
ln (Levy per capita) 
(1) 
All states  
with mandate 
(2) 
No rate or  
levy limit 
(3) 
No levy limit 
(4) 
No rate or  
levy limit 
     
𝐷𝐷−5 −0.005 0.026 −0.031 0.006 
 (0.043) (0.055) (0.050) (0.059) 
𝐷𝐷−4 0.029 0.016 −0.017 −0.002 
 (0.037) (0.046) (0.044) (0.051) 
𝐷𝐷−3 0.009 −0.002 −0.033 −0.019 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) 
𝐷𝐷−2 0.091*** 0.050 0.016 0.058* 
 (0.029) (0.036) (0.048) (0.034) 
𝐷𝐷0 0.001 0.003 0.020 −0.011 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
𝐷𝐷1 −0.032 −0.070** −0.056** −0.066** 
 (0.020) (0.031) (0.024) (0.031) 
𝐷𝐷2 −0.071** −0.113*** −0.102*** −0.122*** 
 (0.032) (0.041) (0.031) (0.046) 
𝐷𝐷3 −0.048* -0.069 0.009 -0.091* 
 (0.026) (0.043) (0.028) (0.049) 
𝐷𝐷4 −0.072* −0.097* -0.007 −0.112* 
 (0.038) (0.056) (0.040) (0.060) 
     
# of observations 6,109 2,593 1,373 7,276 
R2 0.681 0.440 0.596  
Note: Omitted period -1 is calendar year 2005. All models include year and 
county fixed effects as well as state specific time trend. All models include year 
and county fixed effects as well as state and county level covariates (including 
log of own source revenue minus property tax, share of intergovernmental 
transfer out of total revenue, county unemployment rate, log of county median 
household income, annual growth in housing price, share of senior female and 
black population, growth rate of state Gross State Product, log of state Medicaid 
eligibility income threshold and share of each industry to capture state economic 
structure.) Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.  





Table 10. Difference in differences estimates with different control groups (ETR) 
 
 Various comparison groups 
DV: Effective 







Tax rate limit 
(IA,KY) 
    
𝜌𝜌1 − 0.644* −0.827** −0.819*** 
 (0.333) (0.403) (0.234) 
    
N 4,076 1,375 1,918 
R-squared 0.681 0.440 0.883 
 (4) 
No tax rate limit 
nor mandate 
(TN, MD, GA,VA) 
(5) 
No effective tax limit 
(GA, IA, MD) 
(6) 
No restrictive tax rate 
limits 
(No KY) 
    
𝜌𝜌1 −0.733* − 0.750*** −0.644* 
 (0.445) (0.227) (0.389) 
    
N 2,604 2,223 3,315 
    
Note: All models include year and county fixed effects as well as state and 
county level covariates (including log of own source revenue minus property 
tax, share of intergovernmental transfer out of total revenue, county 
unemployment rate, log of county median household income, share of senior 
female and black population, growth rate of state Gross State Product, log of 
state Medicaid eligibility income threshold and share of each industry to 
capture state economic structure.)  Bootstrapped standard errors with 1,000  
replications reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11. Property tax relief estimates with various comparison groups: Event study  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CONTROL
GROUPS 
6 States Keep mandate 
(IA, NJ) 
Tax rate limit 
(IA, KY) 






(GA, IA, MD) 
No restrictive 
tax rate limits 
(No KY) 
       
𝐷𝐷−5 −0.313 −0.014 0.498 −0.398 −0.422 −0.311 
 (0.766) (0.722) (0.637) (0.618) (0.730) (0.718) 
𝐷𝐷−4 0.552 0.671 0.575 0.570 0.520 0.567 
 (0.570) (0.650) (0.602) (0.557) (0.541) (0.643) 
𝐷𝐷−3 0.180 0.103 0.032 0.282 0.317 0.182 
 (0.644) (0.645) (0.709) (0.728) (0.679) (0.747) 
𝐷𝐷−2 0.531 0.233 0.367 0.569 0.673 0.534 
 (0.724) (0.833) (0.760) (0.761) (0.642) (0.833) 
𝐷𝐷0 0.250 −0.159 0.131 0.238 −0.045 0.232 
 (0.760) (0.793) (0.721) (0.816) (0.627) (0.671) 
𝐷𝐷1 1.239 0.663 0.701 1.289 0.980 1.231 
 (0.863) (0.768) (0.866) (0.876) (0.931) (1.080) 
𝐷𝐷2 −1.409*** −2.042*** −2.127*** −1.046* −1.303** −1.423** 
 (0.490) (0.539) (0.503) (0.584) (0.543) (0.632) 
𝐷𝐷3 −1.087* −2.240*** −1.941*** −0.791 −1.559*** −1.097* 
 (0.592) (0.556) (0.607) (0.481) (0.534) (0.590) 
𝐷𝐷4 −1.064* −1.992*** −1.920*** −0.867 −1.513*** −1.067* 
 (0.546) (0.607) (0.615) (0.569) (0.563) (0.583) 
       
Constant 1.948*** −4.403** −9.731* 3.146** −1.941* 1.792*** 
 (0.656) (1.876) (5.831) (1.386) (1.125) (0.524) 
       
N 4,076 1,375 1,918 2,604 2,223 3,315 
R2 0.681 0.440   0.517 0.679 
 
Note: All estimates are from an event-study model, using equation (1) and are coefficient 
estimates of variable 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) that measure the differential change in outcomes between the treated 
counties and comparison counties in each 𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡), relative to period -1.  Omitted period -1 is 
calendar year 2005. All models include year and county fixed effects as well as state and county 
level covariates. 𝑙𝑙�−1  of treated counties in New York State is equal to 7.856. Bootstrapped 














Figure 1. Stylized Facts: Time trend in Medicaid spending and property tax rate 
 
  
Panel A.  Medicaid spending per capita (level) Panel B.  Medicaid / Total spending (share) 
Panel C. County only ETR Panel D.  Total countywide property ETR* 
Note: Each dot depicts the simple average value of the dependent variables among all 57 
counties in New York State. Panel C illustrates the county specific tax rate while Panel 
D shows the countywide rate that includes the overlapping local rates levied by other 
local governments within the county area.  Source: New York Office of Real Property 








Figure 2.  Total and Medicaid expenditure: Time trend 
 
Panel A. Growth rate of expenditure 
 
















Panel C. Actual county level Medicaid expenditure and linear projection 
 
Source: New York State Open Book, New York State Comptroller's Office 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report and New York Department of Health 
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Figure 3. Budgetary spill-over effect: Event study estimates (level, per capita amount) 
 
Panel A. Total spending excluding Medicaid 
  
 
Panel B. Debt 
 





Figure 4. Budgetary spill-over effect: Event study estimates (growth rate) 
 
Panel A. ∆log (Total spending excluding Medicaid ) 
 
 
Panel B. ∆log (Unreserved balance) 
  
Panel C. ∆log (General government expenditure ) Panel D. ∆log (Other) 
 
Panel E. General government (share of total budget) 
 
 




Figure 5. Impact of Medicaid cap on property tax levy and rate: Event study estimates 
  
Panel A. County only ETR 
 
 Panel B. Non-county local ETR 
 
Panel C. Log of property tax levy  
 
Panel D. Property tax levy growth 
 
Note: The event study estimates in Panel A compares effective tax rates of 45 NY 
treated counties relative to 12 unaffected NY counties that did not experience a 
negative decline in Medicaid growth rate between 2005 and 2006. Estimates in Panel 
B uses the combined ETRs of overlapping local jurisdictions that levy tax(excluding 
county government) within a  county area as the dependent variable. Estimates in 
Panel C and Panel D are each from models using log of property tax levy amount (in 
2010 constant dollars) and first difference in log of property tax levy as the dependent 









Figure 6. Impact of Medicaid cap on property tax levy growth: Event study estimates 
  
Panel A. States with Medicaid mandate  
 




Panel C.  States with mandate but no levy limit  
 
 
Panel D.  No levy or rate limit (regardless of 
Medicaid mandate) 
 
Note: The event study estimates in Panel A compares 45 NY treated counties 
relative to 1,309 counties in 21 control states. Panel B uses 344 counties in 8 states, 
while Panel C uses 155 counties in 5 states. All comparison units are in states that 
required their localities to pay for Medicaid, with the exception of subgroup used in 
Panel D.  Estimates in Panel D are from a subsample using 1,117 counties in all 19 







Figure 7. Event-study estimates: NY versus various comparison counties in other states 
 




Panel C.   Any tax rate limits (IA, KY) 
 
Panel B. Keep Medicaid mandate (IA, NJ) 
 
 








Panel F. No restrictive tax rate limit (No KY) 
 







Table A1. Robustness checks: DD estimates with alternative specifications 
 





All states  
with mandate 
(B) 
No rate or  
levy limit 
(C) 
No levy limit 
(D) 
No rate or  
levy limit 
(E) 
All states  
with mandate 
 Inverse probability weighting (clustered) 
  
𝜌𝜌1 −0.008 −0.062** −0.161*** −0.069*** −0.101* 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.055) (0.027) (0.055) 
      
 Propensity score as control variable (bootstrap) 
  
𝜌𝜌1 −0.017 −0.062*** −0.111*** −0.066*** −0.099*** 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.034) (0.017) (0.029) 
      
𝑙𝑙−1 0.119 0.073 0.061 0.065 0.061 
N 6,109 2,593 1,373 7,276 3,794 
      
Note: Treated New York counties' mean value of outcome variable is 0.107. 
















Chapter 2.  
 
Estimating Returns to Scale in Property Assessment:   
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  In this paper, we test whether there are diseconomies or economies of scale in property 
assessment. We  examine the cost effects of an alternative policy option for small tax assessing 
jurisdictions other than consolidation. We focus on tax assessing jurisdictions in New York that 
that formed coordinated units that unifies assessing functions, while maintaining their individual 
authority to levy property taxes. We test whether such decisions lead to cost savings and estimate 
the returns to scale in property assessment, using the cost function approach. We address the 
potential selection bias of forming coordinated units with multiple instruments, including the 
spatial intersection of borders and the history of inter-municipal cooperation in providing public 
services among neighboring jurisdictions. We use administrative data on towns and cities in New 
York State from 2003 to 2014. We find evidence that coordination increases adjustment costs in 
the short run among smaller units and leads to economies of scale among relatively larger units. 
This study potentially contributes to the literature on returns to scale in public service provision 
and to the practice of property tax administration. 
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1. Introduction  
In this paper, we aim to estimate the returns to scale in property assessment. The property tax is a 
quintessential source of local revenue and autonomy in the United States. The administration of 
property tax, mainly assessment and collection, is typically decentralized to the county or 
municipality level. One of the major challenges in administering property tax is estimating the 
tax base in a fair and accurate manner, which is the task of the Tax assessors' office of each 
assessing jurisdiction. There are two main features of decentralized assessment: The (1) lower 
the level of government that conducts assessment, (2) the smaller the size of the assessing 
jurisdiction becomes. Property assessment is closely tied to the levy function, both functions 
which reflect fiscal autonomy of local governments. Decentralized property assessment may also 
be conducive to voters' preference revelation that can lead to optimal provision of public goods 
and services (Oates, 1991). In this line of thinking, proponents of decentralization often argue 
that lower level of governments may be more accountable to local residents' demand for public 
services. 
 However, there are apparent tradeoffs for greater accountability and local autonomy. 
Smaller assessing units often are challenged by lack of own-source revenues and human 
resources, which leads to suboptimal assessment practices. Property assessment requires a 
certain level of professionalism, specialized staffs and capital resources to maintain accurate 
valuation of properties. Therefore, there may be potential cost benefits from economies of size as 
long as assessment conducted by each assessor, does not diminish in quality as the number of 
parcels one overlooks increases.  
 There is little evidence on returns to scale in property assessment, but substnatial work on 
other public services. The literature on returns to scale in education (Tholkes, 1991; Pratten, 
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1991; Duncombe & Yinger, 2007) and police or fire services (Wasylenko, 1977; Duncombe & 
Yinger, 1993) provide abundant evidence on the cost benefits from economies of scale. On the 
other hand, other studies have challenged such view through estimation from production 
functions, suggesting that diseconomies of size may arise from lower monitoring pressure and 
staff motivation as well as higher transportation or adjustment costs (Kenny, 1982; Cotton, 1996; 
Howley, 1996; Duncombe & Yinger, 2007).  Whether there are economies or diseconomies of 
scale in property assessment is an empirical question that deserves more attention. Only a couple 
of papers have posed this question, providing only limited descriptive results (Wicks et al., 1967; 
Sjoquist & Walker, 1999). 
 In this paper, we use data from NYS to assess whether merging the property assessing 
function leads to cost savings. Many states including New York have provided financial 
incentives to encourage consolidation of local tax assessing units or centralization of the 
assessment function to counties, under the assumption that this will provide benefits of 
economies of scale. We focus on a certain type of inter-municipal cooperation or reorganization 
of the unit of public service provision, which can be less costly than consolidation. The case we 
study is the formation of a coordinated assessing unit in New York where two or more local 
assessing governments that agree to combine their office of tax assessors, but preserving other 
local autonomy in budgeting and levying taxes.  
 By testing the presence and estimating magnitude of returns to scale using a unique panel 
data set of NY assessing jurisdictions from 2003 to 2014, this paper attempts to estimate an 
optimal jurisdiction size for efficient property tax assessment. Although we use a sample of tax 
assessing jurisdictions in NY, the population of this study is all local governments that play the 
role of tax assessment in a decentralized property tax system. On a broader scale, this paper 
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extends the perennial discussion on equity and efficiency in public service provision to the study 
of property tax administration.  
 
2. Literature Review   
 The existing literature on returns to scale in the provision of public services provides 
mixed evidence of economies and diseconomies of scale. The earlier studies of economies of 
scale on fire, roads, police services and public libraries have relied on ad hoc functional forms 
rather than reflecting on economic theories to model costs (Ahlbrandt, 1973; Walzer, 1972; 
Deller et al., 1988). Later research started adopting Bradford et al (1969) pro duction cost 
function framework, which adapted the economic theory of cost minimization at firm level to the 
public sector (Fox, 1981).  Duncombe & Yinger (1993) introduced compelling estimates in fire 
protection services and provided formal definition of various dimensions in returns to scale. A 
number of empirical studies in the education finance literature employed the cost function 
framework and reported evidence of economies of size, the results of which vary by different 
types of spending (Ratcliffe et al., 1990; Downes & Pogue, 1994; Duncombe et al. 1995) or finds 
an optimal enrollment size that minimizes cost such as Duncombe et al (1996) or Imazeki & 
Reschovsky (2004). Tholkes (1991) and Pratten (1991) summarized the potential mechanism of 
economies of size in education, which also applies to other relevant public service provision: 
Such mechanisms include indivisibilities of labor input, increased dimension conducive for 
sharing capital or technology, specialization, price benefits of scale in purchasing inputs, lower 
cost of innovation and positive learning spillover effects. On the other hand, another strand of 
literature using production function to study the effects of school size on student performance 
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provided counterevidence against such findings (Deller & Rudnicki, 1993;  Walberg & Fowler, 
1987;  Ferguson, 1991; Lee & Smith, 1977).  
 Andrews et al (2002) provide a detailed review of the empirical literature estimating 
returns to scale in education, underlining the methodological limitations across studies such as 
the measurement issue of performance, efficiency and outcome variables. More importantly, they 
outline the importance of addressing simultaneity bias and omitted variable bias in cost function 
models often found in studies that fail to include important determinants of cost or treating 
potentially endogenous variables as exogenous. While most studies relied on cross-sectional 
variation in size, Duncombe and Yinger (2007) is one of the very few studies that studied the 
cost effect of school district consolidation by employing dramatic variation in size of the service 
provider unit over time to estimate the effect on cost. 
 Despite the long history of the property tax in the United States, the academic literature is 
very thin on the returns to scale in property assessment. Among the earlier studies on the cost of 
property tax administration, Netzer (1966) and Wicks and Killworth (1967) were the first study 
to provide jurisdiction specific estimates of property tax administration costs which is 1.5 percent 
of property tax revenue, on average. As of now, there is only one empirical study that examined 
the relation between the size of assessment jurisdiction and assessment costs. Sjoquist and 
Walker (1999) used a sample of 138 county-level assessment offices in Georgia to examine 
economies of scale in assessment cost. Using a translog cost function model, they find evidence 
of significant economies of scale, and estimate the assessment volume elasticity of total cost to 
be 0.3. They suggest that hypothetical consolidation of smaller assessing units would reduce total 
cost by approximately 20%. However, there is no discussion about the potential endogeneity in 
performance measure or consolidation decision, which leads to a biased estimate of the elasticity. 
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Furthermore, their estimates of consolidation's effect on cost is based on hypothetical 
consolidation and grounded in strong assumptions. Therefore in this paper, we intend to 
contribute to the literature on estimating returns to scale by incrementing potential endogenous 
variables and more importantly, by employing a sample of assessing jurisdictions in New York 
that combined assessing functions with neighboring jurisdictions. 
 
3. Property Assessment in the State of New York  
 As a strong home rule state, New York State has a highly decentralized property tax 
system. Even though the number of assessing units has declined since 1983 when there used to 
be 1,546 assessing units, there are still 994 local governments including mostly towns (932) and 
cities (62) that conduct property assessment. Variations in assessment practices across the 
assessing jurisdictions in NY is large. Many of the 994 assessing units are small and rural 
jurisdictions that are challenged to conduct reappraisal on a regular basis. In addition to the size 
and environmental characteristics of assessing jurisdictions, there is a wide variation in the 
individual level traits of assessors as well as other institutional features of the assessment system 
(such as assessment cycle or ratio) in NY. 
 There are 524 jurisdictions where 180 assessors serve for multiple jurisdictions instead of 
having a sole-assessor per jurisdiction (ORPTS, 2011). By 2017, in more than 94% assessing 
jurisdictions, assessors are appointed by the municipal board, while less than 6% of assessing 
jurisdictions electing assessors (ORPTS, 2017)33. The increasing trend of appointing assessors 
                                                          
33  A few number of jurisdictions that elect assessors either maintain boards of three elected assessors or elect a sole 
assessor. The length of each term for appointed or sole elected assessors is six years, while the three elected assessor 
members of a board serve for four years.   
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reflect the movement toward professionalism since appointed assessors are better insulated from 
political pressure than elected assessors.  
 Assessing jurisdictions in NY are also not bound by any legal requirement of uniform 
cycle or ratio of assessment. Each assessing jurisdiction has its own tax calendar and inconsistent 
level or cycle of reassessment across time. Instead of mandating a specific ratio or cycle, the 
State government of New York provides three different types of financial aid programs to assist 
property assessment functions at the local level. First, instead of mandating a specific 
reassessment cycle, New York provides Cyclical Reassessment Aid as an incentive for assessing 
jurisdictions to conduct reappraisal more frequently. Second, the state government provides aid 
through Consolidated, Coordinated and County Assessment Program. To encourage reduction in 
the number of small assessing jurisdictions, the NY state government introduced a Coordination 
Assessment Program (CAP) in 1994 as an intermediary alternative for consolidation, since 
consolidating two or more local governments is a long process and may incur high political and 
adjustment costs.  
 All CAP agreements requires a majority vote of the Town or City Board in order to be 
implemented. The main agreements of a CAP include employing a single assessor, assessing at a 
uniform percentage of market value, using the same assessment calendar and preparing a single 
assessment roll among participating jurisdictions. Total cost for assessment would initially be 
incurred by a participating jurisdiction that is the employer of a sole assessor, but then shared by 
other participants on a pro-rata basis of the total number of parcels within each jurisdiction. All 
parcels in participating jurisdictions within the same CAP will be assessed at the same uniform 
percent of the full market value. The state government also reports identical equalization rates 
for jurisdictions in the same CAP. On the other hand, each participating jurisdiction maintains 
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their assessment appeal proceedings separately and can individually file complaints against the 
state's calculation of equalization rate. Furthermore, while the jurisdictions share assessment 
function, they impose different tax rates for each local government unit in a county or a school 
district.  
 CAP participants receive a one-time lump sum payment of state aid in the year they unify 
their assessing functions with their neighbors. The maximum amount of state aid payed to each 
municipality is capped at $140,000 (which used to be maximum $7 per parcel since 1996) until 
2005. Since 2006, the payment was limited to $100,000 per municipality. Between 2000 and 
2010, 101 jurisdictions have newly participated in 51 CAPs while 17 units have dissolved. We 
utilize such variation in CAP activity which can be translated into variation in size of assessing 
units, in order to estimate the returns to scale in our analysis.  
 
4. Analytical Framework and Models 
4.1. Cost Function Framework 
 We follow the standard cost function approach for estimating returns to scale in public 
production developed by Bradford et al (1969). The cost function approach relies on the 
economic theory of cost minimization for the provision of public goods and services, and uses a 
modified version of the standard private sector cost function at the firm level. We adopt the 
framework commonly used in the Education finance literature for studying  the cost effect of 
school district consolidation, and adapt it to the context of property tax assessment (Duncombe 
& Yinger, 1993; 2007; 2011; Duncombe et al., 1995; Downes & Pogue, 1994; Imazeki & 
Reschovsky, 2004).  
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The process of providing property assessment service might be relatively simpler than the 
provision of other public services, because other services involves different types of resources 
and multiple actors with vested interests.  In a cost model for public production process for local 
assessing jurisdictions. The tax assessing local governments employ various inputs (denoted by 
the vector 𝑰𝑰𝒊𝒊) such as personnel cost for hiring a full-time assessor and staffs in the assessing 
office or contractual expenses should they hire external contractors to conduct field visits for 
property assessment. The various inputs will be translated into intermediate output of  property 
assessment service, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖), such as revaluation of property values or updating tax maps and 
conducting a sales ratio study. 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 also reflects the production technology that translates factor 
inputs to actual activity of property assessment. Nevertheless, largely due to the limitation of 
data on detailed inputs and intermediate outputs, we instead use performance measures of 
property assessment service such as the coefficient of dispersion that ultimately matter to the 
voters as the final output, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖. The key mission of property assessment is to minimize the variation 
in assessment ratio across home owners. The performance of property assessment, if measured 
by the coefficient of dispersion (COD) that reflects assessment uniformity, is also a function of 
the intermediate output (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖); physical factors such as total number of parcels (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖) that needs to be 
assessed as well as other neighborhood and jurisdiction level environment variables including 
population density ( 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ). The performance model can be written as the following: 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 =
ℎ(𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) or ℎ(𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖),𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖).  
The associated cost function that models the minimum cost for property assessment 
conditional on best technology available, can be written as 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖),𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖) ; where cost is a 
function of intermediate output and input prices (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖). The conventional approach is to use actual 
expenditure as a proxy of Ci, the underlying assumption of which is constant dollar per unit of 
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public service produced. Cost Ci may be equal to observed total expenditure (EXi) for property 
assessment, assuming no technical inefficiency within the assessing unit. Solving the 
performance model for G, and substituting into cost function equation, while replacing C with 
actual operating expenditure of the assessment office in jurisdition i, EXi, we get the following 
cost function form:   
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑙[ℎ−1(𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖),𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖] = 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆                                 (1) 
 
where 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 indicates personnel cost in assessor's office, as the price of major factor input. We 
assume that the price of capital input is the same across assessing jurisdictions within NY State, 
following Sjoquist & Walker(1999). Based on an additional assumption about unity elasticity of 
all inputs, the Cobb Douglas cost function equation (2) can be transformed to a flexible logged 
form that is estimable using linear regression methods and panel data as the following: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑁𝑁)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑆𝑆)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑊𝑊)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡.     (2) 
Among the three dimensions in public service provision (i.e. returns to S, G and N), we 
focus on estimating the change in assessment expenditure with changes in jurisdiction size, 
measured by the total number of parcels. Using parameters from equation (2) and its variants, we 
can estimate economies/diseconomies of size in assessment. The elasticity between property 
assessment expenditure per parcel (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) and jurisdiction size (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡),  
∂EX/N
∂N
 can be estimated 
by β from equation (2). If assessment cost per parcel declines by increasing total number of 
parcels, we suggest there is economies of size in property assessment, controlling for assessment 
uniformity and other socio-economic cost related factors. While the elasticity estimate consists 
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of technical economies of scale and congestion, we do not need to separate the two for our main 
purpose. Unlike the case of fire protection where Duncombe & Yinger (1993) raise the issue of 
congestion, we assume that the environmental factors such as population density do not affect 
factor substitution in property assessment activity. In other words, we consider the potential 
effect of a unit increase in the jurisdiction size on the level of property reassessment (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ) 
required to maintain a given level of assessment uniformity (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) to be independent of the 
environment variables (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖).  Our context is also in a single-product scenario; we do not separate 
different classes of properties as multi-product. This is a result of the data available, because we 
only observe total cost and input costs for assessment of all properties and not by class. In other 
words, we disregard economies of scope because we pool properties in all classes.                    
The estimable expenditure model in equation (2) allows flexibility to add interaction or 
nonlinear terms of the size variable. We add quadratic terms of the variable ln(N)it to test if 
(dis)economies of size diminish with size and identifying an inflection point that can be 
informative. The inflection point would indicate the minimum size of assessing unit where the 
total cost starts to decline instead of increase. Also, we include share of parcels that are exempted 
from assessment in the vector Zit to partially capture inefficiency in property assessment function. 
This reflects reported complaints from town assessors about how the process of identifying 
exempt parcels take away the limited time and staff resource that needs to be spent on actual 
reappraisal. In interviews conducted as part of this study and a survey conducted through the 
New York Association of Assessors, assessors reported that administering large quantity and 
categories of property tax exemptions (reviewing renewals) is one of the major challenges for 
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assessment (Bick, 2016) 34 .  If there are any bureaucratic inefficiencies among assessing 
jurisdictions that cannot be directly observed, we assume they would not vary over time which 
should be absorbed by the jurisdiction fixed effect,  δ . The baseline assessment expenditure 
model is as follows35:   
 
ln (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑁𝑁)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2[𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑁𝑁)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡]2 + 𝜏𝜏 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑆𝑆)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑊𝑊)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 +
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡.                           (3) 
The literature underlines the importance of accounting for the potential simultaneity bias 
of the voters' demand for services affecting both the expenditure and outcome measures (Fox, 
1981; Andrews et al., 2002). Instead of including output measures in the final expenditure model, 
Ratcliffe et al(1990) and Downes & Pogue (1994) indirectly model 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  by incorporating a 
behavioral model of demand for education services and substituting decisive median voter's 
demand equation into the cost function. However, one caveat of this approach is that the 
measurement error in modeled outcome measures may bias the elasticity estimates. Instead, we 
treat 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 as endogenous and employ exogenous determinants of demand for assessment uniformity 
as instruments in our final structural equation.  Following Duncombe & Yinger (2007) approach 
which is an extension of Case et al’s (1993) classic "copycat" theory, we assume that the median-
voter demand for property assessment services among median voters within a given jurisdiction 
may partly be influenced by neighboring jurisdictions' assessment performances and assessment 
uniformity. We use median tax share and average residential COD among neighboring 
                                                          
34 Robert Bick, Assessor, Town of Clay, New York, Personal interview, September 27, 2017; Robert Harris, 
Assessor, Flat Creek of Montgomery County, New York & William F. Roehr, Managing Principal, Montgomery 
County, New York, April 21, 2017. 
35 An alternative is following Duncombe & Yinger's approach (1998, 2001, 2007) where they model efficiency 
based on observable characteristics that may affect (in)efficiency via monitoring efforts among voters and local 
officials' incentives to assess more efficiently. 
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jurisdiction within the same county to instrument for 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . We use the same theory to select 
instruments for assessor wage, 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 : The determinants of county level local labor market 
conditions such as wage in the manufacturing industry or relevant private sector as well as 
unemployment rates are used as instruments for assessor salary.  
 4.2. Empirical Model 
Unlike previous cost function research that relies on cross sectional data, the main source 
of variation we exploit is changes in assessing units over time. Specifically, we observe variation 
in size when a jurisdiction enters a CAP and combines its assessing function with its neighbors 
CAP participants. In order to cope with potential endogeneity in their decisions to join a CAP, 
we use multiple instruments based on the intersection of geographic borders and the history of 
inter-municipal cooperation in providing public services in a standard IV model. The outcome 
equation and treatment equation can be summarized as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑼𝑼it, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)         (4) 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃(𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑿𝑿it,𝑼𝑼it)          (5) 
 
where 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  denotes the dependent variable which is ln (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) ; 𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  is a vector of other 
endogenous determinants outlined in the cost function (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡); 𝑼𝑼it is a vector of 
time varying unobservable traits of jurisdiction i and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the error term from the expenditure 
outcome equation. 𝑃𝑃it is a dummy of CAP decision that equals to 1 if a jurisdiction i enter a CAP 
or were already in a CAP during the sample period and 0 otherwise. 𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is a vector of instrument 
variables for the CAP decision which will be elaborated below. Our underlying assumption of 




𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ⊥ 𝑼𝑼it, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 |𝑿𝑿it                                             (6) 
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ⊥ 𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝)it |𝑿𝑿it for all p ∈ 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)            (7) 
In this paper, we estimate the economies of size among jurisdictions that became larger 
assessing units after joining a CAP. Therefore, we construct a new measure of size that reflects 
the CAP decision defined as the following: 
�     𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + �𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖
)    if  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 1 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 1                          
𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡   if  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 0                                                                        
 
 
where jurisdiction i and jurisdiction j are neighboring towns/cities in county c that become CAP 
partners. 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  is an indicator of CAP participation that is 1 for all years if a jurisdiction ever 
entered a CAP during the sample period. We assume that the size of neighboring jurisdiction j is 
exogenous to jurisdiction i. The size of a jurisdiction i participating in a CAP equals to the 
original 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 before joining a CAP jurisdiction and only becomes the enlarged 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 after they 
enter a CAP. For jurisdictions that never entered a CAP during the sample period, 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  are 
coded as 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 for all years. This adjustment in the measure of size should also be reflected in the 
measure of the dependent variable which is newly defined as follows: 
�  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖
)   if  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 1 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 1                          
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡   if  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 0                                                                               
 
 
The final model to be estimated by 2SLS is an extension of equation (3), but replaces the 
size and cost per parcel variables with the adjusted measures defined as above. This model also 
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includes additional time varying observable covariates that are expected to be correlated with 
both 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  for a jurisdiction i in county c and year t. All covariates for CAP 
participants in years they are in a CAP (whose 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 1) should also be adjusted accordingly. In 
other words, the values of random variables in vector 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  should be converted to the average of 
all CAP participants' values, weighted by population for demographic variables and by number 
of parcels for property related variables. The final structural expenditure model is expressed as 
follows: 
ln (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡/𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2[𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡]2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑆𝑆)𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸)𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 +
𝜆𝜆 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑊𝑊)𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝜌𝜌 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅)𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + Π𝐗𝐗ict + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡                               (8) 
 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 denotes state aid received for property assessment (including the one-time, lump sum 
amount of state aid for joining a CAP); 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  indicates years since last reassessment and 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 
represents a vector of exogenous characteristics of jurisdiction i. In order to isolate an unbiased 
estimate of the returns to size in assessment, it is important to control for other potential channels 
through which CAP may affect assessment expenditure. One of these alternative channels is state 
aid, since CAP participants receive financial award by the state government. The direction of 
potential omitted variable bias in our elasticity estimate by excluding 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  is ambiguous: 
Although state aid is significantly and positively correlated with  CAP by construct, state aid 
(that often comes along with technical assistance) may either contribute to cost savings or it can 
lead to an increase in assessment expenditure. Nonetheless, it is important to include state 
financial assistance for property assessment in the model. We also control for the confounding 
effects of changes in reassessment cycle, to account for the possibility that jurisdictions that enter 
a CAP may be able to save costs by conducting reappraisal more frequently with their partners.  
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Another alternative channel is through changes in the level of assessment, since jurisdictions in a 
CAP are required to assess at the uniform % of true value. If entering a CAP leads to increase in 
the level of assessment through conducting more frequent assessment, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 may partly capture 
this effect on cost. As a robustness check, we test to see if our elasticity estimate is sensitive to 
the inclusion of level of assessment variable measured by state equalization rates.  
The covariates in vector 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  includes share of exempt parcels; share of commercial 
parcels; share of industrial parcels, population density, and population growth. The extent to 
which administrative environment changes over time at the town and city level is limited, and we 
expect the jurisdiction fixed effect 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  will capture any adjustment costs not associated with 
𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  but correlated with 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  and the dependent variable. In several specifications, we also 
include CAP unit specific linear time trend. We weight our estimates by the original parcel count 
of each jurisdiction.  
Following the cost function literature we use instruments for 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 by relying on 
the copy cat or yardstick theory, as in Duncombe & Yinger (2007). We assume that districts are 
influenced by decisions of similar comparable jurisdiction’s decisions (in the same labor market 
area) and treat the neighbor jurisdictions' characteristics as exogenous to actual assessment cost 
in jurisdiction i at year t. The final instruments for  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 are the average amount of 
reassessment state aid received and years since last reassessment among neighboring 
jurisdictions within the same county.  
We use three instruments for 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  and 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  in our final empirical model. The first 
instrument is the number of CAPs formed in the same county, excluding jursidiction i.  This 
reflects the exposure to an environment of collaboration among neighboring tax assessing 
jurisdictions. We hypothesize that the more number of CAPs formed in the same county, the 
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greater the probability for a given jurisdiction to enter a CAP. Indeed we observe positive 
correlation between this first instrument and the predicted probability of joining a CAP as shown 
in Figure 1. 
z1,ict = ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡| 𝑘𝑘, 𝑙𝑙 in the same county, 𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘≠𝑖𝑖     
 
The other two instruments reflect jurisdictions' exposure and opportunities for inter-
municipal cooperation for providing public services other than tax assessment. We use 
administrative data on state aid provided to municipalities that committed to collaborating with 
neighboring local governments. The second instrument is the mean count of other jurisdictions k 
who had experience in sharing the role of providing public services with its neighbor 
jurisdictions in the same county, which can be expressed as follows: 
 
z2,ict = ∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘≠𝑖𝑖 | 𝑘𝑘, 𝑙𝑙 in the same county, 𝑙𝑙   
 
wherez2,ict denotes the second instrument and 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 is a dummy indicator for jurisdiction 
k in the county c that had any experience in sharing public service with other towns or cities in 
the same county and received state aid for such collaborative activities at year t. The underlying 
hypothesis is that there would be a positive relation between the second instrument and decision 
to join a CAP, implicitly grounded on the assumption of path dependency behavior. 
The third instrument is inspired by the so-called Bartik instrument or "shift-share" 
instrument that utilizes the interaction between variation in inflow of immigrants at the national 
level with immigrant's past geographic distribution at the city level  to identify a short run casual 
effect of migration on various outcomes. In this paper, we adopt the intuition of using variation 
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at the higher level of government and interacting with jurisdiction level spatial variation that 
does not vary over time and is exogenous to a jurisdiction's spending decisions at time t. We 
construct the third instrument, z3,ict, which is the frequency of county c's 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 with other 
county governments 36  ( COUNTYSHAREct) , multiplied by the relative size of neighboring 
jurisdictions whose borders are contiguous to that of a given jurisdiction i.  
z3,ict =
# of 𝑘𝑘 with contiguous borders with 𝑖𝑖,   in county 𝑐𝑐  
# of 𝑘𝑘,   in county 𝑐𝑐
 ∙ COUNTYSHAREct 
 
We also instrument for the quadratic size variable, [𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡]2, following Wooldridge 
(2000)37. The first stage model can be expressed as the following equation (9) or alternatively, 
use a multi-year average (three recent years until year t) values of the three instruments in vector 
𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 as the regressors in the first stages.  
 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = π0 + π1𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + Π𝐗𝐗ict + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡   (9) 
 
ln(NCict) = π0 + π1𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + Π𝐗𝐗ict + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡   (10) 
 
ln(NCict) = π0 + π1 ∑ 𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡=𝑧𝑧−2 + Π𝐗𝐗ict + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡            (11) 
 
As a robustness check, we use a control function approach, running separate first stage 
regressions for each of the three key endogenous variables (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and [𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡]2) as 
well as the four endogenous covariates ( 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,  𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) on all exogenous variables then 
                                                          
36 Mean count of counties that a given county c shares public services with, in year t 
37 We first run the first stage regression with 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  as the dependent variable and after obtaining the predicted outcome, 
use the squared term of the predicted value as an instrument for   [𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡]2 in the second stage regression. 
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retrieve residuals from each regression. The second stage regressions include the residuals as 
additional regressors in equation (8). 
 
 
5. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
Our sample is comprised of 760 tax assessing towns and cities in New York State, 78 of 
which participated in 38 CAPs between 2003 and 2014. We exclude Tompkins and Nassau 
county that conduct property assessment at the county level. A third county, Montgomery 
centralized assessment to the county level in 2018, which is outside the sample period. All 
expenditure data are inflation adjusted to 2003 values. Table 4 lists the year each CAP was 
formed and dissolved during the sample period.  
We use annual expenditure and tax revenue data from the New York Local Financial 
Data published by the New York State Comptroller's Office. We match these data to a rich set of 
jurisdiction-level administrative information related to assessment behaviors and local 
environment from the New York Office of Real Property Tax Services (ORPTS). Data provided 
by the ORPTS include logged total assessed value of exempt parcels, parcel count by property 
class, number of exempt parcels per property class, reassessment ratio, year of reassessment and 
annual records of state aid receipt for property assessment by program.  
The New York state Office of Real Property Tax Services (ORPTS) only reports COD 
for a sample of assessing units that have not conduced revaluation over the past three years prior 
to the market value survey year. We also construct performance variables using parcel level sales 
data from annual New York Market Value Survey. For this study, we use the annual market value 
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survey data to calculate an annual COD for each assessing unit. We restrict our parcel level data 
to arms-length sales so as to exclude outliers from anomaly. Then we focus on three major sub-
classes of residential property, which are one-family year-round residence, rural residence with 
acreage, and two-family year-round residence. Together, these three classes account for a very 
high (to add %) percentage of the data, that is, they are the most representative. From these three 
classes, we develop two measures for use in the tests, one is of all three classes and the other is 
only of single-family year-round residences.  We normalize COD in the(?) negative natural 
logarithm form, due to the skewed distribution of COD and for the ease of interpretation, so that 
a positive coefficient on  𝑺𝑺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 would suggest improvement in assessment uniformity.  
We retrieve records of inter-municipal cooperation from the Division of Local 
Government and School Accountability within the Office of the NY State Comptroller. The state 
aid program for inter-municipal cooperation was initiated in 2005, therefore we are able to 
observe cases of collaboration in public service provision only from 2005 to 2014. We also 
calculate border contingency among jurisdictions using the ArcMap10 software and the civil 
boundaries shape file provided by the NYS GIS Clearinghouse. 
We collect median value housing price from the Market Value Survey data for 
constructing median tax share variable. For demographic variables, we use population density 
data from American Housing Survey and population growth from the New York State 
Comptroller's office. County level unemployment rate is provided by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and county level private sector wage is from the New York Department of Labor. 
Tables 1 and 2 each provide a list of data sources and summary statistics of variables used in this 
study.   
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Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of change in assessment costs among 78 
jurisdictions that participated in CAP units in our sample period. The total assessment costs 
(aggregate, not per parcel) seem to be low, on average, after combining their assessing functions 
with their neighbors by participating in a CAP. Most of this reduction in total costs seems to be 
driven by cost savings in personnel cost, while contractual expenses increase. There also seems 
to be lagged effects, where initially the total costs increase in the first year of participating in a 
CAP, possibly due to various adjustment costs. The CAP participants seem to experience cost 
saving between the second and the third year. Appendix Table 1 lists the total, personnel and 
contractual costs by each jurisdiction that participated in a CAP.  
 
6. Results 
6.1. Instrument Validity  
In order to get unbiased estimate of returns to scale, we first examine whether the 
instruments employed in our analysis are valid. Valid instruments for the CAP decision and 
newly constructed size variables should be good predictors of the endogenous variables, but not 
directly determine the total expenditure on assessment. The same logic applies to the four 
endogenous covariates.  
Figure 1 depicts the first stage relationship between each instrument and the potentially 
endogenous decision to join a CAP. The vertical axis on the left-hand side of each graph 
indicates jurisdictions' probability of joining a CAP and the second vertical axis shows the 
density of each instrumental variable's histogram. Panel A shows a strong positive relationship 
between the count of other CAPS within the same county and individual jurisdiction's decision to 
enter a CAP in a given year. Panel B suggests that there might be a quadratic relation between a 
given jurisdiction's exposure to inter-municipal cooperation for providing public service among 
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neighboring jurisdictions and the likelihood of deciding to combine the assessing function with 
its neighbors. Panels C and D suggests that county-level exposure for sharing the role of public 
service provision as well as the third instrument, z3,ict  are both positively correlated with a 
jurisdiction's probability of joining a CAP. In the main analysis, we assess whether our 
instruments are weak by checking conditional first-stage f-test statistics. Since we have multiple 
endogenous variables, we refer to the Cragg–Donald statistic and compare the f statistic with 
simulated critical values from Stock & Yogo (2005). The Cragg-Donald F-statistics for all 2SLS 
models using these multiple instruments are above the critical value and thus passed the weak 
instrument test. 
 Second, we check the exogeneity assumption. We assess whether the instruments and 
errors are uncorrelated in all periods and we conduct a balancing test to see whether the 
exclusion restriction condition holds. Table 5 shows that there is no individual or joint statistical 
significance between covariates and the three instruments. The same holds for other four 
endogenous covariates, which is not reported in this table, but available upon request. In Tables 6 
and 7, we report the p values of the Hansen J test, the null hypothesis of which is that the 
excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term: We fail to reject this null hypothesis 
under all models. We also show whether the instruments are orthogonal to jurisdiction level 
characteristic, such as share of exempt, industrial and commercial parcels, population density 
and average tax share.  
 
 6.2. Empirical Results 
Tables 6 and 7 report the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the relation between size of 
assessing unit and total assessment costs. In all 2SLS models, the size of assessing unit, a 
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quadratic term of the size variable, a dummy indicator of decision to join a CAP are all 
instrumented. Log of assessor wage per parcel, log of state aid and reassessment frequency as 
well as negative log of COD are also treated as endogenous variables in the 2SLS models. The 
first three columns show the effect estimates in the year a given jurisdiction joined a CAP, while 
the next three columns show the cost effect a year after participating in a CAP. Similarly, the last 
three columns show the lagged effects after two years. 
The results in Table 6 shows that that assessment costs increase with assessing unit size 
at a decreasing rate, which is significant at 95% confidence level. The main difference across 
different specification is the magnitude of coefficients on size variables that leads to variation in 
the marginal effect of size and the turning point. In the baseline 2SLS model in column (2) for 
instance, an additional percent increase in size is positively associated with total cost for 
assessing units that have fewer than 3,385 parcels, while the marginal effect of size becomes 
negative for assessing units that have more than 3,385 parcels. In other words, assessing units 
whose sizes are smaller than the turning point experience diseconomies of scale, while the larger 
units are the ones that benefit from economies of scale. 3,385 parcels is less than the mean, 
which is 3,936 and lies between the median and top quartile in the distribution of total number of 
parcels within each assessing unit. This figure is also relatively larger than the average number of 
parcels among jurisdictions that ever participated in CAPs (which is 2,105) and smaller than the 
average count among jurisdictions that never participate in CAPs during our sample period 
(which is 3,597).  
Figure 2 illustrates the marginal effect of assessing unit's size on assessment cost, 
graphically. These graphs help us to see the time trend or potential lagged effects of CAP 
participation and compare effect estimates across different specifications. Panel A summarizes 
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the effect estimates from the first three columns in Table 6 and 7. The negative relationship 
between assessment cost and size of assessing unit is more pronounced among 2SLS estimates. 
The bias from OLS estimates appears to attenuate the estimates of diseconomies of size. The 
findings also hold across three years since joining a CAP. 
Panels B to D each show the 2SLS estimates across three post years for different 
specifications: Each panel show the estimates from the baseline 2SLS models (columns 2, 5, 8 in 
Tables 6 and 7), models including linear trend (columns 3, 6, 9 in Tables 6 and 7) and from 
models using three year average instead of yearly values of instrumental variables (from Table 8). 
The baseline estimates suggest larger lagged effects with steeper negative slope a year after than 
the year a given jurisdiction joined a CAP. The turning point is also the smallest in the first year: 
This indirectly implies that on average, more assessing units experience economies of scale in 
the first year than the following year. The effect estimates also remain relatively stable when 
using three year average values of the three instrumental variables for CAP (Z1,ict, Z2,ict, Z3,ict) 
instead of yearly values. The estimates using three year average values of instruments as illustrated 
in Panel C, Figure 2 suggest that the marginal effect is larger in the year after a given jurisdiction 
enters a CAP, relative to the first year.  
 On the other hand, when controlling for jurisdiction-specific linear trend, the estimate of 
the marginal effect of size on assessment cost is relatively smaller than that from other 
specifications, in the year a jurisdiction joined a CAP, as shown in Panel A in Figure 2 38. 
Estimates in columns (3), (6) and (9) in Table 6 are from models that include jurisdiction-
specific linear time trend, to account for local level characteristics in each jurisdiction that 
change in a linear way and correlated with both assessment costs and the decision to enter a CAP. 
Inclusion of such linear time trend do not affect the statistical significance of coefficients on the 
                                                          
38 Also, the marginal effects show to be largest in the year a jurisdiction joined a CAP rather than later years. 
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size variables across most specifications, although the turning point is relatively smaller than 
other 2SLS estimates in Table 6. However, in Table 7, 𝛽𝛽1  and 𝛽𝛽2  estimates are no longer 
statistically significant when we include jurisdiction-specific linear time trend, in the year of 
joining a CAP and two years after. Not including the linear time trend would only bias the 
coefficients of size variables and Pict, should there be a systematic relationship between the trend 
in assessment costs and participation in a CAP. For instance, we should be concerned of omitted 
variable bias if jurisdictions enter a CAP, largely due to rising trend in assessment budget, which 
would lead to a positive bias of our estimates. However, the coefficients of Pict (dummy indicator 
of entering a CAP) show to be larger when controlling for jurisdiction time trend as shown in 




In this essay, we test whether larger tax assessing units may be able to save costs for 
property assessment. We utilize the expansion in size of assessing unit (or total count of parcels) 
among assessing jurisdictions that combine their assessment function with their neighbors as 
main source of variation to estimate the returns to scale in property assessment. Based on the 
economic theory of cost minimization we adapt the cost function framework widely used in the 
school and fire district consolidation literature. We address the potential selection bias of each 
jurisdiction's decision to form a coordinated unit with multiple instruments, which are 
constructed by using spatial intersection of jurisdiction boundaries and inter-municipal 
cooperation among neighboring jurisdictions for providing other types of public services.  
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We find significant and unbiased evidence of diseconomies of scale among small units 
and economies of scale among larger units. The positive association between total assessment 
cost and size among smaller units suggest that the increases in adjustment costs. The potential 
mechanism for diseconomies of scale for smaller units may be either through higher 
transportation costs or changes in other assessment behaviors such as more frequent 
reassessment or shifting from contracting out to conducting in-house assessment. Although we 
do not fully unpack potential mechanisms in this paper, the descriptive statistics suggest that the 
initial adjustment costs during the first three years are higher for smaller assessing units. On the 
other hand, assessing units that become sufficiently large (ranging from 3,385 to 4,355) post-
CAP, benefit from positive economies of scale.  
In this essay we have explored an alternative policy for small tax assessing jurisdictions 
aside from consolidation which is politically costly. The presence of economies or diseconomies 
of size has important policy implications on the design of local property tax system, but also for 
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Table 1. Variables and data source 
Variables Source 
Performance measure(S): Assessment quality  
Calculated COD NY Market Value Survey 
  
Resources (Expenditure and Revenue)  
Assessment Budget 
State Comptroller's Office 
- Assessment operation (C) 
(Personal services, assessors fees,  
equipment & capital outlay, contractual expenses, 
employment benefits) 
- Real property tax levy 
- State aid for real property tax 




Level of assessment: locally reported AR 
State Equalization rate 
Log assessed value of exempt properties 
Reassessment activity: frequency, dummy, first year 
Method of revaluation: CAMA, Appraise 
Property tax levy, nominal rate  




Environment variables (E)  
Median house values as share of median income Census, NY Market Value Survey 
Population growth rate (annual) Census Intercensal dataset 
Population density  American Housing Survey 
Share of each property classes (annual) ORPTS 
Number of sales of single family houses NY Market Value Survey 
Log of county average wage per industry NY Department of Labor 














 2005  2011 
(Unit: Inflation adjusted $) CAP Non-CAP  CAP Non-CAP 
 
     
Assessment cost (per capita)      
Total assessment  17.80 24.09  16.88 21.51 
Operating  12.19 18.66  11.63 17.64 
Personnel 11.49 18.04  11.31 17.30 
Contractual expense 5.61 5.42  5.24 3.86 
      
State aid (per capita)      
Any assessment state aid 2.75 1.75  1.37 0.66 
Frequent reassessment aid 0.44 0.46  0.10 0.24 
County aid 0.007 0.004  0.005 0.001 
      
Revenue and other spending      
Property tax levy 499 674  392 555 
Non-assessment expenditure 1,132 1,616  1,048 1,547 
      
    CAP Non-CAP  CAP Non-CAP 
Assessment outcome      
COD 29.77 36.02  24.75 28.93 
State EQR 89.19 72.24  92.56 73.71 
Residential AR 82.23 64.99  91.26 72.39 
      
Environment      
Agricultural/Total (%) 7.25 4.41  6.70 3.90 
Residential/Total (%) 58.80 62.87  59.12 63.27 
Commercial/Total (%) 3.03 3.79  2.93 3.76 
Industrial/Total (%) 0.84 0.67  0.95 0.67 
      
Exempt parcels/Total (%) 12.14 15.95  12.20 15.59 
      
Population density 173.91 508.02    155.29   365.41 
Total parcel 2,298 4,460  2,307  3,667 
Median household income ($) 53,046 55,697  48,482 50,487 
Median house value ($) 112,208 102,521  99,162 96,061 






Table 3. Change in assessment costs among CAP participants 
 
 Assessment costs  
(Unit: Inflation adjusted $) 
Total 
assessment  Personnel 
Contractual 
expense # of parcel 
 
    
Before 43,087 31,622 8,634 2,915 
After (all post year average) 35,723 24,462 10,476 5,503 
     
One year after 51,072 31,235 13,597  
Two years after 41,476 29,832 11,163  
Three years after 41,912 29,838 11,848  
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Table 4. Creation of coordinated units over time 











Cayuga County C.A.P. #2 2016 2 
Herkimer County C.A.P. #2 
 
3 
Madison County C.A.P. #2 
 
3 
Ontario County C.A.P. #1 2008 2 
Warren County C.A.P. #3 2014 2 
Washington County C.A.P. #1 2013 2 




Schoharie County C.A.P. #2 
 
3 





  Hamilton County C.A.P. #1 2004 
 
3 
Genesee County C.A.P. #1 2005 
 
3 
    Lewis County C.A.P. #1 2006 
(3) 
2019 2 
Livingston County C.A.P. #3 2018 2 
Washington County C.A.P. #2 2016 2 
 
 





Cattaraugus County C.A.P. #2 2014 2 
Delaware County C.A.P. #2 
 
2 
Dutchess County C.A.P. #1 
 
2 
Dutchess County C.A.P. #2 
 
2 
Dutchess County C.A.P. #3 
 
2 
Genesee County C.A.P. #2 
 
2 
Genesee County C.A.P. #3 
 
2 
Jefferson County C.A.P. #1 
 
2 
Jefferson-Lewis County CAP #2 2019 2 
Lewis County C.A.P. #2 2014 2 
Livingston County C.A.P. #4 
 
2 
Madison County C.A.P. #3 
 
4 
Niagara County C.A.P. #1 
 
2 
Orleans County C.A.P. #2   2 






Chemung-Tioga County C.A.P. #1 2015 3 
Columbia County C.A.P. #1  2 
Erie County C.A.P. #1 2014 2 
Essex County C.A.P. #1 2014 3 
Jefferson County C.A.P. #3 2014 2 
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Lewis County C.A.P. #3  2 
Montgomery County C.A.P. #1  2 
Schuyler County C.A.P. #3 2010 2 
Schuyler County C.A.P. #4 2014 2 
    
Genesee County C.A.P. #4 2009  2 
Onondaga County C.A.P. #3 (2)  2 
    
Onondaga County C.A.P. #4 2010  2 
Schuyler County C.A.P. #1 (2)  5 
    
Cattaraugus County C.A.P. #3 2011   2 
 
. 
Table 5. Validity of instruments for the decision to join a CAP: Balance test  
 (1) (2) (3) 
DV: Z1,ict Z2,ict Z3,ict 
    
Share of exempt parcels -10.4909 69.724 2.1901 
 (6.9835) (19.646) (1.4473) 
Share of commercial -1.0356 -9.292 -0.6479 
 (2.7864) (13.701) (0.4975) 
Share of industrial 0.7209 -41.359 3.4162 
 (12.5966) (54.205) (2.9287) 
Population density -0.0002 -0.00106 -0.0001 
 (0.0005) (0.00078) (0.0001) 
Mean tax share -0.8383 6.597 -0.3332 
 (1.9426) (5.184) (0.2185) 
    
Year f.e. Y Y Y 
Jurisdiction f.e. Y Y Y 
F test 0.48 8.03 3.60 
    
Note:  Total number of observations is 8,464 (851 municipalities).
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Note: Other endogenous variables included in the 2SLS models are assessor wage per parcel, state aid, reassessment 
frequency and COD.  Total number of observation are 8,466 (851 unique municipalities).  Standard errors clustered at the 
jurisdiction level reported in parentheses. Exogenous covariates from the models include Share of exempt parcels, Share 
of commercial parcels, Share of industrial parcels, population density, population growth and Median tax share. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
            
DV: Same year as CAP 
               Ln(Cost/NCAPict) 
 One year after CAP 
             Ln(Cost/NCAPict+1) 
 Two years after CAP 
               Ln(Cost/NCAPict+2) 
 OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
            
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳(𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵) 1.177** 4.405** 5.217**  1.162** 6.100*** 5.460**  1.286*** 4.671*** 5.6480** 
 (0.4788) (2.139) (2.292)  (0.474) (2.252) (2.319)  (0.384) (1.755) (2.6302) 
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳(𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵)𝟐𝟐 -0.069** -0.271** -0.329**  -0.072** -0.364*** -0.354**  -0.078*** -0.281*** -0.3825** 
 (0.0305) (0.1304) (0.142)  (0.030) (0.135) (0.155)  (0.024) (0.106) (0.1656) 
            
Turning point (N) 5,059 3,385 2,775  3,195 4,355 2,235  3,803 4,069 1,608 
            
Year f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Jurisdiction f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Linear trend   Y    Y    Y 
            
Cragg-Donald Fstat  10.938 12.508   8.669 7.938   7.478 13.244 
Hansen J pvalue  0.074    0.1210    0.136  
Endogenous pvalue  0.153    0.355    0.512  
            
Observations 8,466  8,449  7,737 
            
98 
 

























Note: Other endogenous variables included in the 2SLS models are assessor wage per parcel, state aid, reassessment 
frequency and COD.  Total number of observation are 8,466 (851 unique municipalities).  Standard errors clustered at 
the jurisdiction level reported in parentheses. Exogenous covariates from the models include Share of exempt parcels, 
Share of commercial parcels, Share of industrial parcels, population density, population growth and Median tax share. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
            
DV: Same year as CAP 
               Ln(Cost/NCAPict) 
 One year after CAP 
             Ln(Cost/NCAPict+1) 
 Two years after CAP 
               Ln(Cost/NCAPict+2) 
 OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
            
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳(𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵) 1.177** 5.829** 1.963  0.7070 5.829** 3.926*  1.396*** 4.958** 3.016 
 (0.478) (2.932) (3.384)  (0.4669) (2.932) (2.178)  (0.392) (2.456) (2.922) 
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳(𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵)𝟐𝟐 -0.069** -0.400** -0.151  -0.0464 -0.400** -0.260**  -0.078*** -0.339** -0.224 
 (0.030) (0.181) (0.203)  (0.0299) (0.181) (0.130)  (0.024) (0.153) (0.174) 
𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.070 0.944** 3.508*  0.0409 0.944** 2.586  -0.108 0.807** 21.202 
 (0.062) (0.432) (2.103)  (0.0817) (0.432) (7.241)  (0.067) (0.395) (34.112) 
            
Turning point (N) 5,059 1,455 2,713  3,195 1,455 1,900  3,803 1,501  
            
Year f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Jurisdiction f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Linear trend   Y    Y    Y 
            
Cragg-Donald Fstat  7.243 6.087   7.068 7.987   7.995   8.617 
Hansen J pvalue  0.942    0.127    0.837  
Endogenous pvalue  0.049    0.093    0.095  
            
Observations 8,466  8,449  7,737 
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Table 8. Robustness checks 
Panel A. Estimates from 2SLS models with IVs as 3Y average values 
DV: 
 




    
Ln(Cost/NCAPict+1)      Ln(Cost/NCAPict+2) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳(𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵) 5.387** 3.492  6.538*** 7.117**  4.120** 5.765** 
 (2.324) (2.458)  (2.530) (3.156)  (1.712) (2.760) 
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳(𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵)𝟐𝟐 -0.325** -0.252*  -0.390*** -0.467**  -0.249** -0.384** 
 (0.138) (0.147)  (0.150) (0.196)  (0.107) (0.173) 
  0.972*   0.898   0.858* 
𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊  (0.547)   (0.601)   (0.494) 
         
Turning point (N) 3,975 1,526  4,368 2,019  3,917 1,791 
         
Cragg-Donald F-stat 11.217 7.995  8.284 6.303  13.366 5.798 
Hansen J p-value 0.381 0.837  0.118 0.179  0.268 0.742 
Endogenous p-value 0.306 0.095  0.306 0.098  0.524 0.117 
Observations 8,466  8,449  7,737 
         
 
 
Panel B. Robustness check: Control function estimates 







    
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳(𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵) 1.5999*** 0.8497** 1.2960*** 
 (0.3862) (0.3848) (0.4713) 
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳(𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵)𝟐𝟐 -0.0800*** -0.0507** -0.0830*** 
 (0.0224) (0.0245) (0.0297) 
    
Observations 8,466 8,449 7,737 
Number of muni_id 880 877 870 
Note: All models include year and jurisdiction fixed effects/ Standard errors clustered at 









Figure 1. First stage: Relation between instruments CAP decision and the likelihood of joining a 
CAP 
Panel A. Z1,ict (count of other CAP) as instrument  
Panel B.  Z2,ict as instrument  
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Panel C.  Z3,ict as instrument  




Figure 2. Marginal effects 
 
 
Panel A. Estimates from baseline year  
 





Panel C. Specification 1I with lagged effects 
 





Table A1. List of municipalities participating in CAPS  (78 jurisdictions in 38 CAPs) 









years Nt-1 Nt Total t-1 Total t Total t+1 Total t+2 
           
ALLEGANY ALMA Town 2002 2018 2002 2002-2007 1,047 5,184 4,523 16,454 404 9,058 
ALLEGANY WELLSVILLE Town 2002 2018 2002 2000-2007 3,777 5,184 44,260 104,578 70,842 55,089 
           
ALLEGANY ALLEN Town 2007 2008 2007 05-07,09-11 564 1,145 4,875 4,925 4,900 5,187 
ALLEGANY BIRDSALL Town 2007 2008 2007 2001-2011 568 1,145 4,714 5,452 11,785 5,966 
CATTARAUGUS ELLICOTTVILLE 
Town 2007 2014 2007 
2000,05-12 2,798 5,990 55,834 42,454 65,816 73,129 
CATTARAUGUS ALLEGANY Town 2007 2014 2007 2004-2012 3,167 5,990 77,768 79,186 80,782 65,664 
CATTARAUGUS HINSDALE Town 2011  2010 2007-2010 1,417 2,181 15,905 15,511 14,895 14,479 
CATTARAUGUS ISCHUA Town 2011  2010 2010 756 2,181 7,166 7,060 7,062 7,215 
           
CAYUGAIRA Town 2002 2016 2000 2003-2011 1,214 2,144 10,311 10,165 10,729 13,463 
CAYUGA VICTORY Town 2002 2016 1997 2003-2011 912 2,144 5,969 24,592 20,225 21,331 
           
CHEMUNG CHEMUNG Town 2008 2017 2008 08-11,13,15 1,456 6,565 48,555 43,771 21,678 24,045 
CHEMUNG VAN ETTEN Town 2008 2017 2008 08-11,13,15 11,49 6,565 27,954 14,384 9,620 9,867 
TIOGA BARTON Town39 2008 2013 2008 08-11,13,15 3,966 6,565 58,306 52,692 36,549 44,466 
           
COLUMBIA AUSTERLITZ Town 2008  2005 2011,13-15 1,500 3,142 20,208 23,320 17,864 19,249 
COLUMBIA HISSDALE Town 2008  2005 2011,13-15 1,635 3,142 26,698 29,963 30,416 73,762 
           
DELAWARE KORTRIGHT Town40 2007  2007 07-11,13-15 1,601 2,937 17,243 16,034 18,929 18,697 
                                                          
39 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2002, 2003 ; initial assessment in 1985 
40 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2005-2006 ; initial assessment in 2001 
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DELAWARE MEREDITH Town 2007  2007 08-11,13-15 1,317 2,937 16,407 15,892 18,668 18,582 
           
DUTCHESS FISHKILL Town 2007  2008  7,041 16,842 386,099 228,349 202,435 225,016 
DUTCHESS WAPPINGER Town 2007  2007  9,381 16,842 262,605 234,002 149,415 119,736 
           
DUTCHESS EASTFISHKILL Town 2007  2007 2007-2015 11,403 15,971 401,104 461,920 231,866 210,274 
DUTCHESS BEACON City 2007  NA NA 4,470 15,971 119,968 136,927 82,324 79,174 
           
DUTCHESS LAGRANGE Town 2007  2007 2007-2015 6,311 8,402 230,336 200,103 128,980 124,350 
DUTCHESS UNIONVALE Town 2007  2007 2007-2015 2,014 8,402 27,458 30,144 33,425 35,020 
           
ERIE EVANS Town 2008 2014 2008 2008-2010 9,727 11,746 256,838 230,345 117,009 108,852 
ERIE NORTHCOLLINS Town41 2008 2014 2008 2008-2010 2,017 11,746 18,851 19,916 20,991 20,233 
           
ESSEX ELIZABETHTOWN Town 2008  2008 2008-2015 1,409 5,002 12,000 19,843 22,711 22,336 
ESSEX WESTPORT Town 2008  2008 2008-2015 1,428 5,002 28,961 52,096 53,817 61,665 
ESSEX WILLSBORO Town 2008 2014 2008 2008-2014 2,157 5,002 28,508 28,006 39,721 32,534 
           
GENESEE BETHANY Town 2005  2005 05,08,11,14 978 5,030 17,981 19,162 18,733 19,292 
GENESEE DARIEN Town 2005  2005 05,08,11,14 1,740 5,030 28,446 30,812 27,504 28,481 
GENESEE PEMBROKE Town42 2005  2005 05,08,11,14 2,281 5,030 32,609 33,200 32,974 34,307 
           
GENESEE BYRON Town 2009  2009 2009-2015 1,340 2,866 18,645 17,349 17,787 18,750 
GENESEE OAKFIELD Town 2009  NA  1,510 2,866 26,119 19,920 23,213 24,011 
           
HAMILTON BENSON Town 2004  2004 2004-2007 587 2,657 7,820 NA 5,367 5,177 
HAMILTON HOPE Town 2004  2004 2004-2007 596 2,657 12,521 13,995 6,670 7,161 
HAMILTON WELLS Town 2006  2006 2006-2007 1,479 2,645 20,554 17,393 13,994 14,613 
           
                                                          
41 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2001-2007 ; initial assessment in 1986 
42 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2002 ; initial assessment in 1976 
106 
 
HERKIMER COLUMBIA Town 2002  1997 2003-2007 997 2,973 4,007 8,970 13,547 23,115 
HERKIMER LITCHFIELD Town 2002  1991 
2003-2007 903 2,973 6,879 8,696 12,466 21,396 
HERKIMER WINFIELD Town 2002  1997 
2003-2007 1,051 2,973 7,497 10,314 16,514 24,124 
           
JEFFERSON LORRAINE Town 2007  2007 2007,2012 660 1,394 6,405 7,790 7,646 7,159 
JEFFERSON RODMAN Town43 2007  2007 2007,2012 726 1,394 10,355 9,296 11,245 8,148 
           
JEFFERSON CHAMPION Town 2007 2019 2007 2007-2014 1,979 3,529 27,732 37,438 37,335 39,154 
LEWIS DENMARK Town44 2007 2019 2007 2007-2014 1,504 3,529 15,552 19,738 16,362 16,569 
           
JEFFERSON CLAYTON Town 2008 2014 2008 2008-2014 3,932 6,284 67,536 92,219 96,558 92,298 
JEFFERSON ORLEANS Town45 2008 2014 2008 2008-2013 2,730 6,284 97,691 156,226 86,404 88,847 
           
LEWIS NEWBREMEN Town 2007 2014 2007 2007-2013 1,597 3,935 23,008 31,313 29,761 30,564 
LEWIS WATSON Town 2007 2014 2007 2007-2015 2,308 3,935 28,968 38,409 37,268 38,943 
           
LEWIS OSCEOLA Town 2008  2008 2008-2014 866 1,402 7,003 7,325 7,281 7,200 
LEWIS MONTAGUE Town46 2008  2008 2008-2014 535 1,402 4,874 5,623 5,481 5,219 
           
LIVINGSTON WESTSPARTA Town 2006 2018 2006 06,10,14 828 2,469 13,906 12,750 12,607 13,301 
LIVINGSTON SPRINGWATER Town47 2006 2018 2006 06,10,14 1,629 2,469 19,379 20,506 21,361 21,476 
MADISON LINCOLN Town 2002  2002 02-05,08,12 1,031 6,864 8,253 8,313 1,189 15,493 
MADISON LENOX Town 1997  2002 02-05,08,12 5,806 6,864 51,100 43,768 50,163 62,442 
MADISON STOCKBRIDGE Town48 1997  2002 02-05,08,12 5,806 6,864 9,034 8,867 9,361 8,761 
           
                                                          
43 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2002 ; initial assessment in 1982 
44 Pre CAP period: Annual and initial reassessment from 2003 until 2006  
45 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2002(CLAYTON) and 2006 (ORLEANS) ; initial assessment in 1982 for both 
46 Pre CAP period: Annual and initial reassessment in 2002(OSCEOLA) and 2000-2001(MONTAGUE; initial assessment in 1998)  
47 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2002; initial assessment in 1980 
48 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2000-2001  ; initial assessment in 1981 
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MADISON SMITHFIELD Town 2007  2006 2006,2010 775 5,339 8,872 6,838 6,948 7,222 
MADISON NELSON Town49 2007  2006 2006,2010 1,776 5,390 15,384 15,208 15,396 26,634 
           
MONTGOMERY CHARLESTON Town 2008  2008 08-10,15 1,143 4,268 15,794 17,362 19,506 14,991 
MONTGOMERY ROOT Town50 2008  2008 08-10,15 1,304 4,268 17,619 15,078 20,063 21,408 
NIAGARA WILSON Town51 2007  2006 NA 3,106 26,246 35,838 52,212 57,843 37,479 
NIAGARA NIAGARAFALLS City 2007  2003 NA 23,135 26,246 474,682 557,465 427,235 433,104 
           
ONONDAGA LYSANDER Town52 2009  2009 2009-2015 9,184 15,003 156,144 149,245 153,831 159,874 
ONONDAGA VANBUREN Town 2009  2009 2009-2015 5,634 15,003 119,368 100,029 106,070 102,436 
           
ONONDAGA CAMILLUS Town 2010  2010 2010-2012 10,391 10,402 194,493 167,905 182,689 171,345 
           
ONTARIO GORHAM Town53 2002 2008 2002 02-11,14 2,606 4,089 55,644 51,326 57,375 55,939 
ONTARIO SENECA Town 2002 2008 2002 02-13,15 1,461 4,089 37,588 31,911 39,670 43,102 
ORLEANS GAINES Town54 2007  2007 07,10,13 1,258 5,237 17,820 577 0 0 
OSWEGO ALBION Town 2007  2007 2007-2012 1,426 5,237 13,587 14,748 14,868 25,215 
           
SCHOHARIE CARLISLE Town 2003  NA NA 1,023 3,411 8,780 9,330 10,116 9,335 
SCHOHARIE SEWARD Town 1996  NA NA 2,372 3,411 9,733 9,769 9,941 9,635 
SCHOHARIE SHARON Town 1996  NA NA 2,372 3,411 11,006 11,586 11,794 11,208 
           
SCHUYLER CAYUTA Town55 2008 2010 2008 2008-2015 413 8,016 3,911 7,125 7,896 6,373 
                                                          
49 Initial assessment in 1981 
50 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2006-2007 (CHARLESTON ; initial assessment in 2006) and 2002-2007 (ROOT ; initial assessment in 1982) 
51 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2000-2006 (WILSON  ; initial assessment in 1982) and  2003 (NIAGARAFALLS ; initial assessment in 1983) 
52 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2000-2008  ; initial assessment in 1988 and 1989 
53 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2000-2001  ; initial assessment in 1997 and 1999 
54 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2001 and 2004(GAINES; initial in 1980) and  2000-2006 (ALBION; initial assessment in 1998)  
55 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2002, 2007 (HECTOR; initial in 1990); in 2002(CAYUTA and TYRONE; initial in 1996) and  2000-2002 
(MONTOUR; initial assessment in 1999) 
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SCHUYLER HECTOR Town 2008 2010 2008 2008-2015 3,498 8,016 74,605 40,987 51,436 54,417 
SCHUYLER  TYRONE Town 2008 2014 2008 2008-2015 1,698 8,016 24,336 19,953 2,451 28,112 
SCHUYLER CATHARINE Town 1999 NA 2010 2010-2015 2,364 8,016 16,233 12,016 11,801 12,868 
SCHUYLER MONTOUR Town 1999 2018 2008 2008-2015 2,364 8,016 17,466 13,223 13,105 14,127 
           
SCHUYLER DIX Town56 2003  2002 2009-2015 2,174 4,594 26,717 28,373 29,570 31,326 
SCHUYLER READING Town 2003  2002 2009-2015 1,234 4,594 16,197 16,213 17,412 17,943 
SCHUYLER ORANGE 2008 2014 2002 2008-2015 1,206 4,752 18,967 NA NA 19,092 
           
ORANGE CHESTER Town57 2002 2014 NA NA 4,766 11,105 102,992 106,757 112,392 127,412 
WARREN CHESTER Town 2002 2014 2002 02,04,08 3,769 11,105 95,992 99,202 71,191 85,017 
WARREN HORICON Town 2002 2014 2002 02,04,08 2,481 11,105 71,4680 53,749 37,665 54,436 
           
WASHINGTON DRESDEN Town58 2002 2013 2001 NA 856 1,859 17,640 15,491 15,667 16,696 
WASHINGTON PUTNAM Town 2002 2013 2001 2013 1,000 1,859 17,596 15,888 13,592 14,544 
           
WASHINGTON GREENWICH Town 2006 2016 NA NA 2,500 2,506 35,071 36,716 39,232 39,845 
WASHINGTON KINGSBURY Town59 2006 2016 2006 2005-2015 4,723 4,735 70,709 73,048 76,971 82,927 
           
 
  
                                                          
56 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2002 (DIX; initial in 1992); Initial assessment in 2001 (ORANGE) and 2002(READING) 
57 Initial assessment in 1989 (Town of CHESTER) and in 1993 (Town of HORICON) 
58 Initial assessment in 1997 in both towns 
59 Pre CAP period: Annual reassessment in 2000-2001,2003-2004 and initial assessment in 1998 
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Table A2. Assessment cost by category among CAP participants 




Pre (t-1) Post (t) Post(t+1) Pre (t-1) Post (t) Post(t+1) 
        
ALLEGANY ALMA Town 2002 4,140 0 0 383 16,454 404 
ALLEGANY WELLSVILLE Town60 2002 39,336 45,676 47,328 4,199 9,785 4,588 
        
ALLEGANY ALLEN Town 2007 4,750 4,750 4,750 125 175 150 
ALLEGANY BIRDSALL Town61 2007 4,300 4,636 0 414 816 11,785 
        
CATTARAUGUS ELLICOTTVILLE 
Town 2007 24,777 25,212 28,539 31,057 17,242 37,278 
CATTARAUGUS ALLEGANY Town 2007 12,328 11,487 4,643 64,240 66,789 75,439 
        
CATTARAUGUS HINSDALE Town 2011 12,300 12,878 12,878 3,605 2,633 2,017 
CATTARAUGUS ISCHUA Town 2011 7,000 7,000 7,000 166 60 62 
        
CAYUGA IRA Town 2002 9,300 750 750 1,011 9,415 9,979 
CAYUGA VICTORY Town 2002 5,725 12,900 12,900 244 11,692 7,325 
        
CHEMUNG CHEMUNG Town 2008 18,966 20,780 19,405 28,845 21,513 1,833 
CHEMUNG VAN ETTEN Town 2008 10,070 9,500 9,500 17,884 4,884 120 
TIOGA BARTON Town 2008 46,037 32,022 28,781 12,268 16,815 7,334 
        
COLUMBIA AUSTERLITZ Town 2008 18,287 19,463 17,670 1,921 3,857 194 
COLUMBIA HISSDALE Town 2008 24,593 25,149 27,758 2,105 4,814 1,655 
        
DELAWARE KORTRIGHT Town 2007 14,428 14,861 17,500 2,365 1,173 1,429 
DELAWARE MEREDITH Town 2007 15,240 15,690 17,500 1,167 202 1,168 
        
DUTCHESS FISHKILL Town 2007 228,780 128,608 117,442 6,305 64,741 84,992 
DUTCHESS WAPPINGER Town 2007 74,405 132,632 128,038 3,690 8,537 15,816 
        
DUTCHESS EASTFISHKILL Town 2007 135,284 188,910 185,448 38,368 37,818 46,418 
DUTCHESS BEACON City 2007 26,207 34,753 38,069 92,458 101,868 44,255 
                                                          
60 0 for personnel cost from 2002 until 2015 
61 0 for personnel cost from 2008 until 2015 
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DUTCHESS LAGRANGE Town 2007 109,672 117,168 122,938 33,588 5,536 6,042 
DUTCHESS UNIONVALE Town62 2007 27,458 29,241 31,890 0 903 1,535 
        
ERIE EVANS Town 2008 102,420 132,997 108,819 4,224 7,946 8,190 
ERIE NORTHCOLLINS Town63 2008 0 0 0 18,851 19,916 20,991 
        
ESSEX ELIZABETHTOWN Town64 2008 10,000 0 0 2,000 19,843 22,711 
ESSEX WESTPORT Town 2008 26,636 50,000 51,240 2,325 2,096 2,578 
ESSEX WILLSBORO Town 2008 26,869 23,240 32,526 1,639 4,766 7,195 
        
GENESEE BETHANY Town 2005 14,740 15,182 15,637 2,996 3,820 3,096 
GENESEE DARIEN Town 2005 18,820 21,000 21,500 7,130 9,812 6,004 
GENESEE PEMBROKE Town 2005 31,632 32,472 32,412 977 727 562 
        
GENESEE BYRON Town 2009 16,500 16,800 16,800 1,479 549 987 
GENESEE OAKFIELD Town 2009 16,000 17,790 17,801 9,367 1,378 4,660 
        
HAMILTON BENSON Town 2004 5,000 NA 5,000 2,820 NA 367 
HAMILTON HOPE Town 2004 7,100 5,300 6,300 5,422 8,696 370 
HAMILTON WELLS Town 2006 19,875 15,390 13,390 679 2,003 604 
        
HERKIMER COLUMBIA Town65 2002 3,936 8,273 11,172 71 697 2,376 
HERKIMER LITCHFIELD Town 2002 0 0 0 6,879 8,696 12,466 
HERKIMER WINFIELD Town 2002 6,228 0 0 1,269 10,314 16,514 
        
JEFFERSON LORRAINE Town 2007 6,200 6,800 6,800 205 990 846 
JEFFERSON RODMAN Town 2007 7,500 7,725 7,725 2,855 1,571 3,520 
        
JEFFERSON CHAMPION Town 2007 18,715 35,530 36,264 7,614 1,213 1,071 
LEWIS DENMARK Town 2007 14,000 15,000 15,180 1,552 4,738 1,182 
        
JEFFERSON CLAYTON Town 2008 7,681 25,312 13,662 58,855 66,006 82,397 
                                                          
62 0 contractual expense in 2006 
63 0 for personnel cost from 2006 until 2013 
64 0 for personnel cost from 2008 until 2015 
65 0 for personnel costs for all years in LITCHFIELD Town; from 2008 until 2015 in COLUMBIA Town; from 2002 until 2015 in WINFIELD Town 
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JEFFERSON ORLEANS Town 2008 59,740 62,000 63,860 37,951 94,226 22,544 
        
LEWIS NEWBREMEN Town 2007 19,128 25,621 26,010 3,880 5,692 3,751 
LEWIS WATSON Town 2007 24,651 35,050 35,450 4,317 3,359 1,818 
        
LEWIS OSCEOLA Town 2008 6,900 6,900 6,900 103 425 381 
LEWIS MONTAGUE Town 2008 4,000 5,000 5,000 874 623 481 
        
LIVINGSTON WESTSPARTA Town 2006 11,050 11,400 11,900 790 1,350 707 
LIVINGSTON SPRINGWATER Town 2006 18,000 18,550 19,300 1,379 1,956 2,061 
        
MADISON LINCOLN Town66 2002 2,002 753 588 7,500 7,725 0 
MADISON LENOX Town 1997 45,591 37,696 33,623 4,390 3,332 14,484 
MADISON STOCKBRIDGE Town67 1997 7,600 7,800 0 1,383 837 9,326 
        
MADISON SMITHFIELD Town 2007 7,500 6,600 6,800 1,372 238 148 
MADISON NELSON Town 2007 14,465 14,465 14,900 919 743 496 
        
MONTGOMERY CHARLESTON Town 2008 12,525 11,000 13,700 3,269 6,362 5,806 
MONTGOMERY ROOT Town 2008 12,000 12,264 12,630 5,619 2,814 7,433 
        
NIAGARA WILSON Town 2007 21,260 15,873 19,291 14,578 36,339 38,552 
NIAGARA NIAGARAFALLS City 2007 328,130 381,582 404,279 146,319 147,279 22,439 
        
ONONDAGA LYSANDER Town 2009 124,308 121,140 117,890 31,691 28,105 35,941 
ONONDAGA VANBUREN Town 2009 100,532 94,490 96,872 16,137 5,539 9,198 
        
ONONDAGA CAMILLUS Town 2010 129,682 130,961 140,611 64,268 36,945 41,087 
        
ONTARIO GORHAM Town 2002 47,937 43,737 47,499 7,706 7,589 5,377 
ONTARIO SENECA Town 2002 28,986 26,606 34,570 5,933 5,305 4,905 
        
ORLEANS GAINES Town68 2007 10,925 495 0 6,040 82 0 
OSWEGO ALBION Town 2007 11,650 12,200 12,275 1,287 1,898 2,593 
                                                          
66 0 contractual expense for a single year in 2003 
67 0 personnel cost from 2003 until 2015 
68 0 for all costs from 2007 until 2015 
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SCHOHARIE CARLISLE Town 2003 8,160 8,184 8,232 620 1,146 1,884 
SCHOHARIE SEWARD Town 1996 8,488 8,608 8,656 1,246 1,162 1,285 
SCHOHARIE SHARON Town 1996 10,376 10,376 10,400 1,080 630 1,187 
        
SCHUYLER CAYUTA Town 2008 5,550 5,825 6,049 1,638 1,300 1,847 
SCHUYLER HECTOR Town 2008 25,587 19,727 1,436 49,018 21,260 50,000 
SCHUYLER  TYRONE Town69 2008 297 17,401 0 24,039 2,553 2,451 
SCHUYLER CATHARINE Town 1999 375 375 375 15,858 11,641 11,426 
SCHUYLER MONTOUR Town70 1999 0 0 0 17,467 13,223 13,105 
        
SCHUYLER DIX Town71 2003 0 0 425 26,717 28,373 29,145 
SCHUYLER READING Town72 2003 0 0 0 16,197 16,213 17,412 
SCHUYLER ORANGE73 2008 13,708 NA NA 2,071 NA NA 
        
ORANGE CHESTER Town 2002 91,923 95,883 99,168 11,069 10,874 12,103 
WARREN CHESTER Town 2002 56,304 59,365 62,849 39,297 38,378 8,343 
WARREN HORICON Town 2002 42,074 25,640 12,435 27,353 27,885 25,230 
        
WASHINGTON DRESDEN Town 2002 14,000 14,000 14,000 3,639 1,491 1,667 
WASHINGTON PUTNAM Town 2002 14,500 14,940 12,000 3,096 948 1,592 
        
WASHINGTON GREENWICH Town 2006 29,037 30,940 32,650 5,904 5,776 6,009 
WASHINGTON KINGSBURY Town 2006 64,545 67,786 69,691 6,164 5,262 7,280 
        
                                                          
69 0 personnel cost from 2009 until 2015 
70 0 personnel cost for all years 
71 0 personnel cost for all years except 2004 
72 0 personnel cost for all years 
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This essay examines the effect of regular, short assessment cycles on assessment performance, 
using two separate case studies of assessing jurisdictions in two representative states, Virginia 
and New York. Infrequent property assessment is commonly known to undermine equity and the 
efficiency of levying property taxes. This essay first tests the effect of reassessment lag on 
assessment uniformity using sample of assessing jurisdictions in Virginia. Then it provides 
estimates of the relationship between the length of reassessment cycle and assessment uniformity 
from a separate sample of New York's local assessing units, by employing multiple instrumental 
variables constructed from parcel-level sales data. We find an average of 2% deterioration in 
assessment uniformity per additional year of skipping reassessment, relative to jurisdictions that 
reassess annually, in Virginia. We also find that longer reassessment cycle leads to deterioration 
in assessment uniformity among towns and cities in New York. From an event study analysis 
using sub-groups of assessing jurisdictions in New York that ever committed to annual 
reassessments for multiple consecutive years, we find evidence on annual reassessment leading 
to improvement in assessment quality. 
 
Key words: property tax, assessment cycle, equity, coefficient of deviation  





How does the length of reassessment cycle affect assessment quality? Does annual reassessment 
improve equity in property assessment? This paper examines the effect of the regularity or 
frequency of property valuation on assessment quality. We also test the conventional wisdom in 
property tax administration that annual reassessments are the gold standard.  
One of the key challenges in property tax administration is estimating the tax base 
through accurate and fair assessment. Particularly, the problem arises since the market value of a 
vast majority of properties are not observed in most years, unless they are sold in a competitive 
market. The main objective of a local government's Office of Tax Assessor is to accurately 
estimate the value of each property based on an estimate of its market value. Inaccurate 
assessment leads to inequity problems, as any discrepancy in the ratio between assessment value 
to the fullmarket value across  two properties of the same value would lead to different effective 
property tax rates.  
In practice, there is a large variation in assessment behaviors that may contribute to 
inaccurate assessment. A number of empirical studies have spelled out various determinants of 
variation in assessment uniformity (Geraci & Plourde, 1976; Mikesell, 1980; Giertz & Chicoine, 
1990; Bowman & Mikesell, 1990; Eom, 2008). One set of key determinants include individual 
level characteristics of assessors (such as indicator of elected versus appointed) or methods used 
to estimate market value. The other group of determinants are the institutional features of the 
property tax system, such as the frequency of assessment; fractional assessment or average 
assessment ratio, the level of government that conducts assessment, which is also related to the 
116 
 
size of local assessing unit and resources available for assessment 74 . This study intends 
contribute to the empirical literature by isolating the effect of reassessment frequency on 
assessment uniformity, conditional on other assessment behaviors. So far, the consensus among 
scholars and property tax practitioners is almost unanimous – regular and short cycles of 
reassessment is the norm of equitable administration of the property tax.  The ideal is considered 
to be annual assessment. However, a vast majority of assessing jurisdictions nationwide conduct 
reassessment less frequently, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Considering the high political 
and pecuniary costs of annual reassessments, it is important to understand whether and how 
reassessing less frequently than annually leads to deterioration in assessment uniformity75.  
States fall into three groups in terms of required cycles of reassessment. The first group 
(ten states including Georgia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania) of state governments require 
local assessing jurisdictions to reassess annually (Higginbottom 2010). On the other hand, most 
states (including Virginia) belong to the second group that mandate longer cycles. 18 states 
mandate regular cycles ranging from every two to 4 years, and 11 states require valuation to be 
updated at least every five to 10 years. The last group (of seven states including New York) do 
not mandate regular assessments76. In this paper, we focus on two different cases of state setting, 
in the Commonwealth of Virginia (VA) and New York State (NYS). Virginia is a representative 
example of a strong Dillon Rule State where the maximum length of reassessment cycle is fixed 
for all counties and independent cities that conduct property assessment. The 1984 Virginia tax 
                                                          
74 Other determinants that may not be directly related to assessment behavior but may affect assessment uniformity 
includes local fiscal factors such as property tax limitations; effective tax rates (Bowman & Mikesell, 1978; Borland 
& Lile, 1980; Bowman& Butcher, 1986) and monitoring pressure of local tax payers (Eom, 2008). 
75 The net cost of reassessment may have been higher even after receipt of aid that they decided to stop investing in 
annual revaluation. When the town of Cicero conducted reassessment most recently for the first time in over ten 
years since 2006, the town had to spend approximately $1,000,000 for full revaluation to update their inventory and 
record of sales. However, the additional revenue the town was able to generate was not large enough to offset the 
cost, even with the reimbursement of $67,500 of state aid. 
76 Two others, New Jersey and California, reassess upon sale or improvement. 
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code also required counties and cities to adopt a regular cycle and for most localities the cycle 
did not change, so the timing of reassessment was pre-determined in 1984, and plausibly 
exogenous to the determination of assessment outcomes in the recent years. On the other hand, 
New York is a typical example of a strong Home Rule State where the state lets local 
jurisdictions choose their own cycle. Though home rule states often provide financial assistance 
to assessing jurisdictions to encourage frequent reassessment. 
The potential contribution of the paper is two- fold: to fill in the gap in the reassessment 
cycle literature and to provide the first empirical evidence on the effects of short cycles that can 
be null, positive or otherwise. Does the recency and length of reassessment cycle affect 
assessment uniformity? Does commitment to annual reassessment improve assessment quality? 
These are the questions we plan to empirically test with two separate case studies of assessing 
jurisdictions in Virginia and New York. To test the first question, we employ a production 
function model and multiple instrumental variables that are based on the dispersion in housing 
price and growth rate in median market value to address the potential endogeneity in assessing 
jurisdictions' decision to reassess. We also use an event study framework to test the second 
question about the effects of annual reassessment. This paper reports an average effect of 2% 
reduction in assessment uniformity for each additional year without reassessment and a 4% 
reduction for each additional year in a cycle. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature. Section 3 
presents the background to the research question examined in the context of Virginia and New. 
Section 4 illustrates the data and identification strategy used in this study and Section 5 





2. Literature Review 
 
While scholars have long debated the incidence of the real property tax, the academic 
literature is relatively short on administration of the tax and specifically, the effects of 
assessment cycle. The earlier literature identified individual assessors' characteristics along with 
their staffing and tools of the assessment office as the key determinants of assessment uniformity 
(Geraci 1977; Bowman & Mikesell 1990).  
Mikesell (1980) is one of the few studies that tests the relation between the cycle of value 
reassessment on assessment quality. If reassessments do not improve equity, then their value is 
questionable. He finds the revaluation process often merely copies prior year’s value, sometimes 
adjusted for a flat percentage for all properties and sometimes with even no change at all (except 
additions or sales) among 31 states that require annual reassessment. Using state-level data of 46 
states, the natural log of COD as dependent variable, Mikesell (1980) regresses ETR and 
prescribed assessment cycle on COD. His results show that both variables exerted statistically 
significant negative effects. Specifically, at the median effective property tax rate, COD would 
be 3.4 units lower with a prescribed cycle than without a specified cycle.  
An important rationale for state governments promoting frequent and preferably annual 
reassessment is that unavoidable assessment errors capitalize into property values and will stay 
and can escalate if not corrected in a timely manner. A simple capitalization model of property 
values based on present value calculations suggests that shorter cycles fare better than longer 
ones and annual cycles are the best (Mikesell, 1980). However, there is no consistent evidence to 
support the idea that annual reassessment should be the norm cycle. Using data of the 
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Commonwealth of Virginia local assessing units in years 1973 through 1976, Mikesell (1980) 
shows that at least 68 percent of jurisdictions that were in a cyclical reassessment year improved 
their uniformity (lower COD) by 10 percent. In contrast, the year-to-year improvements in the 
annual reassessment group is much smaller. The reason, he argues, is that when the prior 
assessment is more recently updated, it is more likely that mass appraisal may not lead to major 
improvements in uniformity.  
A key limitation of these earlier studies is that the findings are largely descriptive to 
conclude that annual reassessment is the optimal cycle. A more recent study accounts for the 
potential simultaneity and omitted variable bias in the earlier estimates. Eom (2008) uses cross-
sectional data of assessing towns and cities in New York in 1992, and specifies a long list of 
determinants in his empirical model, of assessment uniformity, instrumenting the potentially 
endogenous regressors. He concludes that assessment uniformity increases with frequent 
reassessment by reporting that an additional year of reassessment lag may lead to 1.6 percent 
reduction in assessment uniformity and an additional reassessment over the previous four years 
improves assessment uniformity by 17.8 percent. While Eom(2008) was the first paper to 
explicitly address the potential endogeneity in reassessment lag and frequency, there are various 
limitations of using cross-sectional data of a single year to estimate dynamic reassessment 
behaviors. Echoing Mikesell and Eom's findings, we test whether reassessment lag and 
frequency as well as actual commitment to specific cycles improve uniformity in assessment. 
 
3. Evolution and Status of Practice in Virginia and New York State  
3.1. Property Assessment in Virginia 
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The Commonwealth of Virginia (stated as the Virginia State from below) is a 
representative case of a strong Dillon Rule state where local governments are bound by various 
institutional constraints. The institutional setting in Virginia provide an opportunity to conduct a 
natural experiment on assessing jurisdictions to test the effect of their assessment behavior on 
assessment outcomes. In Virginia, 134 counties and independent cities are the tax assessing 
jurisdictions, and function under the supervision of the local Commissioner of Revenue. 77  
Counties and independent cities in Virginia conduct revaluation according to a regular cycle and 
the State Department of Taxation monitors each locality's assessment practice through an annual 
sales-ratio study. The State annually surveys all assessing jurisdictions to monitor whether they 
conduct mass reappraisal according to the stipulated cycle, perform physical inspection, elect or 
appoint full time assessor, and contract out reappraisal. The sales ratio study also reports the 
median assessment ratio as well as horizontal and vertical equity measures including COD and 
price related differential ratio based on randomly sampled market transactions of properties 
across the state. The State law also requires local assessing jurisdictions to reassess all residential 
properties at 100% of full market value, which contrasts with the case of NYS that allows 
fractional assessment. 
In 1984, the Commonwealth of Virginia enacted a tax code that mandated all local 
assessing jurisdictions to adopt regular reassessment cycles, that set the maximum limits of 
interval periods between years of mass reappraisal. Section 58. 1-3252 of the tax code requires 
counties to conduct mass reappraisal every four years with the exception of smaller counties that 
can elect their own cycle at either five or six-year intervals. Meanwhile, independent cities with 
                                                          
77 Counties are also the primary local level of general purpose government in Virginia, providing services for public 
education and health services. Unlike in New York, school districts are operated at the county level. 
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population above 30,000 are required to reassess every two years, while smaller cities with 
population of 30,000 or less may elect a four-year cycle (section 57. 1-3250, ibid).  
For the counties and cities that never changed their reassessment cycle, the timing of 
reassessment that occurs decades after the enactment of the 1984 tax code is plausibly exogenous 
to the change in assessment outcomes during later periods. Since the cycle was pre-determined in 
1984, there is no exact same combination of assessing jurisdictions conducting revaluation in a 
given year. While most counties and cities did not change their reassessment cycle since 1984, 
the tax code does not hinder the local jurisdictions from reassessing more frequently than the 
pre-determined cycle. Between 2002 and 2016, 36 counties and cities elected a shorter cycle than 
previous years, and 17 reverted to a longer cycle. This suggests that the local jurisdiction's 
decision to maintain the pre-determined cycle or change the cycle to either a shorter or longer 
cycle can be potentially endogenous to assessment outcomes. In order to address the potential 
threats to internal validity from reverse causality of assessing jurisdictions adjusting their 
reassessment cycle due to concern of high COD or high tax rates, we employ instrumental 
variables which will be specified in the following section. 
 
3.2. Property Assessment in New York  
Unlike most states, New York is one of the seven that do not mandate regular assessment 
cycles (two others, New Jersey and California, reassess upon sale or improvement)78. Instead, 
NYS uses financial aid as an incentive for localities to comply.  The absence of regular 
reassessment has led to deterioration in the uniformity of property valuation, eroding the equity 
                                                          
78 A northeast neighbor, Massachusetts, simply orders its localities with faulty assessment rolls to conduct 
reassessments; in cases of non-compliance, the state may hire a contractor for the job and charge the locality for the 
project (2010 MVS). 
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basis of the whole property tax system (NYS ORPTS, 2010).79 NYS allows its tax assessing 
municipalities full discretion to set their own cycle or absence thereof, of assessment. Tax 
assessing jurisdictions in New York are not only cities (62), but mostly towns (932), and until 
1983 all villages (553), totaling over 1,50080. According to the NYS ORPTS annual report, the 
number of assessing units stood at 1,029 as of 2016 (61 cities, 2 counties, 930 towns, and 127 
villages and CAP units). Since most of these assessing units are small and many rural, the cost 
and data scarcity issues discussed above are big hurdles for them to assume short reassessment 
cycles. On the cost side, for example, 524 jurisdictions share sole assessors with other assessing 
units, put another way, around 180 assessors serve in multi-jurisdictions.  
A report from the NYS ORPTS states a strong assumption that was used for reviewing 
local assessment practices until 1998: Their report states that “uniformity exists for three years 
following a state-approved reassessment” (NYORPTS 1998), though they also emphasized that 
“frequent reassessment contributes strongly to uniformity and equity” (ibid, p.7). This is typical 
of the cyclical assessment approach under which assessed values are held constant till the next 
reassessment. During years of volatile markets and high inflation, property values do change a 
lot and transactions of property (sales) cause equity issues (though assessing units can ameliorate 
on new houses by valuing them back to the date of the last assessment).   
New York's property tax system has also long remained at a lower-local level in 
comparison to many other states. As recently as 1983, all its 553 villages were separate tax 
assessing units beside 1,546 towns and cities (NYORPTS 2001). By 2010, only less than one-
                                                          
79 Though property tax administration is decentralized in New York, the State’s Department of Taxation and Finance 
is charged by state law to regularly monitor the equity of assessments. As required by Section 1200 of NYS Real 
Property Tax Law, the Office of Real Property Tax Services in the Department has, since the 1980s, been 
conducting annual market value survey of real properties in the state, thereby analyzing assessment uniformity 
(2010 MVS, p. 1). 
80 In contrast, Georgia and California have counties as tax assessing units; thus, their units are few and much larger. 
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third (127 out of 553) of villages still had assessors, for village purposes, property assessment 
had become a town and city function and the total number of assessing jurisdictions was reduced 
to 1,029. NY State promoted more frequent reassessments of local assessing units, not by 
statutory mandate but by providing financial and technical assistance, starting in the late 1970s, 
the aid programs have continued, though in varied forms. Over roughly a quarter century, the 
state made strides in changing tax administration. From 1985 to 2000, most units received 
reassessment aid and conducted reappraisals according to their submitted plans, whereas one-
fifth (192) did not reassess a single time (NYORPTS 2001). Thus, the NYS aid programs for 
reassessment offer opportunities for semi-experiments in this study.    
New York State first introduced Attainment Aid Program in 1977 to encourage local tax 
assessing units that have not updated their tax assessment roll for a long period to conduct 
revaluation. This program was reinforced in 1991 and changed to Maintenance Aid program that 
provided $5 per parcel in the year of reassessment and $2 per parcel in subsequent years, if the 
jurisdictions met the state standards of reassessment quality. The payments were only provided 
once in any three-year period as long as the jurisdiction did not receive any reassessment aid 
within the previous three years. This restriction changed in 1999 (by the enactment of Chapter 
405  of the 1999 Laws), when the state replaced the Maintenance Aid program (fully replaced by 
2001) with a new Annual Reassessment Aid program. In addition, the state also provided 
triennial aid for localities that conducted recent reassessments but are not able to reassess 
annually. From then on eligible applicants were provided $5 per parcel on each roll in the year 
they annually reassessed. While the provision was to expire after 2004, and the payments were 
reduced to $3 per parcel, the state eventually extended the provision of benefits until 2009 For 
those who were eligible for Triennial Aid, the state paid up to $5 per parcel upon completion of 
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full revaluation. The state removed sunset and phase down provisions under Chapter 655 of the 
2004 laws to encourage participation. Jurisdictions were also still eligible for annual aid even 
after receiving triennial aid. By 2007, 250 towns and cities were reassessing annually and by 
2010, 27%  of all assessing units were conducting cyclical reassessment plans to the state. 
The incentives changed in 2009 when the state cut real property tax-related 
appropriations by 12.5% (under Chapter 502 of the laws of 2009). By 2009, the State Operations 
part of the ORPS budget was $32.56 million, $13.965 of which were paid to municipalities in the 
form of intergovernmental grant. The state terminated the previous Annual and Triennial Aid 
programs in 2010, replacing it with Aid for Cyclical Reassessments (ACR) program that is more 
restrictive in terms of its eligibility requirements. The constant increase in participation in aid 
programs and reassessment activities between 2000 and 2009 suddenly declined after this policy 
enactment, as illustrated in Figure 1. After the 2010 reform, cyclical reassessment aid was only 
payable to assessing units conducting reassessment according to their submitted plan (minimum 
every four years) that did not benefit from the aid program in the previous two years. Also, 
municipalities were required to remit all aid payments received since the last reappraisal, once 
they discontinue a planned reappraisal. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Sample and Data 
 In this study, we use two separate state samples. With the Virginia sample, we analyze 
the relation between reassessment lag and assessment uniformity. Next, in the analyses using the 
New York sample, we study the relation between the length of reassessment cycle and 
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assessment uniformity. In the final analysis using a subsample of NYS assessing units, we test 
the effect of annual reassessment on assessment quality. 
 
Dependent variables 
Our main dependent variable is coefficient of dispersion (COD) which is a commonly 
used performance measure of assessment uniformity in the public financial management 
literature (Geraci and Plourde 1976; Bowman and Butcher 1986; and Chicoine and Giertz 1988). 
We normalize COD in a negative logged form, for a number of reasons. First, the distribution of 
COD is highly skewed towards zero. Since relative differences in COD are more useful than 
absolute distances, we use the natural logarithm of COD. The log form gives more weight to 
changes at low values than at high values, which Bowman and Butcher (1986) argue is more 
preferable. We then multiply ln(COD) by negative one for the ease of interpretation – a positive 
coefficient on a point estimate would indicate improvement in horizontal equity or assessment 
uniformity.  
The New York state Office of Real Property Tax Services (ORPTS) only reports COD 
for a sample of assessing units that have not conduced revaluation over the past three years prior 
to the market value survey year. For this study, we use the annual sales data to calculate an 
annual COD for each assessing unit. We restrict our parcel level data to arms-length sales so as 
to exclude outliers from anomaly. Then we focus on three major sub-classes of residential 
property, which are one-family year-round residence, rural residence with acreage, and two-
family year-round residence. Together, these three classes account for 67% percentage of the 
data and are the most representative sub-classes. From these three classes, we develop two 
126 
 
measures for use in the tests, one is of all three classes and the other is only of single-family 
year-round residences.   
We focus on assessment uniformity of residential properties for three reasons. IAAO 
(2010 Standard on Ratio Studies) sets more stringent CODs for residential property. Some of the 
IAAO standards for acceptable COD ranges related to this study are as follows. Single-family 
housing:  5 to 10 in new or homogeneous areas, 5 to 15 in older or heterogeneous areas. Other 
types of residents like rural, seasonal, recreational, manufactured (2-4 units), 5 to 20. Vacant 
land: 5 to 25. CODs lower than 5 may be due to sales chasing or non-representative sampling 
(IAAO 2010).  The results from assessing units sampled in New York’s Market Value Survey 
series show that the percent of jurisdictions achieving acceptable uniformity is systematically 
lower on residential properties than on all properties at all population density levels. 
One big challenge in estimating COD arises from extremely low sale prices or assessed 
values. In cases where the sale price of a property is abnormally below the assessed value, we 
assume that this may not be a problem of tax administration, but rather the (owner) seller’s credit 
problem due from, for example, bankruptcy-triggered auction (though such cases were rare in the 
dataset). Cases of extremely low assessed value arise mainly, if not solely, from outdated 
assessments in the jurisdiction. In order to cope with such outliers, we calculate assessment ratio 
per parcel and winsorize extreme values of assessment ratio. To winsorize is to replace outliers 
larger than (or less than) the highest (or lowest) one percentile with those minimum (or 
maximum) values. Then we identify the median assessment ratio per municipality and calculate 
the absolute deviation per parcel from the municipality’s median. Finally, we divide the average 
deviation at the municipality level by the municipality’s median assessment ratio and multiply 
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the value by 100 to get a measure of COD in percentage format. The equation to calculate COD 








�,        
where |𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 −𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚| is the absolute deviation from the median per parcel, 𝑁𝑁 is the number of parcels 
sampled in the sales data, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the assessment ratio for each parcel in the sales data, and 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 is 
the median assessment ratio. 
In the Virginia sample, we use COD measured by the Commonwealth of Virginia's  
Department of Taxation. Virginia's COD measures are based on randomly sampled fair market 
transactions from the Virginia Sales Price Ratio Studies conducted annually by the Virginia 
Department of Taxation. We use county and independent city level COD to construct the 
dependent variable for the Virginia sample.   
 
Independent variables  
 We primarily use administrative and survey data on local reassessment activities of 
counties and independent cities in Virginia  as well as towns and cities in New York.  We obtain 
data from various sources for the New York sample – local financial data published by the New 
York Comptroller’s Office, population from the U.S. Census, and Market Value Survey by the 
New York Office of Real Property Tax Services (ORPTS, via Freedom of Information Act 
request). Year and frequency of reassessment are also reported by the New York ORPTS. 
 The key variable of interest in the Virginia model is a measure of reassessment lag, 
operationalized as years since last reassessment. This variable ranges from 0 to 6 since the 
maximum reassessment cycle of counties and cities in Virginia is stipulated as 6 years, by the 
state law. We also include interaction terms between the reassessment lag variable and dummy 
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indicators of each cycle (five different dummy variables of each cycle from every 2 years to 
every 6 years) to the baseline model in some of the specifications. In the New York model, the 
key independent variable is a measure of reassessment cycle in addition to reassessment lag and 
the same set of  interactions as in Virginia model. There is larger variation in cycle across time 
among assessing jurisdictions in New York, as opposed to the Virginia's case where most 
counties and independent cities did not change their cycle since 1984. This institutional setting 
allows us to measure the effect of changes in the cycle per se, which is the underlying question 
of interest, in addition to reassessment lag that measures how recently reassessment was 
conducted last time within a given cycle.  
 We also use a rich set of jurisdiction-level characteristics related to reassessment 
behaviors and local environment that vary over time as covariates. These includes 1) logged total 
assessed value of exempt parcels, 2) logged value of total municipality budget minus assessment 
cost, and 3) total parcel count. We control for average assessment ratio as well as methods of 
reassessment such as use of computer assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) and actual reappraisal. 
We also control for reassessment aid (logged) received per municipality each year and the shares 
of different property classes to account for the heterogeneity in the structure of the local 
economy. We use assessing unit's aggregate average of parcel-level characteristics such as 
acreage of lot and indicators of properties that sold over one million USD.  
 Indicators of year of reassessment, physical inspection, full-time assessor, contract versus 
in-house inspection as well as median sales price, median assessment ratio, coefficient of 
dispersion and share of exempt properties or properties by class are all provided by the Virginia 
Department of Taxation. Budget data on property tax levy, intergovernmental grant and total 
revenue are provided by the Virginia Auditor of Public Accounts.  
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 Other socio-economic covariates including county level unemployment rate is from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Demographic covariates are also included to account for the potential 
confounding effects of local voters' time-varying characteristics. These covariates include the 
share of female, Hispanic, black and non-hispanic white population, population of children 
between age of 0 and 9, share of population over age of 65. All population estimates are 
provided by the U.S. Census. 
 Instrumental variables are also constructed using housing price index from multiple 
sources. The source median housing price of all sales and top tier sales for Virginia counties and 
cities is from Home Value Index provided by Zillow. An alternative measure of median housing 
price is the Federal Housing Agency's Housing Price Index based on mortgage data. Growth rate 
in median market value of sold properties, housing dispersion ratio data at towns and cities in 
New York are calculated by using parcel-level NY Market Value Survey data.  
 Our final Virginia sample consists of 133 unique assessing units in Virginia  while the 
New York sample is comprised of 43 Cities and 779 Towns. The sample period runs from 2000 
to 2016 for the NY sample and from 2002 to 2016 for Virginia sample.  Table 2 provides a 
summary of data sources.  Panel A in Tables 3 and 4 provides the summary statistics of 
observable characteristics of various groups of assessing jurisdictions in each state that had 
different maximum length of reassessment cycle. Panel B in Table 3 compares the pre and post 
difference in variables used in the analyses among three groups of assessing jurisdictions in 
Virginia. The first two columns  
 
4.2. Identification Strategies  
Effect of Lag and Length of Reassessment on Assessment Uniformity 
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The key challenge in isolating the effects of reassessment lag or cycle on assessment 
uniformity is that the direction of the causal relation can go both ways. Changes in reassessment 
lag or cycle may lead to changes in actual assessment uniformity, while an assessing 
jurisdiction's decision to reassess in a given year may also be a function of its prior year's (i.e., 
current) COD, which is a typical performance measure of property assessment. In order to cope 
with potential bias in the estimates from reverse causality, we first employ a control function 
approach. As an alternative approach, which is our preferred identification strategy, we 
instrument for the reassessment lag and cycle variables with multiple instrumental variables. We 
use various measures of dispersion and the growth in housing price to construct instrumental 
variables separately for samples of assessing jurisdictions in Virginia and New York, 
respectively. The outcome production function equation and the treatment equation can be 
summarized as follows: 
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,  𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)         (1) 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃(𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑿𝑿it,\𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)          (2) 
where 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 denotes the dependent variable, −ln (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡). 𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a vector of other determinants of 
COD that are endogenous in the case of New York ( 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 each indicating state aid for 
reassessment and level of assessment), but exogenous in the case of Virginia so included as part 
of 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 . 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the unobserved residual from the outcome equation and 𝑅𝑅it  is a measure of 
reassessment lag or the length of reassessment cycle in a given year t. 𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a vector of 
instrument variables for jurisdiction’s decision to reassess in a given year which will be 
elaborated below.  
The exogenous covariates in vector 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 includes share of exempt properties out of total 
number of parcels, share of commercial parcels, share of industrial parcels, median assessment 
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ratio as well as dummy indicators of physical inspection, full-time assessor, whether assessment 
is contracted out. The models also include time varying demographic characteristics that may 
capture the confounding effects of median voters’ preference for reassessment such as the share 
of female, Hispanic, black and non-hispanic white population, population of children between 
age of 0 and 9, share of population over age of 65.  
 Three instrumental variables from different sources are used for the endogenous 
reassessment lag variable in the Virginia model. We are particularly concerned of potential 
reverse causality, i.e. assessing units with shorter intervals between reassessment periods might 
reassess more frequently than other assessing jurisdictions due in part to high demands for 
uniform assessment. Also, assessing units with less frequent reassessment might choose to have 
longer reassessment cycle or longer intervals in response to high resistance from owners of 
expensive properties that would not benefit from updating property valuation. The first 
instrument is housing price dispersion (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)of is constructed using Zillow's data and measured 
as annual growth in the ratio of median housing price in the top 30% divided by median housing 
price of all properties sold (One of the major downside of using Zillow data is that we lose 54 
assessing jurisdictions, most of which being independent cities, from the Virginia sample, 
because they do not have enough records of sales to separately report median market value 
across the distribution of housing price. The second instrument is growth in median housing 
price using the Federal Housing Agency's Housing price index based on mortgage data. The third 
instrument is the growth rate in median market value of sold properties, using data from the 
Virginia Department of Taxation.  
The underlying intuition of using these instruments is that the owners of more expensive 
properties that expect to gain from less frequent revaluation may impose political pressure 
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against frequent reassessment. Their potential gain may depend on the growth in the market 
value of their houses, relative to the growth in values of other houses. Property values tend to 
rise faster where income is higher, or expensive properties tend to appreciate at a higher rate than 
cheaper properties (conditioning on infrequent reassessment, which is correlated with local 
wealth). Eom (2008) proposed using similar measures of distribution houses and changes of 
house value dispersion over time as potential instruments for reassessment activities. However, 
he was not able to use them as valid instruments for town/city level assessment activities in his 
cross-sectional analysis and eventually used county average values of reassessment variables as 
instruments.   Our underlying assumption of independence can be expressed as (3) which implies 
the exclusion restriction condition (4): 
 
𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ⊥ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 | 𝑿𝑿it                                             (3) 
𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ⊥ 𝑙𝑙(𝑇𝑇)it | 𝑿𝑿it for all r ∈ 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)            (4) 
 
In the New York analysis, we use similar instruments for reassessment lag and cycle 
variables. We use different combinations of four instrumental variables. The first instrument 
z1,ict is the growth rate in median market value of all sold properties. The second and third 
instruments are town and city level average measures of housing value dispersion constructed 
from parcel level sales data. The second one, z2,ict, is the annual growth rate of the median 
housing price in the top quartile relative to the bottom quartile. The third measure, z3,ict, is the 
annual growth in the ratio of dispersion in market value from the jurisdiction median in the top 
quartile, relative to the bottom quartile. The fourth instrument, z4,ict which is used for robustness 
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check is similar to Eom (2008)'s measure, which is the average reassessment cycle of 
neighboring jurisdictions within the same county. 
Following the Duncombe & Yinger (2007) that builds upon the copy cat or yardstick 
theory to construct instruments, we use the characteristics of neighboring jurisdictions as 
instruments for 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡. The assumption of this diffusion approach is that each jurisdiction 
is influenced by decisions of similar comparable jurisdiction’s decisions that are in the same 
labor market area (counties, in New York’s case) and treat the neighbor' receipt of state aid and 
level of assessment as exogenous to assessment uniformity in jurisdiction i at time t. The final 
instruments for  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 are the average amount of reassessment state aid received (za,ict) 
and median assessment ratio among other jurisdictions within the same county ( z𝑙𝑙,ict ), 
respectively.  
za,ict = �𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡| 𝑘𝑘, 𝑙𝑙 in the same county, 𝑙𝑙
𝑘𝑘≠𝑖𝑖
 
z𝑙𝑙,ict = �𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡| 𝑘𝑘, 𝑙𝑙 in the same county, 𝑙𝑙
𝑘𝑘≠𝑖𝑖
 
 Equation (5) is the baseline reduced form model including jurisdiction and year fixed 
effect. In order to address the potential bias in 𝜋𝜋1by treating 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 as an exogenous variable, we 
employ control function and 2SLS estimators.  
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜋𝜋0 + 𝜋𝜋1𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + Γ𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + Υ𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖+𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   (5) 
To begin with control function approach, we run the following first stage regressions by 
regressing each of the endogenous variables on all exogenous variables. After retrieving the 
residuals from each regression (𝜖𝜖1,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, 𝜖𝜖2,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and 𝜖𝜖3,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡), we include them as additional regressors 
to baseline regression (5).  
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𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = π0 + π1𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + Υ𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖1,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡   (6) 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = π0 + π1za,ict + Υ𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖2,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 (7) 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = π0 + π1zl,ict + Υ𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖3,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 (8) 
 
The final model to be estimated by 2SLS is also an extension of equation (5) but the 
endogenous variables (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) are instrumented by exogenous variables (𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, za,ict and 
zl,ict). All instruments pass the tests for weak and valid instruments. The first stage Cragg-
Donald F statistics are all above the critical values from Stock & Yogo (2005) and reported in 
Tables 4, 6 and 7 along with the p value of Hansen J statistics. In all models, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of excluded instruments being uncorrelated with the error term. The standard 
errors are also clustered at the jurisdiction level and we also weight our estimates by the original 
parcel count of each jurisdiction.  
 
Effect of Annual Reassessment on Assessment Uniformity 
The main empirical question raised in the previous section is whether reassessment 
frequency measured by the time lag between reassessment period and the length of reassessment 
cycle affects assessment outcomes. In this section, we narrow our target population to a group of 
assessing units that conduct annual reassessment. The majority of tax assessing jurisdictions in 
New York conduct triennial rather than annual reassessment, largely due to the high 
administrative cost (Bick 2016; NYAA 2018).  Therefore, it is important to understand whether 
jurisdictions that commit to annual reassessment achieve better assessment uniformity than 
comparable jurisdictions that do not.  
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In this analysis, we test whether annual reassessment improve horizontal equity and 
affect effective property tax rates. Hypothetically, those jurisdictions that reassess annually 
should have better horizontal equity (lower cod). Given the high initial cost of conducting full 
reassessment, whether the benefit from frequent reassessment (equity, efficiency, adequacy and 
transparency) is large enough to balance the cost is an important empirical question for local 
policy makers. We use event study framework to address this question.  
We test whether annual reassessment for three (or four in a separate analysis) consecutive 
years lead to any change in assessment uniformity and tax rate. The treated group in this analysis 
are those that started to reassess between 2003 and 2008 for three (or four) consecutive years 
then stopped reassessing. In order to cope with potential selection bias in our estimates, we need 
to select a comparable comparison group. We compare the outcome of this group to that of a 
comparison group that do not annually reassess until the end of the post period: The comparison 
group start consecutive annual reassessment at least from six years after the early adopters 
started annual reassessment.  
To address these two questions, we use semi-parametric event study framework with 
inverse probability weighting. We use the event study framework to see the timing of changes in 
the outcomes relative to the timing of initiation of annual reassessment. This approach has the 
flexibility to allow the effect of annual reassessment on assessment outcomes to vary relative to 
the date of initiation of reassessment. The baseline non-parametric event study model can be 
specified as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗≠−1 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡




𝑝𝑝  is an indicator of lead and lag from the year of first reassessment for each jurisdiction i 
in year t.  p is an index of periods relative to the start of annual reassessment and period 0 
indicates the first year when annual reassessment began. The omitted category for 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝  is one 
calendar year before the starting year of consecutive annual reassessments. Coefficients of 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖, 𝜌𝜌 
is the difference in COD between the two groups of municipalities in t-1 period.  The estimated 
coefficients on the lagged indicators (𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝) are the differential change in Y𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   between the 
municipalities that started reassessment and those that did not relative to period -1. We use the 
same model to capture any improvements in the outcomes among municipalities that conduct 
annual reassessment for 3 to 7 consecutive years, respectively. All models include municipality 
fixed effects as well as group specific time trend. We control for a vector of municipality level 
observable characteristics that vary across time, 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 that includes reassessment frequency since 
2000, average assessment ratio, log of reassessment budget, share of each property class, years 
since first assessment, total parcel count and state reassessment aid. We also control for receipt 
of state reassessment aid in the first analysis of estimating the effect of conducting annual 
reassessment.  
To cope with potential endogeneity of municipalities’ decision to reassess each year, we 
impose weights to the control units using propensity score based inverse weighting strategy to 
seek balance between two groups of municipalities. This allows control units that seem to have 
higher probability of receiving treatment to receive larger weight. Following Imbens (2000) and 
Hirano, Imbens and Ridder’s (2003) approach, we calculate the following weight,  
 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 
e�(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)
1−e(𝑋𝑋𝚤𝚤)�
(1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖)           
where  e�𝑖𝑖(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) is the estimated propensity score for a municipality. e(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) =  Pr (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖). 
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 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 eventually becomes 1 for treated group and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 =
e�(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)
1−e�(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)
 for the control group. As long as the 




� = 0              
we can estimate the average treatment effect on the treated as the following; 
 
(𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖=1,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖=1,𝑡𝑡=0) − (∑  𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼+1𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡=0𝐼𝐼+1𝑖𝑖=2 )  
 
where 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖=1,𝑡𝑡 is the outcome for a treated municipality (i = 1) that is committed to consecutive 
annual reassessments in year t, and 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖=1,𝑡𝑡=0 is outcome for that municipality in one year prior. 
Panel B in Table 4 provides the summary statistics of observable characteristics among both the 
treated and the control units in NY that ever committed to annual reassessment. 
 
5. Results  
5.1. Effect of Reassessment Lag and Length of Cycle on Assessment Uniformity 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of maximum length of reassessment cycle among VA 
assessing units as well as the negative association between the length of maximum cycle and 
assessment uniformity. Figure 3 depicts the stylized facts about the relation between 
reassessment lag and assessment uniformity using VA sample. The histogram in Panel A in 
Figure 3 plots the distribution of reassessment lag among all assessing jurisdictions in VA. Panel 
B uses a subsample that excludes jurisdictions that conduct annual reassessment, which is the 
reference group. The descriptive figures suggest a negative association between reassessment lag 
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and assessment uniformity: The longer the interval between two periods of revaluation, the 
worse the assessment quality becomes. Moreover, the negative relation shows a linear pattern.  
The baseline fixed effect model estimates reported in the first two columns in Table 5 
supports the descriptive observation that an additional year of no reassessment is associated with 
deterioration in assessment uniformity. This finding also holds when addressing the potential 
endogeneity in three endogenous variables with the control function approach: The coefficient on 
reassessment lag variables remain statistically significant when using various combinations of 
three exogenous variables (z1,ict, z2,ict and z3,ict) based on home value dispersion and growth in 
median market value. When including the interaction terms, we find evidence of significant 
decrease in assessment uniformity by 4 to 5 percent among jurisdictions that conduct 
reassessment biannually and every four years per additional year of skipping reassessment.  
Tables 5 and 6 suggest significant negative effects of reassessment lag on assessment 
uniformity among assessing jurisdictions in Virginia. The signs on estimates are consistent 
across different specifications when using both control function and instrumental variables. 
Particularly the IV results show more pronounced negative effects among jurisdictions that 
reassess every other year. While the average deterioration in assessment uniformity for an 
additional year of no reassessment is a little over 2 percent for all groups, those that reassess 
biannually  are shown to experience a 9.5 to 10.8 percent decline in assessment quality. 
Assessment uniformity also seem to deteriorate by over 3 percent among jurisdictions that 
reassess every four years per each additional interval year.  
The control function and IV estimates reported in Table 7 suggest that a longer 
reassessment cycle leads to deterioration in assessment uniformity among assessing jurisdictions 
in New York. The IV estimates suggest that an increase in the length of reassessment cycle by 
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one year leads to deterioration in assessment uniformity by approximately 4%, relative to 
municipalities that conduct annual assessment. On the other hand, the coefficient estimates on 
the interacted terms tells us a slightly more complex story. The average effect seems to mask the 
hidden heterogeneity across different groups of jurisdictions that have various cycles. In fact, 
municipalities that conduct reassessment biannually or triennially show nonnegative change in 
assessment uniformity during interval periods. This indirectly lead us to question the necessity of 
requiring annual reassessment as the norm cycle, considering the high cost and administrative 
challenges for conducting mass reappraisal every year. Nonetheless, when we trim our sample by 
excluding jurisdictions that have longer maximum cycle than 15 years, we find suggestive albeit 
weak and inconsistent evidence of negative association between reassessment lag and assessment 
uniformity. An additional year of reassessment lag may contribute to a decrease in assessment 
uniformity by approximately 1% on average,  and by 2% for jurisdictions that reassess every four 
years. On the other hand, reassessment lag shows to have positive effect on assessment 
uniformity among jurisdictions that reassess triennially as found in the full sample.  
 
5.2. Event Study Estimates from New York 
A closely related question raised in this study is whether annual reassessment effectively 
leads to improvement in assessment uniformity. Our event study result provides suggestive 
evidence of consecutive annual reassessments improving assessment uniformity. Figure 4 and 
columns (1) and (2) in Table 10 show the results for assessing jurisdictions that reassessed for 
three consecutive years in New York. The comparison group are late adopters or jurisdictions 
that started consecutive reassessments after the end of the post period. Each coefficient on 
𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗  measures the differential change in outcomes between two groups, relative to the reference 
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period, which is one year before the treated group initiated consecutive reassessments. The 
insignificant pre period estimates reveal that all the outcomes trended similarly among both early 
and late adopters before the early adopters started reassessing. Jurisdictions that committed to 
consecutive annual reassessments tend to observe improvement in horizontal equity as measured 
by coefficient 𝛽𝛽3 of dispersion for single-family residence properties, after they had conducted 
three annual reassessments.  
Such trend is evident among those who committed to four consecutive years of annual 
reassessment, as reported in the last two columns in Table 10. The positive estimate of 𝛽𝛽4 in the 
three residential sub-classes model suggest that assessment uniformity improved significantly by 
42 percent after three consecutive reassessments, relative to the year before they initiated such 
commitment. The magnitude of this effect shows to be a considerable improvement, considering 
the fact that the assessment uniformity for single family residential properties was higher among 
treated units than the comparison group, one year before start of consecutive reassessment 
(although the difference is not statistically significant). This suggests that the jurisdictions that 
committed to four years of annual reassessment observed improvement in their horizontal equity, 
relative to late adopters who did not reassess during the same period.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we have examined the effect of assessment frequency on assessment 
performance using natural experiments for two case studies of assessing jurisdictions in Virginia 
and New York. As a strong Dillon state, the Commonwealth of Virginia mandated a fixed 
assessment cycle in the 1984 and local assessing units have little autonomy in administrating 
property assessment. On the other hand, New York State is a strong home rule state employing 
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financial incentives and no mandates for property assessment cycle. We tested the effect of 
assessment frequency on horizontal and vertical equity in property assessment, by employing 
multiple instrumental variables to account for the potential endogneity in the decision to reassess 
across assessing units in two states. We also conduct a semi parametric event study analysis 
using parcel-level sales data and detailed jurisdiction-level administrative data on assessment 
activities in New York. 
This research yields several suggestive findings. First, we find evidence that an additional 
year of reassessment lag has negative effect on assessment uniformity, that suggests infrequent 
reassessment may undermine fair assessment. Specifically, we find an average 2 percent decline 
in assessment uniformity per additional interval year between mass reappraisal among assessing 
jurisdictions in Virginia.  
Second, we find that the length of reassessment cycles may also contribute to assessment 
uniformity. Using control function and instrumental variables we find that longer reassessment 
cycle leads to deterioration in assessment uniformity among towns and cities in New York. Our 
event study estimates using sub-sample of assessing jurisdictions that ever committed to annual 
reassessment for consecutive multiple years also suggest that assessing jurisdictions that 
annually reassess experience improvement in assessment uniformity, relative to comparable 
jurisdictions that did not. We also observe improvement in assessment uniformity typically from 
the year the jurisdictions complete their annual consecutive reassessment.  
Our findings have limited policy implications to be extrapolated to tax assessing 
jurisdictions in other states with different institutional settings. We further plan to alternative 
approaches by using geographic boundary discontinuity and parcel level data to better assess 
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whether initiation of annual reassessment lead to improvement in outcomes. We can extend our 
analysis at the micro level to assess whether the cycle has any bearings on tax burden, 
controlling for various parcel level characteristics. We can also use additional measures of 
outcomes such as price-related-differential (PRD) to assess the effect of reassessment cycle on 
vertical equity. More importantly, we hope to test the efficiency and equity effects of shifting 
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List of states 
   
Annual 10 Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, 
Pennsylvania, West Virginia 
 
Every 2 years 5 Colorado, Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, Virginia 
cities 
 
Every 3 years 5 Alabama, Arkansas, North Carolina(counties with 
75 thousand or more population), Texas, D.C. 
 
Every 4 years 8 Illinois*, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Oklahoma, 
Virginia counties, Washington, Wyoming 
 
Every 5 years 7 Florida, Idaho, Nevada, South Carolina, Utah, 
Wisconsin 
 
Every 6 years 2 Ohio, Tennessee 
 
Every 10 years 2 Connecticut, Rhode Island 
 
Varied requirements by locality 3 Virginia, North Carolina, Kansas 
 
Upon sale or improvement 2 New Jersey, California 
 
No requirements 7 Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, New Hampshire, 
New York, Oregon, South Dakota 
     
Source:  Justin Higginbottom (2010), “State Provisions for Property Reassessment,” Tax Foundation, Fiscal Fact 






Table 2. Variables and source of data 






Budget and property tax levy Virginia Auditor of Public Accounts 
 
Coefficient of dispersion Virginia Department of Taxation, 
Virginia Annual sales ratio studies 
 
Indicator of full time assessor 
(same as above) 
 




Median assessment ratio 
 
Median sales price 
 
Share of exempt properties 
 
Share of property classes  
 
Indicator of contract versus in-house inspection 
 
Cycle of physical inspection 
 




New York Sample 
 
Assessment Budget Comptroller Office, Open book 
 Assessment operation Office of Real Property Tax Services 
 Real property tax levy 
(same as above) 
 State aid for real property tax 
  State Equalization rate 
 
Log assessed value of exempt properties 
 
Property tax levy, nominal rate  
 
Reassessment activity(frequency) 
 Parcel count by class 
 Share of property classes 
 Coefficient of dispersion (authors' calculation) NY Market Value Survey 
 Assessment method(CAMA, appraise)  
 Share of million dollar MV properties (same as above) 
 Number of sales of single family houses  
 Acre size of properties  
   
 Common Covariates 
 Unemployment rate Bureau of Labor statistics 
 Share of gender, race and age groups U.S. Census 
 Median Housing Price Index  Federal Housing Agency 





Table 3. Summary statistics: Virginia sample 
Panel A. Summary statistics of VA jurisdictions by longest cycle 
       










Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Negative log of  COD -2.196 -2.574 -2.344 -2.887 -3.011 -3.228 
Effective tax rate 0.96 0.85 0.93 0.64 0.58 0.48 
       
Total parcel count 2,869 613.9 143.1 440.5 344.0 245.1 
Assessment ratio 90.57 90.77 95.03 90.50 90.16 87.26 
Full time assessor 1 0.911 1 0.26 0.26 0.22 
Contract out (general) 0 0.088 0 0.59 0.57 0.65 
Contract out (mass appraisal) 0 0.062 0 0.27 0.22 0.12 
Physical inspection 0.10 0.32 0.25 0.61 0.60 0.58 
Property tax/total revenue share 0.37 0.29 0.39 0.29 0.30 0.26 
State &federal aid/revenue share 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.44 
Appeal count 316 140 56 110 150 126 
Residential (share of total) 0.96 0.94 0.97 0.91 0.91 0.84 
Commercial & industrial  0.030 0.041 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 
𝑧𝑧1𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 Housing dispersion growth -3.34 1.59 2.20 0.27 1.94 3.05 
𝑧𝑧2𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 HPI growth rate  4.12 2.77 3.69 2.45 3.12 2.28 
𝑧𝑧3𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 Growth in median MV 0.084 0.049 0.052 0.050 0.056 0.051 
       
Population 195,249 43,027 11,903 33,108 24,537 20,333 
Female (share of population) 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.49 
Hispanic  0.08 0.06 0.017 0.03 0.028 0.02 
Black  0.23 0.24 0.008 0.15 0.19 0.17 
Non-hispanic white  0.60 0.66 0.94 0.78 0.74 0.78 
Age 0 to 9 (share of population) 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.26 
Age over 65  0.089 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.14 
       
No. of jurisdictions 23 19 1 26 12 54 





Panel B. Summary statistics: Assessing VA jurisdictions that changed reassessment cycles  
       
 More frequent  Less frequent  Maintain  
 Pre Post  Pre Post  cycle 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) 
        
        
Negative log of  COD -3.03 -2.89  -3.09 -3.05  -2.79 
Effective tax rate 0.55 0.61  0.64 0.55  0.71 
Years since last reassessment 1.95 0.95  1.35 2.05  1.21 
        
Total parcel count 423.8 288.5  161.3 297.8  1,032 
Assessment ratio 81.37 97.49  97.52 99.94  89.40 
Full time assessor 0.34 0.48  0 0.29  0.50 
Contract out (general) 0.31 0.60  0.92 0.78  0.41 
Contract out (mass appraisal) 0.10 0.17  0.14 0.30  0.12 
Physical inspection 0.35 0.68  0.71 0.80  0.43 
Property tax/total revenue share 0.28 0.32  0.42 0.37  0.28 
State &federal aid/revenue share 0.40 0.38  0.30 0.36  0.39 
Appeal count 38.37 242.1  2.57 149.4  170.9 
𝑧𝑧1𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 Housing dispersion growth 1.93 1.40  3.32 2.01  -0.40 
𝑧𝑧2𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 HPI growth rate  6.12 -0.62  -1.35 -0.44  2.88 
𝑧𝑧3𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 Growth in median MV 0.04 0.07  0.10 -0.07  0.06 
        
Population 25,499 28,287  14,525 23,491  73,786 
Female (share of population) 0.50 0.50  0.516 0.511  0.50 
Hispanic  0.02 0.04  0.03 0.03  0.04 
Black  0.18 0.19  0.08 0.13  0.19 
Non-hispanic white  0.76 0.74  0.86 0.80  0.72 
Age 0 to 9 (share of population) 0.17 0.37  0.33 0.48  0.27 
Age over 65  0.13 0.11  0.13 0.12  0.12 
Residential (share of total) 0.88 0.88  0.76 0.89  0.90 
Commercial & industrial  0.031 0.034  0.018 0.019  0.036 
        
No. of jurisdictions 36  17  85 









Table 4. Summary statistics: New York  
Panel A. Summary statistics by assessing jurisdictions with various cycles 
       










Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
State aid for reassessment 10.30 10.04 9.826 10.08 10.27 9.152 
Assessment ratio (EQR) 4.57 4.60 3.51 4.50 4.49 4.07 
Share of exempt parcels 0.007 0.031 0.031 0.035 0.029 0.036 
Log of assessor salary per parcel 2.74 2.42 2.69 2.54 2.71 2.49 
Total parcel count 8,892 3,113 2,547 9,872 6,512 3,391 
Residential (share of total) 0.758 0.623 0.569 0.668 0.668 0.627 
Share of commercial 0.047 0.025 0.067 0.028 0.037 0.047 
Share of industrial 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.006 
Population growth -0.001 0.001 0.0005 0.001 0.001 -0.0001 
Unemployment rate 6.17 6.78 6.55 6.24 6.51 6.42 
Mean tax share 2.53 1.99 1.99 2.05 1.89 1.63 
𝑧𝑧1𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌  Growth in median MV 0.056 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.14 1.01 
𝑧𝑧2𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 Relative growth, median MV -1.59 -0.05 -0.33 0.34 -0.67 -1.16 
𝑧𝑧3𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌  Growth in dispersion  0.164 5.37 1.631 1.906 1.106 4.377 
       
Female (share of population) 0.499 0.495 0.499 0.506 0.502 0.502 
Hispanic  0.051 0.025 0.040 0.039 0.036 0.039 
Black  0.077 0.036 0.043 0.078 0.058 0.047 
Non-hispanic white  0.838 0.918 0.893 0.855 0.883 0.886 
Age 0 to 9 (share of population) 0.248 0.226 0.254 0.236 0.239 0.237 
Age over 65  0.127 0.127 0.131 0.127 0.125 0.128 
       
       
Number of unique jurisdictions 3 23 13 21 14 658 
       






















      
 
 3Years  4Years 
Variables Treated Control Difference  Treated Control Difference 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 



















































































































































        
No. of jurisdictions 29 54   24 54  
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Table 5. Effect of reassessment lag: Fixed effect and control function estimates, Virginia  
 Fixed effects  Control function  
DV: -ln(COD) (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 -0.030*** -0.097*  -0.051*** -0.144* -0.028 -0.105 
 (0.004) (0.050)  (0.015) (0.078) (0.018) (0.076) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒2𝑙𝑙  0.037    -0.050* -0.031 
  (0.055)    (0.026) (0.037) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒3𝑙𝑙  0.088    0.017 0.007 
  (0.056)    (0.029) (0.037) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒4𝑙𝑙  0.066    -0.040** -0.041* 
  (0.050)    (0.019) (0.021) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒5𝑙𝑙  0.082    0.014 0.018 
  (0.051)    (0.015) (0.017) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒6𝑙𝑙  0.067    -0.014 -0.018 
  (0.050)    (0.053) (0.068) 
        
Exogenous regressors    𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� ,𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀�  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� ,𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼�  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� ,𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀�  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� ,𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼�  
Year f.e. Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Jurisdiction f.e. Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
        
Observations 1,862 1,862  1,063 1,049 1,063 1,049 
R-squared 0.813 0.814  0.890 0.889 0.895 0.890 
        
Note: N=1,862 with a sample of 133 unique municipalities for fixed effect models. N=1,063 with 79 unique 
counties and independent cities for models using 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷�  and 𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀�  as exogenous determinants of reassessment frequency in 
the control function models.  N=1,049 with 78 counties and independent cities where  𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼�  is used as a key exogenous 
determinant of reassessment frequency. 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 indicates years since last reassessment. The covariates include share of 
female, hispanic, black and non-hispanic white popualtion, share of population between age 0 and 9, population 
share of senior citizens, intergovernmental grant's share of total revenue, share of property tax revenue out of total 
revenue, population, number of property tax appeals, unemployment rate, number of total parcels, median 
assessment ratio, fulltime employment status of property assessor, indicator of contract-out of reappraisal service, 
indicator of physical inspection, % of commercial properties, % of industrial properties, total MV per parcel.  
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Table 6. Effect of reassessment lag: 2SLS estimates, Virginia 
        
DV: −ln (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 -0.023** -0.019 -0.022* -0.018 -0.023** -0.021* -0.022* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒2𝑙𝑙 -0.104*** -0.095** -0.108*** -0.098** -0.104*** -0.098** -0.096** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒3𝑙𝑙 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.006 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒4𝑙𝑙 -0.034** -0.034** -0.035** -0.034** -0.033** -0.033** -0.032** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒5𝑙𝑙 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.022 0.024 0.023 0.023 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒6𝑙𝑙        
        
Excluded IV 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼�  𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀�  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼�  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀�  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� ,𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼�  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� ,𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀�  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼,𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀�  
Year f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Jurisdiction f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
        
1st stage Fstat 29.741 30.789 25.470 26.363 25.495 22.489 22.520 
Hansen J 0.1156 0.1983 0.1238 0.1847 0.1731 0.2960 0.2938 
        
Observations 1,049 1,063 1,049 1,063 1,049 1,049 1,049 
        
 
Note: N=1,063 with 79 unique counties and independent cities for models using 𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀�  instead of 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼�  (where N=1,049 with 78 
unique counties and independent cities) as instrument for reassessment frequency. Robust standard errors clustered at county/city 







 Table 7. Fixed effect and control function estimates: New York (all cycles) 
 OLS  Control function  IV 
DV: −ln (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷) (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 -0.002 -0.003  0.012*** 0.011**   0.077** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.005)   (0.035) 
𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 -0.000 0.000  -0.016*** -0.014**  -0.040* -0.047** 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.022) (0.022) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒2𝑙𝑙  0.003   0.009  0.282** 0.534** 
  (0.042)   (0.043)  (0.144) (0.222) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒3𝑙𝑙  0.073***   0.078***  0.202*** 0.127* 
  (0.018)   (0.018)  (0.068) (0.065) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒4𝑙𝑙  -0.020*   -0.019*  0.151** -0.004 
  (0.011)   (0.011)  (0.062) (0.039) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒5𝑙𝑙  -0.007   -0.007  0.129* 0.029 
  (0.013)   (0.013)  (0.068) (0.039) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 6𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙  0.001   0.005  0.101* 0.033 
  (0.011)   (0.011)  (0.054) (0.034) 
         
Year f.e. Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Jurisdiction f.e. Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
         
1st stage Fstat       5.787 5.591 
Hansen J        0.555 0.8020 
Observations 10,799 10,799  10,799 10,799  10,755 10,755 
         
Note: N=10,755 with 864 unique municipalities. Endogenous variables that are instrumented include years since 
last reassessment, Cycle, interaction between dummy of each cycle and years since last reassessment, State aid for 































Note: N=6,967. The sample used in this analysis uses 658 unique municipalities that conducted reassessment at 
least every 15 years or more frequently.  Endogenous variables instrumented: Years since last reassessment, cycle, 
interaction between dummy of each cycle and years since last reassessment, State aid for reassessment, 
Assessment ratio or level of assessment. (Added instrument: neighbors' mean frequency) 
  
 OLS  Control function  IV 
DV: −ln (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷) (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 -0.007* -0.008*  -0.008** -0.009*   0.011 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.005)   (0.023) 
𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 (0.001)    0.002  0.034 0.030  0.005 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.023) (0.023)  (0.020) (0.020) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒2𝑙𝑙  0.009   0.009  0.100 0.156 
  (0.041)   (0.043)  (0.262) (0.248) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒3𝑙𝑙  0.076***   0.077***  0.013 0.027 
  (0.018)   (0.019)  (0.096) (0.081) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒4𝑙𝑙  -0.017   -0.020*  -0.055 -0.047 
  (0.012)   (0.012)  (0.071) (0.054) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒5𝑙𝑙  -0.009   -0.012  -0.035 -0.025 
  (0.013)   (0.014)  (0.066) (0.050) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 6𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙  -0.003   -0.002  -0.003 0.005 
  (0.012)   (0.012)  (0.059) (0.042) 
         
Year f.e. Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Jurisdiction f.e. Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
         
1st stage Fstat       4.647 6.010 
Hansen J        0.8012 0.5173 
Observations 6,967 6,967  6,967 6,967  6,890 6,890 
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Note: N=1,862 with a sample of 133 unique municipalities for fixed effect models. N=1,063 with 79 unique 
counties and independent cities for models using 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷�  and 𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀�  as exogenous determinants of reassessment frequency 
in the control function models.  N=1,049 with 78 unique counties and independent cities where  𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼�  is used as a key 
exogenous determinant of reassessment frequency.  Constant for model (1) is 5.2%.
 OLS  Control function 
DV: ETR (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 -0.027  0.021* 0.001 0.026* 0.001 
 (0.022)  (0.012) (0.036) (0.015) (0.036) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒2𝑙𝑙 0.014    0.004 -0.021 
 (0.023)    (0.006) (0.043) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒3𝑙𝑙 0.016    0.004 -0.025 
 (0.026)    (0.007) (0.045) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒4𝑙𝑙 0.029    0.004 -0.007 
 (0.022)    (0.007) (0.043) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒5𝑙𝑙 0.024    -0.002 -0.016 
 (0.022)    (0.009) (0.044) 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒6𝑙𝑙 0.023    0.002 -0.014 
 (0.022)    (0.010) (0.044) 
       
Exogenous   𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� ,𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀�  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� ,𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼�  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� ,𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀�  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� ,𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼�  
Year f.e. Y  Y Y Y Y 
Jurisdiction f.e. Y  Y Y Y Y 
       
Observations 1,862  1,049 1,053 1,063 1,053 
R-squared 0.906  0.914 0.913 0.914 0.913 
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Table 10. Event Study: NY jurisdictions that ever conducted annual reassessments  
      













DV: −ln (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷)  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
𝐷𝐷−5 -0.018 0.024  0.128 0.095 
 (0.106) (0.094)  (0.227) (0.244) 
𝐷𝐷−4 -0.106 -0.091  0.224 0.102 
 (0.101) (0.072)  (0.186) (0.189) 
𝐷𝐷−3 0.036 0.099  0.054 0.041 
 (0.117) (0.102)  (0.161) (0.162) 
𝐷𝐷−2 0.000 0.047  0.074 0.027 
 (0.142) (0.111)  (0.182) (0.183) 
𝐷𝐷0 0.120 0.259  -0.315 -0.482 
 (0.118) (0.266)  (0.278) (0.345) 
𝐷𝐷1 -0.135 -0.051  0.101 0.228 
 (0.250) (0.270)  (0.315) (0.357) 
𝐷𝐷2 0.256 0.426***  0.273 0.273 
 (0.162) (0.150)  (0.390) (0.375) 
𝐷𝐷3 0.027 0.113  0.696** 0.674** 
 (0.366) (0.346)  (0.277) (0.289) 
𝐷𝐷4 -0.018 0.024  -0.081 -0.144 
  (0.106) (0.094)  (0.164) (0.195) 
      
𝐷𝐷 0.068 0.034  -0.008 0.045 
 (0.112) (0.115)  (0.152) (0.149) 
      
Observations 445  427 
      
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parentheses. The treated 
units are assessing jurisdictions in NY that conducted annual reassessment for three to 
four consecutive years between 2003 and 2008, while the comparison group is 
consisted of NY assessing jurisdictions that did not started annual reassessment only 









Figure 1. Trend in reassessment and aid receipt: New York 
 
 





Figure 3. Stylized facts: Distribution of reassessment lag among tax assessing jurisdictions in Virginia 
 
Panel A. All tax assessing jurisdictions  
  






















Figure 5. Event study estimates (Four consecutive years of reassessment) 
 
Panel A. COD of three residential sub-classes 
 
 






Table A1. Seven plus consecutive annual reassessment: No comparison group  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Start Annual COD3 COD1 ETR Nominal tax rate 
     
𝐷𝐷−4 -0.118 -0.228 0.760 7.794 
 (0.162) (0.206) (2.058) (15.625) 
𝐷𝐷−3 -0.073 -0.141 2.995 10.793 
 (0.202) (0.215) (2.694) (15.724) 
𝐷𝐷−2 -0.051 -0.051 0.136 2.570 
 (0.168) (0.163) (2.096) (1.638) 
𝐷𝐷0 0.290** 0.185** -0.428 0.458* 
 (0.114) (0.089) (1.225) (0.238) 
𝐷𝐷1 0.210 0.075 2.187 0.550** 
 (0.166) (0.153) (3.100) (0.251) 
𝐷𝐷2 0.392** 0.281 -1.995 0.590** 
 (0.199) (0.221) (2.178) (0.270) 
𝐷𝐷3 0.417* 0.352* -1.051 0.610** 
 (0.224) (0.185) (1.588) (0.293) 
𝐷𝐷4 0.513** 0.427 -2.026 0.674* 
 (0.238) (0.272) (2.646) (0.398) 
𝐷𝐷5 0.122 0.135 -1.380 0.432 
 (0.458) (0.407) (2.094) (0.274) 
     
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 0.030 0.051 1.146 -3.564 
 (0.088) (0.087) (1.695) (2.412) 
     
R-squared 0.517 0.522 0.239 0.901 














Table A2. Triennial reassessment (at least two cycles): No comparison group  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Start Annual COD3 COD1 ETR Nominal tax rate 
     
𝐷𝐷−4 -0.104 -0.095 -0.000 0.341** 
 (0.067) (0.087) (0.001) (0.167) 
𝐷𝐷−3 -0.045 -0.029 0.001 0.118 
 (0.146) (0.116) (0.001) (0.231) 
𝐷𝐷−2 -0.040 0.006 -0.001 -0.044 
 (0.139) (0.161) (0.001) (0.148) 
𝐷𝐷0 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.100 
 (0.048) (0.055) (0.001) (0.121) 
𝐷𝐷1 0.146 0.171* 0.002*** 0.265** 
 (0.153) (0.104) (0.000) (0.107) 
𝐷𝐷2 0.017 -0.020 0.001 0.040 
 (0.157) (0.137) (0.001) (0.122) 
𝐷𝐷3 0.121 0.197** 0.002 -0.159 
 (0.133) (0.089) (0.006) (0.144) 
𝐷𝐷4 -0.282*** -0.270*** -0.000 -0.273 
 (0.030) (0.053) (0.004) (0.166) 
𝐷𝐷5 -0.043 -0.029 -0.003 -0.137 
 (0.121) (0.130) (0.003) (0.263) 
𝐷𝐷6 -0.104 -0.095 -0.000 0.341** 
 (0.067) (0.087) (0.001) (0.167) 
     
R-squared 0.402 0.406 0.927 0.950 
 
Note: N=4,683 Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
YUSUN KIM
426 Eggers Hall Syracuse University, Syracuse NY 13204
Phone: (315) · 708 · 5716 Email: ykim79@syr.edu
EDUCATION
Maxwell School, Syracuse University
Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Public Administration (2019, expected)
Dissertation: Three Essays on Property Tax Administration
Committee Members: Drs.Yilin Hou (Advisor), John Yinger, Sarah Hamersma, Michah Rothbart,
Michael Wasylenko
Seoul National University, South Korea
M.A. Public Administration, Highest Honors, 2013
Korea University, South Korea
B.A. Economics, 2011
RESEARCH INTERESTS
Public Financial Management, State and Local Finance, Property Tax
Health Policy, Public Health Insurance, Medicaid
PUBLICATIONS
Hamersma, S., Hou, Y., Kim, Y., & Wolf, D. (2018). Business Cycles, Medicaid Generosity, and Birth
Outcomes. Population Research and Policy Review, 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11113-018-9483-3
Kwon, H.J., Cook, S. & Kim, Y. (2015). Shaping the national social protection strategy in Cambodia:
Global influence and National ownership. Global Social Policy, 15(2), 125-145.
RESEARCH IN PROGRESS
‘How Reduction in Mandated Medicaid Spending Affects Local Fiscal Behaviors: Evidence from New
York’
‘Estimating Returns to Scale in Property Assessment: Coordination among Property Assessment
Jurisdictions in New York’(with Yilin Hou & John Yinger)
‘Impact of Property Assessment Frequency on Assessment Uniformity in New York and Virginia’(with
Yilin Hou)
‘How Do Local Governments Respond to State Aid Eligibility Requirement: Evidence from Tax
Assessing Jurisdictions in New York’
‘Medicaid Local Mandate and Local Fiscal Behaviors’(With Pengju Zhang)
‘Impact of Budget Stabilization Fund on Public Employment’(with Yilin Hou)
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
Yilin Hou & Yusun Kim, ‘Reassessment Cycle and Equity in Property Tax’ at the American Society
for Public Administrtion, D.C., March, 2019.
Yusun Kim, ‘How Reduction in State Mandated Medicaid Spending Affect County Fiscal Behav-
iors: A Study of New York Counties’ at the Association for Budgeting and Financial Management
Conference, D.C., October, 2018.
Yilin Hou & Yusun Kim, ‘State Aid, Regular Property Reassessment, and Assessment Outcomes:
Evidence from New York State’ at the Association for Budgeting and Financial Management Confer-
ence, D.C., October, 2018.
Yusun Kim, ‘State Mandate Relief and Local Property Tax Cut: How Reduction in New York Man-
dated Medicaid Spending Impacts County Fiscal Behaviors’ at the Western Social Science Conference,
San Antonio, April, 2018.
Sarah Hamersma, Yilin Hou,Yusun Kim & Doug Wolf, ‘Medicaid and Birth Outcomes over the
Business Cycle’ at the Midwest Economic Association meetings, Evanston, March, 2016
Yilin Hou & Yusun Kim, ‘Tracing the Impact of Countercyclical Fiscal Policy on Employment’ at
the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Conference, D.C., November, 2016.
Yilin Hou & Yusun Kim, ‘State Fiscal Reserves and Employment Stabilization: Empirical Tests’ at
the Association for Budgeting and Financial Management Conference, D.C., October, 2015.
Huckju Kwon, Yusun Kim & Sarah Cook, ‘Shaping the National Social Protection Strategy in
Cambodia: Global Influence and National Ownership of a Policy’ at the Social Policy Association,
Seoul, July, 2014.
Lai, Ngan-yin Lai & Yusun Kim, ‘Extending Health Protection to the Informal Economy and the
Poor: A Comparative Analysis of Thailand and Indonesia’, at the International Labor Office (ILO)
Annual Conference on Regulating for Decent Work, Geneva, July, 2011
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Teaching Assistant for MPA Health Economics and Policy Spring 2019
Teaching Assistant for MPA Quantitative Methods II Spring 2019
(Led review sessions for assignments and exams)
Teaching Assistant for MPA Quantitative Methods II Spring 2018
(Led exam review sessions for two sections)
Co-instructor for STATA Course, Six-week course Spring 2018
(Prepared course materials and taught the course for three weeks)
Teaching Assistant for Public Budgeting, Summer Session #2 Summer 2015-2017
(Led review sessions for assignments and exams)
Teaching Assistant for Economics for Policy Decision Making Fall 2016
(Lectured a session on public goods and led review sessions for exams, Evaluation 4.68/5)
Co-instructor for Excel Course, Six-week course Fall 2016
(Designed and taught the course for three weeks)
Teaching Assistant for Public Budgeting Fall 2016
(Lectured two sessions on cost analysis and led review sessions)
Instructor for a one-day Executive MPA Math Camp Fall 2015
(Prepared course materials and lectured as the main instructor)
OTHER WORK EXPERIENCE
Graduate Research Associate, Center for Policy Research, Syracuse University 2014-2019
Research Assistant, Economic Budget Analysis Division,
National Assembly Budget Office, Korea 2013-2014
RESEARCH AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS
Best Graduate Paper Honorable Mention Award, Western Social Science Association 2018
Summer Research Award, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University 2014 - 2018
Graduate Associate Award, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University 2014 - 2018
Department Travel Grant, Syracuse University 2014-2018
Highest Honors in Masters of Public Administration, Seoul National University 2013
LANGUAGES & TECHNICAL STRENGTHS
Languages English(Fluent), Korean(Native), Mandarin(HSK6)
Data analysis and skills ArcGIS, LATEX, Stata, SAS, SPSS
REFERENCES
Yilin Hou Johnny Yinger Sarah Hamersma
(Advisor) (Committee Member) (Committee Member)
Professor Trustee Professor Associate Professor
Public Administration Economics & PA Public Administration
Syracuse University Syracuse University Syracuse University
(315)443-9072 (315) 443-9062 (315) 443-5455
yihou@maxwell.syr.edu jyinger@maxwell.syr.edu sehamers@maxwell.syr.edu
